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ABSTRACT 
 
 
While in several jurisdictions corporate criminal liability is accepted, in Brazil the 
maxim still prevails that corporations cannot commit crimes. In common law 
countries the attribution of criminal liability to corporations was developed more than 
a century ago, and the concept of corporate criminal liability has been extensively 
discussed.  This work is an attempt to look into the common law experience and to 
offer a plausible basis for the introduction of corporate criminal liability in Brazil.  
The research is essentially theoretical; it is mostly based on relevant literature from 
Britain, Canada and United States, three exponents of common law jurisdictions, and 
on relevant literature from Brazil. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A generous and elevated mind is distinguished by nothing more certainly 
than an eminent degree of curiosity; nor is that curiosity ever more 
agreeably or usefully employed, than in examining the laws and customs of 
foreign nations. (Samuel Johnson).1  
Large-scale corporations are the main defining force on the globe.2 They are 
everywhere, in almost every aspect of our lives. Parallel to this subtle and 
sometimes not so subtle dominance, corporations have become dangerous 
criminals as well. However, because they are a special kind of entity- non-human 
entities - their criminal behaviour is also out of the ordinary. Corporate 
criminality “challenges or nags at our sense of reality.”3 It is this characteristic 
that makes corporate crime a problematic issue. Contemporary western law, 
especially criminal law, has its roots in individualistic principles, in both civil law 
and common law jurisdictions. The criminal law as an institution in most legal 
systems has excluded full consideration of collectives. The question thus arises: 
How should we to put a stop to corporate criminality, and, more particularly, how 
could we use such individualistic legal system to put a stop to them?  
Different legal systems have reacted to the problem of corporate crime in their 
own way. While common law countries have tried to deal with corporate crime 
over the past century, in some countries affiliated to civil law, especially in 
 
1George Birbeckl Hill & Lawrence Fitzroy Powell, , eds., Boswell’s Life of Johnson I (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1934) at 89.  
2 The object of the thesis is large-scale corporations which will be referred to as  “corporations.” 
3 Joseph Vining, “Corporate Crime and the Religious Sensibility” (2003) 3 Punishment & Society 313 
at 315. 
  
 
                                                
Brazil, the maxim that corporations do not commit crime has prevailed. The 
endorsement of criminal liability of corporations has largely been a twentieth 
century judicial development, influenced by the “sweeping expansion”4 of 
common law principles. Civil law countries were, and to some extent still are, 
reticent to embrace the idea of corporate criminal liability. Nowadays, some 
common law and civil law jurisdictions share the same position, but there are 
communities of scholars such as those of Brazil who remain unconvinced.  
The goal of this work is to furnish a plausible set of arguments for the institution 
of corporate criminal liability in Brazil from a comparative perspective. This set 
of arguments will be drawn as a result from a critical assessment of different 
approaches to corporate criminal liability that have been used by common law 
countries.     The relevant literature in Canada, Britain and US on corporate 
criminal liability, moral philosophy and organization theory grounds the approach 
taken in this thesis. Parallel to that, it is also a general goal of the present work to 
contribute to a more cogent framework of corporate criminal liability in Brazil. 
Questions related to the efficiency of criminal liability, moral agency, and the 
ability of corporations to act and have mens rea, which are the pillars of a theory 
of criminal liability, will be examined. The purpose is to offer a more 
comprehensive approach to the problem of corporate criminal liability in Brazil. 
An interdisciplinary examination of corporations and corporate behaviour will 
enrich the study of corporate criminal liability. This will be the starting point of a 
 
4 Harvey L. Pitt, and Karl A Groskaufmanis., “Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A 
second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct” (1990) 78 The Georgetown Law Journal 1560 at 1560. 
  
 
                                                
more solid approach. Holistic theories will be critically assessed in order to 
discern to what extent they could or could not be imported into the Brazilian legal 
system.5 My hope is that this thesis will contribute to clarity on the issue of 
corporate criminal liability for Brazilians or at least that it will no longer be 
considered as “the less familiar and more esoteric area of the law of criminal 
liability.” 6  
This research will focus on large-scale corporations and the formation of the 
mental element in these types of corporations. The attribution of criminal liability 
for small corporations does not appear to be as complex as the attribution of such 
liability to large corporations. Given the size and the reduced number of 
employees, traditional models of criminal liability can be applied to small 
corporations whereas large corporations do not fit these models. Moreover, the 
proportion of the damage caused by large corporations surpasses the harm caused 
by closely held companies.  
Chapter One will rely on legal history to explain the origins of the concept of 
corporate criminal liability and its evolution until the contemporary era. The goal 
of this chapter is to show that the individualistic maxim that corporations do not 
commit crime is not an absolute principle but simply a social creation.  Law has 
been constantly manipulated and principles of criminal liability are no exception 
to that. The history of criminal liability shows that collective punishment and 
 
5 The materials used in the present research are current until November of 2004.   
6 Eliezer Lederman, “Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex Triangle” 
(1985) 76 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 285 at 294.  
  
 
punishment of non-human entities were culturally accepted, and it was only after 
the predominance of the ideals of the Enlightenment that the individual became 
the only agent able to be held criminally liable. The historical analysis reinforces 
the notion that legal systems can and should create legal institutes to serve social 
needs. The acceptance of corporate criminal liability is one of these needs.  
Chapter Two is an analysis of the Brazilian reality, i.e, how the Brazilian legal 
system has faced the problem of corporate criminality. The institution of 
corporate criminal liability is still considered by the majority of Brazilian scholars 
as incompatible with the principle that only individuals can be criminal agents. 
Parallel to that, the advance of the minimal penal law movement has been a strong 
force against the attribution of corporate criminal liability. In spite of that, there 
has been some effort from those advocating the doctrine and from the legislature 
to familiarize the Brazilian legal system with the attribution of corporate criminal 
liability.  For example, the law of environmental crimes can be considered an 
advance in this area. This innovation is far from being a stamp of approval of 
corporate criminal liability but it is undoubtedly a sign that there is space in the 
Brazilian legal system for the growth of ideas of corporate criminal liability.  
Chapter Three is a general overview of some important issues related to corporate 
criminal liability that make the case for the attribution of criminal liability to 
corporations in Brazil. A conceptualization of corporate crime, its cost and 
seriousness will clarify the image of corporate crime for the Brazilian public. 
  
 
Chapter Four is an attempt to justify why criminal liability is needed and whether 
it can be used as an effective controlling device. The main justification to use 
criminal law against corporations is corporate power. Powerful institutions need 
to be resisted with power. Criminal law happens to carry this power, although the 
imbalance is obvious. It is usually argued that civil sanctions could serve the same 
purpose of criminal law in the case of corporate crime, but it is the very essence 
of criminal law that can be the antidote against corporate misconduct. The stigma 
attached to criminal sanctions has a powerful deterrent effect on others and on the 
criminal agent. Another objection to the use of criminal law is related to the 
proper rationale of punishing corporations. It is commonly argued that criminal 
law achieves utilitarian ends at best, and indeed the traditional idea of 
retributivism seems to have no place in the punishment of corporations. However, 
a more modern approach to the retributive theory will make it evident that 
retributivism can also be a rationale for punishing corporations. A third objection 
that is usually raised against the use of criminal sanctions with corporations is that 
fines do not deter corporate misbehaviour and can affect third parties, such as 
employees and consumers. Whereas the use of the fine is questionable as the 
ultimate sanction against corporations, there are other alternative sanctions that 
can be effectively applied. The objective of this chapter is to show that the use of 
criminal law is not only possible, but also, desirable. 
Chapter Five is a critical analysis of the traditional common law theories of 
corporate criminal liability, agency theory, identification doctrine and aggregation 
  
 
                                                
theory. These models of attributing corporate criminal liability were pioneers but 
have been strongly criticized for their inefficiency. An examination of these 
theories can offer a salutary view of the concept of corporate criminal liability for 
the Brazilian legal system, as it can serve as an inspiration for what needs to be 
done and what needs to be avoided.  
In Chapter Six, a variety of understandings about corporations, their life and 
existence will be examined. One of the main problems of traditional models of 
corporate criminal liability is the lack of theoretical investigation. A more 
complete portrayal of corporations will give the theoretical basis for a more 
workable approach to corporate criminal liability. This portrayal will only be 
possible by looking at corporations through different eyes.  
As Monks and Minow note,  
Through the centuries, corporate power has been the focus of a great deal of 
scholarship and debate, but each of the professions has described the 
phenomenon in its own language. Lawyers, economists, financial analysts, 
political scientists, ethicists, and managerialists are like the builders of the 
Tower of Babel, all working toward the same goal but unable to 
communicate because they speak different languages.7  
 
 
The goal is to understand these different “languages” and create a new meaning of 
corporate criminal liability. From the analysis of the nature of corporations, 
organizational theory will help to show that a corporation is more than the sum of 
 
7 Robert A. Monks & Nell Minow, Power and Accountability (United States: Harper Business, 1991) 
at 13.  
 
  
 
its parts; it is a real entity with characteristics of its own that are not derivable 
through simplistic exercises.  
Chapter Seven will investigate whether a corporation is a moral person and, what 
would allow them to be subjects of criminal liability. The answers we accept, 
even if only tentatively, are important because our notions about the nature of 
corporations and their ability to be moral agents will shape our positions on 
crucial questions relating to the criminal liability of corporations. 
In Chapter Eight, the analysis will focus on the traditional elements of criminal 
liability. Some elements are required for the attribution of criminal liability: the 
ability to act, to have intentions and to be a moral agent. The attribution of 
criminal liability to corporations for mens rea crimes is predicated upon the 
presence of these elements. Instead of neglecting some elements and proposing a 
model of corporate criminal liability under different requirements, I will argue 
that all these elements can be found in the corporate entity. It is critical to a 
plausible approach to corporate criminal liability that the mental element of the 
misconduct is found in the corporation itself and not in its individual members. 
The proper place to find corporate intention is within the corporate culture. The 
objective is to better understand what corporate culture is and why it is 
appropriate to ascribe liability based on the culture of the corporation.  
In Chapter Nine, the alternative holistic models of corporate criminal liability will 
be assessed. To what extent an effective approach is found in these theories, 
  
 
including their shortcomings and which one appears to be more appropriate to 
deal with corporate criminal liability. Legal scholars such as Brent Fisse, John 
Braithwaite, Peter French, Pamela Bucy, William Laufer and others have 
contributed to a new and promising paradigm of corporate criminal liability. This 
new perspective is the fruit of a holistic approach to studies of organizations and 
of the idea of corporate culture.  
This work does not attempt to utter the final word on corporate criminal liability 
for the Brazilian legal system, but to get a better picture of corporations and 
whatever advances that such a picture can provide. A more plausible model does 
not intend to be a view, but a window.  It is through this window that Brazil can 
start to examine corporate criminality. Most importantly, this work is an attempt 
to weaken the myth that criminal law cannot be used against corporations. For 
that to be effective, the present proposal goes beyond the limits of legal analysis 
in a Brazilian context. 
  
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ATTRIBUTION OF 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO CORPORATIONS 
 
 
Introduction  
Theories of corporate criminal liability and their associated investigations are 
relatively new, having been in existence for about two centuries. However, the 
ascription of criminal liability to collective entities had existed before any theory 
took shape.  Since ancient times, collectivities have been held criminally liable for 
their behaviour. The historical background of the criminal liability of corporations 
has its genesis in the ascription of criminal liability to other antecedent collective 
entities such as clans, tribes, cities, churches, old enterprises and other groups. 
The attribution of criminal liability to groups had coexisted with individual 
liability for a long time, yet this started to shift and legal institutions became more 
and more centred in the individual; criminal liability was no exception to this 
trend.  
Since the advent of liberal ideas, legal thought, and especially criminal law has 
been dominated by individualistic values. This process of humanization of 
criminal institutions was a determinant in the positions taken by different legal 
systems regarding the criminal liability of corporations. On the other hand, 
theories of corporate criminal liability have been created in common law 
countries in such a context, influenced and shaped by individualism. Although 
  
 
                                                
these theories have represented an important step in the field of corporate criminal 
liability, the inherited individualism has been its major weakness. As Christopher 
Stone emphasizes, “[i]t is not an oversimplification to claim that the problems we 
face in controlling corporations today have their roots in legal history.” 8An 
inclusive overview of criminal accountability of corporations requires a concise 
analysis of the matter over time. In this chapter, the evolution of corporate 
criminal liability since ancient times until today will be outlined. 
1.1. Ancient law 
The ascription of criminal liability to groups is not the fruit of modern society, as 
it is usually assumed. In ancient society, the rule was the ascription of collective 
liability.  Ancient society was not conceived as a collection of individuals but 
rather as an aggregation of families.9  This peculiarity made all the difference and 
framed the law of that time.  Law was adjusted to a system of small independent 
groups which were the clans or families.10 Responsibility of all kinds was 
attributed taking into account this reality. The conduct of each member of the 
society was viewed as the conduct of the society as a whole.  
[T]he moral elevation and moral debasement of the individual appear to be 
confounded with, or postponed to, the merits and offences of the group to 
which the individual belongs. If the community sins, its guilt is much more 
than the sum of the offences committed by its members.11  
 
8 Christopher D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1975) at 1. 
9 Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, 10 th ed. (London: John Murray, 1930), at 143. 
10 Ibid at 142. 
11 Ibid at 143. 
  
 
                                                
The wrongdoing was a sign that the harmony within a community, or clan, had 
broken down and the group was uncontrolled. As a result, the clan had the duty of 
maintaining the control and harmony and to impeding such rupture. The clan was 
responsible for the conduct of each of its members. The harm caused by a person 
was attached to the clan the person belonged to and not to the person herself.12  
1.2.Roman law 
In opposition to ancient law, Roman law reflected the value of individualism 
over collectivism. From the 4th and 3rd centuries BC, ancient Roman society 
witnessed a movement of internal disintegration; social groups, such as the 
gentes13 and families, were breaking down. It was a period of individual 
emancipation.  It is, therefore, not surprising that the scholars of that time held 
an individualistic view of society. However, the earliest forms of corporations 
were arising, and the law could not simply close its eyes to this fact. The 
solution found by Roman Scholars to conciliate its individualist roots to the 
existence of such corporate bodies was to regulate these entities without 
matching them up with individuals.  
The earliest forms of corporations were merely civil organizations, associations of 
individuals.14 The functions of these earlier organizations were different from the 
 
12 F. McAuley, & J. P. McCutcheon, Criminal Liability (Dublin: Round Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 
273. 
13 communities [translated by author] 
14 These associations included: municipalities (civitas, municipium, respublica, communitas), colleges 
of priests and vestal virgins, corporations of subordinate officials such as lectors and notaries (scribae, 
decuriae), industrial guilds such as smiths, bakers, potters, mining companies (aurifodinarum, 
  
 
                                                                                                                                          
functions of today’s corporations; they were essentially passive devices to hold 
property, sometimes real estate and sometimes special privileges.15In order to 
regulate these social actors that were becoming more and more part of the society, 
Roman scholars created the concept of “juristic persons.”These collectivities were 
considered juristic persons, so they were invested with rights of property; 
however, because they were mere fictions or ideal unities, they were incapable of 
making a disposition (declaration of intention). They could not have intention and 
consequently could not commit crimes. 
The individualistic view of Roman law did not impede Roman Glossators of 
attributing liability to collective entities.  Romans did not develop a theory of 
collectivities or of the ability of groups to commit crimes, even though they 
considered the possibility of attributing criminal liability to a collective entity 
such as the city. According to Ulmann,  
[T]hey [Roman Glossators] were bold enough to proclaim the 
corporate criminal liability, without however attempting to justify it on 
the strength of the sources available.16  
In effect, the maxim societas delinquere non potest, which reflects the view that 
corporations do not have the capacity to act nor to be guilty, did not prevail in 
Roman law. Roman law instituted rules that precisely dealt with the rights, 
 
agentifodinarum, salinarum, societas), revenue contractors (vectigalium publicorum societas), social 
clubs (sodalitates, sodalitia), and friendly societies (tenuiorum colegia) [translated by author]. 
15 See Stone, supra note 1 at 11. 
16W. Ulmann,.“The Delictual Responsibility of Medieval Corporations” (1978) 64 The Law Quarterly 
Review 77 at 78. 
  
 
                                                
obligations, accountability, infractions and punishments applicable to ciutates. 17 
For example, it was possible to prosecute the municipium as the personification of 
the group of its citizens. 18   
1.3. Medieval law 
By the end of Roman Empire, the Church had became a powerful and influential 
institution. It was in the Church and not in the State that the device of legal 
personality was first used as an instrument of political policy.19 The medieval 
society was not firmly established but had a richer structure with an abundance of 
ordered groups such as cities, villages, ecclesiastical bodies, universities, and 
within them faculties and colleges. A theory was needed to meet these 
institutions. Pope Innocent IV, who taught that the foundation of faculties and 
colleges was fiction, established this theory. In 1245 he introduced the principle 
that corporate bodies were a fiction. He “was the father of the dogma of the purely 
fictitious and intellectual character of juridical persons.”20 This theory embraced 
the notion that “the corporate body is not in reality a person, but is made a person 
 
17  ciutates – collectivities, entities, cities [translated by author]. 
18 Aquiles Mestre, Les personnes morales et le probleme de leur responsabilite penale,  quoted in  
Fausto Martins de Sanctis,Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Juridica ( Sao Paulo: Saraiva, 1999), at 
26. 
19 Leicester C Webb, ed., Legal Personality and Political Pluralism (Victoria: Melbourne University 
Press, 1958) at v. 
20 Gierke, 3 Das deutches Genossenschaftrecht at 279-285, cited in J. Dewey, ‘The Historic 
Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 655 at 665. 
  
 
                                                
by fiction of the law”21 or in the case of some ecclesiastical body, by divine 
power. 
Le pape Innocent IV pose le principe, par une decrétale rendue au premier 
concile de Lyon en 1245, qu’une universitas22 ne eut pas être excommuniée, 
car c`est un être amoral, sans âme et qui ne fait pas partie de l`Eglise. Il ira 
jusqu`à dire que la personne morale n`existe pas en réalité et ne constitue 
qu`une fiction.23
The development of this theory was a successful attempt by the medieval Church to 
bring some order into the groups under its jurisdiction and to establish the supreme 
authority of the papacy.24 It appears that the doctrine that corporate bodies were 
persona fictae was intended for ecclesiastic collegium,25 universitas or capitulum,26 
which could not be excommunicated, or be guilty of a delict because they had neither 
a body nor a will. With the presumption that corporate bodies were personae fictae 
the ecclesiastic bodies were placed in such a privileged and protective position.27 
Even the recognition of ecclesiastic bodies as moral persons was different from other 
groups. The ecclesiastic bodies had the status of juridical persons by divine 
 
21 W.M Geldart, “Legal Personality” (1911) 27 The Law Quarterly Review 90 at 92. 
22 universitas in this case means corporate body, community [translated by author]. 
23M. Lizée, “De la capacité organique et des responsabilités délictuelle et pénale des personnes 
morales” (1995) 41 McGill Law Journal 131 at 134 [Author’s translation: Pope Innocent established 
the principle by a decree pronounced at the first council of Lyon in 1245, in which the universitas did 
not have to be excommunicated, because it is an amoral being, without soul and it isn’t part of the 
Church. At this point it would be to say that the legal entity doesn’t exist in reality and it constitutes 
nothing more than a fiction]. 
24Webb supra note 16. 
25collegium can be understood as college/board (priests) [translated by author]. 
26 Capitulum in this case refer to a cathedral or other important religious building. [translated by 
author]. 
27 William H. Jarvis, “Corporate Criminal Liability: Legal Agnosticism” (1961) Western Law Review 
1 at 10. 
  
 
                                                
disposition. Therefore, to be recognized as juristic persons, other groups needed the 
approval of a competent authority, i.e., the recognition by the law.28   
However, practical need made the canonists accept the criminal liability of legal 
persons. After the 17th century, the Bologna Scholl began to stipulate sanctions to be 
imposed on communities. One of the provisions stipulated that a city that conceded 
asylum to criminals or that did not help to arrest criminals could be captured. The 
canonist at last accepted liability, but with certain conditions. The most important of 
these was that the community could not be responsible for the act of one individual 
alone; the community would be responsible only if the individual act was a 
consequence of the collective will, or it was a result of the will of the majority of the 
community members. 
As a result of the recognition of responsibility, some of the sanctions were adopted. 
The canonists adopted fines, rights restrictions and dissolution.  Apart from these 
sanctions, some spiritual sanctions were applicable to the individuals that were 
members of a group. These sanctions included interdiction of the sacraments and, if 
the individuals were ecclesiastic members, suspension of the exercise of religion and 
excommunication.     
 
28“ There are two moral persons that exist by divine institution. They are the Catholic Church; 
established on earth by Jesus Christ, true God, and the Apostolic See, established by the same divine 
authority. A moral person means a juridical entity, a subject of rights, distinct from all physical or 
natural persons. Such a person comes into being only when constituted by public authority” [T. L. 
Bouscaren & A. C. Ellis, Canon Law: A Text and Commentary (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing 
Company, 1957) at 86)].Can 115 § 1 - Juridical persons in the Church are either aggregates of persons 
or of things.Can 117 - No aggregate of persons or of things seeking juridical personality can acquire it 
unless its statutes are approved by the competent authority. (The Code of Canon Law in English 
Translation (London: Collins Liturgical Publications, 1983) at 19-20) 
 
 
  
 
                                                
In medieval English law, liability was imposed on the group instead of the person 
who had committed the wrongful act. The group was to be held responsible for the 
wrongdoing of one of its members, but it could avoid condemnation by capturing the 
individual wrongdoer and delivering him to the authorities.  
In France, as a heritage of the canon law, the criminal responsibility of corporations 
was admitted in France prior to the French Revolution. Before the Revolution it was 
accepted that the community had factual existence and groups could commit crimes 
and should be punished independently of the nature of the groups.29 In 1331, the City 
of Toulouse was condemned by the parliament to lose its rights of body and 
community, and had its patrimony confiscated. Losing the rights of body meant that 
Toulouse was not represented as an autonomous and concrete entity. It had no right to 
represent itself. Parallel to this, the denial of the right to be a community meant that it 
was not recognized as an independent community. Finally, by confiscating the 
property, the parliament was assuring that the city was not allowed to receive any 
advantage by the economical use of its patrimony. The same thing occurred with 
Bordeaux in 1558 and Montpellier in 1739.30  
The advent of the 1670 regulation created the fundamentals that guided the French 
criminal law. One of these fundamentals was the criminal liability of groups. The first 
provision of this regulation (Title XXI, article I) announced that the criminal 
 
29 This acceptance was not unanimous. According to Charondes, if the crimes were not committed 
through a common deliberation, there would not be any responsibility. Other authors said that because 
the fiction theory prevailed at that time, the liability was not admitted. [See De Sanctis supra note 12]. 
30 João Marcello Araújo Jr., “Societas Delinquere Potest – Revisão da Legislação Comparada e Estado 
Atual da Doutrina” in Luiz Flávio Gomes, Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Juridica e Medidas 
Provisórias e Direito Penal ( São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1999) 72 at 80. 
  
 
                                                
procedure could be used against cities, villages, bodies and companies that had 
committed any kind of rebellion, violence or other crime. The term “body” referred to 
schools, religious councils and convents. The term “companies” referred to lawyers 
and justice officials and prosecutors’ associations. In order to attribute responsibility 
to such collectivities, it was necessary that the conduct had been the fruit of the 
collective deliberation. Mestre31 claims that the mens rea element assumed special 
importance at this point. The action per se was not enough; the will of the group had 
to be present as an essential element of the crime. In addition, the doctrine of that 
epoch indicated that criminal responsibility of groups did not move away or diminish 
the responsibility of the individual. In this way, the main author and the compliers 
were not allowed to escape from personal liability. 
1.4. Modern French Law  
If in the field of criminal law there had been room for the coexistence of individual 
and corporate responsibility, in the 18th century the ideals brought by the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution extirpated the concept of corporate 
liability.  One of the core principles of the French Revolution was the humanization 
of the institutions; consequently criminal responsibility was to be restricted to 
individuals. Organizations were seen with hostility. The revolution did not favour a 
concept that interposed any intermediary group between the State and the individuals, 
for these groups represented a threat to the revolution. Collective bodies other than 
the State were considered a danger to the sovereignty of the State. More importantly, 
 
31 De Sanctis, supra note 12 at 29. 
  
 
                                                
the revolution needed money and believed it was crucial to liquidate any collective 
body, not only to confiscate its properties, but also to prevent its independence. 
These values forever changed the face of legal institutions, for the concept of criminal 
liability humanization meant the attribution of liability was directly linked to human 
capacities and moral elements such as intention. 32   
Laws had to account for certain capacities and rights of the 
individual human being. The natural capacities that were to 
prevail included reason, dignity, will, perfectibility, and 
freedom.33
Groups and all kinds of collectivities as unnatural persons were definitely excluded 
from the sphere of criminal law since they did not have the individual characteristics 
necessary to be responsible for their acts. This exclusion of groups from the domain 
of criminal law was considered a great advance in the doctrine of criminal liability.   
Nonetheless, the practice and theory of collective responsibility were so deep-rooted 
that even after the revolution some laws were promulgated consecrating this old 
habit.  A typical example is one French imperial law that established it was the 
responsibility of the state if a group of people were responsible for the death of an 
individual. In this case the state was obliged to compensate the family of the 
individual. 
 
32 Josè Hurtado Pozo, “Responsabilidad Penal de Las Personas Juridicas” (1996) Anuário de Derecho 
Penal – asociácion peruana de Derecho Penal (3 November 2003), online: Anuário de Derecho Penal 
<http://www.unifr.ch/derechopenal/anuario/96.html> 
33 Stone, supra note 2 at 8. 
  
 
                                                
The ideal brought about by the revolution influenced the Penal Code of 1810, which 
highlighted the principle of the individuality of punishment. In the same way, the 
Napoleonic legislation did not recognize any corporate responsibility. Other western 
countries underwent the same process of individualization of criminal law principles. 
Since then, the development of criminal science has taken this individualist 
conception, on which contemporary criminal law is grounded, for granted. 
1.5. Modern English law  
The early modern English law rejected the concept of collective or imputed guilt that 
was pervasive in medieval law. The principle of no-responsibility of legal persons 
prevailed. Only individuals who committed a harmful act with a guilty state of mind 
could be guilty of crimes. The Chief Justice of England confirmed this claim in 
170134 when he announced that corporations could not be charged with crimes, but 
rather the particular members of the corporations could be indicted.  
By the mid-nineteenth century, the common law rule started to shift and the ascription 
of criminal liability to juristic persons was becoming a reality. Initially, liability was 
restricted to nuisance. Later it was extended to nonfeasance, such as failure to repair 
roads or bridges. Some courts held, for example, that corporations that were obligated 
by their corporate charters to maintain public bridges or highways could be criminally 
charged if they failed to discharge their duties. In Regina v. Birmingham and 
 
34 Anonymous Case [1701] 12 Mod 559. 
  
 
                                                
Gloucester Railway, a company was indicted for disobeying an order of the Justices, 
directing it to remove a bridge that had been erected over a road. 35
Court decisions gradually started to challenge the practice of centuries.36 These 
decisions were the product of social and cultural changes brought about by the 
Industrial Revolution.  After the 19th century, industrial bodies were considered 
responsible for statutory crimes, and most of the possible condemnations were fines. 
In 1889, the British parliament introduced an imperative that the expression “person”, 
present in all legislative texts related to criminal infringement, should be interpreted 
as including both individuals and collective entities. Since then, the jurisprudence 
began to admit the criminal responsibility of these entities even for intentional acts.  
Two models of corporate liability emerged from the work of English courts: vicarious 
liability doctrine and the identification doctrine. These doctrines have been the 
dominant basis for ascribing corporate criminal liability since then. Although these 
doctrines challenged the position prevalent at the time they were developed, they 
have not represented a complete rupture with individualistic principles. 
 
35Regina v. Birmingham and Gloucester Railway (1842) 3 QB 223. 
36 L.H Leigh,The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (London: Lowe & Brydone, 1969) 
at 16. 
  
 
                                                
 
II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN BRAZIL 
 
Introduction 
For the Brazilian legal system, the axiom societas deliquere non potest is still 
revered. 37 Mainstream Brazilian legal thought strongly rejects the mere 
possibility of attributing criminal liability to juristic persons. Statutes, court 
decisions and the majority of legal scholars corroborate this position. 
However, some dissonant ideas are proving that, although the axiom has been 
considered sacred, it is not undisputed. For a long time the principle that 
juristic persons do not commit crimes has seemed to be inviolable, but recent 
innovative statutory provisions and academic research have produced an 
increasing debate that has started to question this conservative position.   
The Brazilian legal scenario is puzzling. There has been a strong opposition to 
corporate criminal liability, especially by scholars and Courts; yet there has 
been an effort by the legislature and some influential scholars to introduce 
some changes into the legal setting. Corporate criminal liability is attacked on 
the same basis that it is criticized elsewhere. Questions about the need, 
propriety and efficiency of criminal law to punish corporations are also 
traditionally raised in Brazil. However, the central question today in Brazil is 
not one of whether corporate criminal liability is workable or not, or which 
 
37 The maxim can be interpreted as “corporations cannot commit crimes.” 
  
 
                                                
theory would be more appropriate; theories of criminal liability are not even 
directly addressed. It is in the fundamental conditions for the attribution of 
criminal liability that stronger resistance to corporate criminal liability 
continues. Some prominent Brazilian scholars still treat corporate criminal 
liability as a bizarre concept that would never fit in any coherent legal system. 
In addition to that, the growing influence of minimal penal law and the new 
interventionist movement bring more skepticism towards corporate criminal 
liability.  
2.1.Brazilian Constitution  
The Brazilian Constitution,  promulgated in 1988, has two provisions that 
eventually deal with the issue of corporate criminal liability.38The first 
provision is article 173 § 5 which regulates crimes against the popular 
economy and economic order; the other provision is article 225 § 3 which 
regulates environmental crimes. These provisions are harshly attacked 
because they contradict criminal law principles that have been seen as 
untouchable.  
Art. 173 , δ 5° - The law, without disregarding the individual 
responsibility of the corporation managers, will establish the 
responsibility of the corporation for acts against the economic order 
and against the popular economy. The corporation will be affected 
by sanctions that are compatible with its nature.39
 
 
38 “Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil 1988.” 
39 [Translated by author] 
  
 
                                                
Art. 225, & 3° - The subjects and activities considered harmful to the 
environment will subject the infractors, individuals or legal persons, 
to criminal and administrative sanctions, independently of their 
obligation for civil damage. 40
Article 173, § 5 declares that the law will establish the responsibility of  the 
juristic person regardless of the individual accountability of the managers and 
employees for acts practised against the financial and economic order, and 
against the popular economy. In addition, this same article states that the 
juristic person will be submitted to sanctions compatible with its nature. This 
provision has been interpreted by scholars in both directions, for and against 
the imposition of criminal liability to corporations. It has been argued that 
because this provision uses the term “sanction” it is considering only non 
criminal sanctions. In this connection, it is also observed that if the legislator 
wanted to submit corporations to criminal law, he or she would have used the 
word “punishment,” the proper word to refer to criminal sanctions.   
Moreover, opponents of corporate criminal liability claim that the historic 
interpretation of this provision shows that the legislator intentionally changed 
the language of the provision in order to exclude the liability of juristic 
persons. Miguel Reale Jr., explains that the term “criminal” before the term 
“responsibility” was part of the original version of this provision but this 
version was not approved and the legislator had to exclude this expression.41  
 
40 [Translated by author] 
41 Miguel Reale Jr., “A Responsabilidade Penal da Pesoa Juridica” , in Luiz Regis Prado, ed., 
Responsabilidade Penal da Pesoa Juridica: Em Defesa do Principio da Imputacao Penal Subjetiva 
(Sao Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2001) 137 at 138. 
  
 
                                                
On the other hand, it has been claimed in defence of the criminal liability of 
corporations, that the term “sanction” is used in this provision in its general 
meaning, including criminal sanctions. It is emphasized that the sanctions 
would be compatible with the juristic person’s nature, except those criminal 
sanctions, such as imprisonment, that could not be used against 
corporations.42  Because of the unclear will of the legislator, the more 
restricted interpretation of this stipulation prevails. The interpretation of 
constitutional rules has to avoid contradiction and  unjustified harm, 
accordingly, an ambiguous dispositive article like173, δ5° has to be literally 
understood and interpreted in harmony with the prevailing principle that 
criminal sanctions cannot be imposed on corporations because they cannot 
commit crimes.  
In another provision, article 225 § 3 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution 
asserts that criminal and administrative sanctions will be applied to punish 
offenders, whether individuals or juristic persons, who are responsible for 
conduct or activities that harm the environment, independently of the 
obligation of civil reparation.43 Once more, semantic difficulties make the 
provision confusing and impede its total application. The mainstream 
doctrinal interpretation argues that this provision leads to the conclusion that 
 
42 Juarez Cirino dos Santos, “A Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Juridica,” online: Direito 
<www.direito.com.br/doutrina.ASP?=1&T=127>  
43 Art. 225, δ3. As condutas e atividades consideradas lesivas ao meio ambiente sujeitarao os 
infratores, pessoas fisicas ou juridicas, a sancoes penais e administrativas, independentemente da 
obrigacao de reparar os danos causados, 
  
 
                                                
corporations cannot be criminally responsible.44 According to this position, 
the legislator used two semantic different words on purpose; the word 
“conduct” is used to refer to individuals and consequently criminal law, and 
the word “activity” is used to refer to juristic persons and therefore 
administrative law. As a result, corporations can be held responsible for 
illegal activities and not for illegal conduct.  On the contrary, a more flexible 
view concludes that the formulation of article 225 § 3 is straightforward, and 
that juristic persons can be criminally liable for illegal conduct that harms the 
environment.45 The use of the conjunction “and” in the phrase “administrative 
and penal sanctions” implies similarly that the sanctions are to be applied 
indiscriminately to individuals and juristic persons. 
 In an extremely traditionalist legal scenario, the more conservative approach 
becomes the accepted belief. This constitutional provision has been 
 
44 See e.g. Cézar Roberto Bittencourt, “Reflexões Sobre a Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Juridica”, 
in Gomes, supra note 99 at 51; Jose Carlos de Oliveira Robaldo, in Gomes, supra note 99 at 96. Luiz 
Luisi,  “Notas Sobre a Responsabilidadde Penal das Pessoas Juridicas”,  in Luiz Regis Prado, ed., 
Responsabilidade Penal da Pesoa Juridica: Em Defesa do Principio da Imputacao Penal Subjetiva 
(Sao Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2001) 79; Miguel Reale Junior, “A Responsabilidade Penal da 
Pesoa Juridica” , in Luiz Regis Prado, ed., Responsabilidade Penal da Pesoa Juridica: Em Defesa do 
Principio da Imputacao Penal Subjetiva (Sao Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2001) 137; Luiz Regis 
Prado, ed., Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Juridica: Fundamentos e Implicacoes , in 
Responsabilidade Penal da Pesoa Juridica: Em Defesa do Principio da Imputacao Penal Subjetiva 
(Sao Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2001) 101; Luiz Régis Prado, Curso de Direito Penal Brasileiro- 
Parte Geral, 2ed. (Sao Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2000). 
45See e.g. José Afonso da Silva. Curso de Direito Constitucional Positivo, 5th ed. (São Paulo: Revista 
dos Tribunais, 1989); João Marcello Araújo Jr., “Societas delinquere potest – Revisão da Legislação 
Comparada ao Estado Atual da Doutrina”, in Gomes, supra note 99 at 46; Luiz Regis Prado ed., 
“Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Jurídica: Fundamentos e Implicações” in Responsabilidade Penal 
da Pessoa Jurídica e Medidas Provisórias e Direito Penal, 101; Celso Ribeiro Bastos & Ives Gandra 
Martins, Comentários à Constituição do Brasil (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2000); Sérgio Salomão Shecaria. 
Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Jurídica. De acordo com a Lei nº 9.605/98 (São Paulo: Revista dos 
Tribunais, 1998). 
 
  
 
infrequently used as justification to impose criminal sanctions on 
corporations. Corporate misconduct is still seen as an accident or a disaster, 
and not a crime. As an illustration, one can cite the Petrobrás and the 
Cataguazes disasters. In 2000, the biggest Brazilian oil refinery, Petrobras, 
polluted Guanabara Bay in Rio de Janeiro as a consequence of the rupture of a 
pipeline. It was proved that if the corporation had hired more employees to 
inspect the controlling machines, and if it had checked the equipment more 
frequently, the accident could have been avoided. In 2003, a reservoir of 
Cataguazes Papel Ltd. (a paper factory in Minas Gerais) exploded and spilled 
320 million gallons (1.2 billion liters) of toxic materials into two rivers. It left 
over 600 000 people without regular water, and dozens died as a result of the 
contamination. Both companies were tried and condemned to compensate the 
victims, yet there has been no attempt to criminally prosecute them because 
the prevailing understanding is that the Constitution does not permit the 
ascription of liability to corporations. 
2.2. Law 9 605/88 
In spite of the controversy regarding the meaning of the Constitutional 
provisions on criminal liability of juristic persons, the Environmental Law 
(Law number 9 605), edited in 1998, was innovative and brought some 
constructive perspectives to this troublesome area.  The Brazilian 
Environmental Law was the first statute to follow the interpretation of the 
Constitution that authorizes criminal responsibility of corporations, yet the 
  
 
                                                
pioneering character of this ruling is no guarantee of immediate effect. This 
statute faces problems of two orders, theoretical and practical. On a theoretical 
level, its legitimacy is questioned. It is argued that the statute violates 
constitutional principles. The practical problems range from the model used as 
a parameter to attribute liability to juristic persons to the lack of more 
comprehensive stipulations about the proper procedures to be employed to the 
excessive number and hybrid character of types of conduct to be considered as 
crimes.  
The validity of Law 9 503/98 as a legitimate legal instrument has been 
questioned, especially by those who traditionally oppose the imposition of 
criminal liability on corporations. It has been constantly argued that this law 
tries to violate the precious axiom societas deliquere non potest and for that 
reason is unconstitutional and need not to be obeyed.46 This kind of argument 
only reiterates what had been previously claimed against the Constitutional 
provisions about criminal liability of corporations. It seems logical that such 
opposition would occur; however these claims are not only obsolete but also 
completely unsound.  It is clear that the Constitution gave special power to the 
ordinary legislator to regulate conduct that would harm the environment; this 
statute is simply an exercise of this legitimate power.  The opposing argument 
reflects a myopic view of the legal system and of the corporations. It  
incorporates the idea that there are immutable principles, the maxim that only 
 
46 Luiz Regis Prado, Curso de Direito Penal Brasileiro- Parte Geral, 2ed. (Sao Paulo: Revista dos 
Tribunais, 2000) at 181. 
  
 
individuals commit crimes would be one of these principles. It is at least 
archaic to think of a legal system as something static, guided by principles 
that cannot be reinterpreted or replaced. In addition to that, if the protection of 
the environment is another constitutional principle, it would make no sense to 
understand that the constitution could not confer power to the ordinary 
legislator to regulate and control environmental offences. 
The unsoundness of the opposition’s argument does not mean that   the Law 
9503/98 is flawless. The more challenging provision of the Law 9605/98 is 
article 3, where it is asserted that fictional entities can be criminally 
accountable when the crime is committed by their legal or contractual 
representatives in the interest of the corporation.  This provision faces two 
related problems. First, it is not clear if the legislator wanted to embrace some 
kind of agency or identification doctrine, i.e, to attribute criminal liability to 
corporations by identifying a guilty mind within its members.  The statute 
says that the juristic person can be held liable for the conduct of its legal or 
contractual representatives. The expression “legal representatives” can be 
broadly interpreted as so  to include lower echelon employees up to directors. 
This interpretation would lead to an attribution of liability that resembles 
agency theory. The same article can be interpreted in a narrower way, 
identifying as legal representatives only higher echelon employees. Such 
understanding is reminiscent of the identification theory which also targets 
only a small group of employees.  
  
 
                                                
Regarding the proper procedures to prosecute a juristic person for crimes 
against the environment, Law 9503/98 is largely silent. Chapter IV of this 
statute has only two stipulations regarding the suitable penal procedure to be 
employed, and neither says anything about juristic persons. Luiz Regis Prado 
states that the legislator was influenced by the Anglo-American law but 
inspired by the French model of attributing liability to corporations. 
According to this author, it was right to be inspired and influenced by these 
two legal systems, although the legislative sin was not to adopt these 
examples more comprehensively. 47 The problem with the Brazilian approach 
to corporate criminal liability, or the Brazilian frustrated attempt to regulate 
corporate criminal liability, is not that it has chosen the wrong models to 
evolve from. That the inspiration for such liability must come, at least in part 
from common law legal systems, is obvious; they pioneered this concept in 
the 19th century after the French Revolution and from their experience it is 
possible to extract valuable lessons, to learn what has failed and what has 
succeeded. The French approach, as the first adaptation of the common law 
idea of corporate criminal liability to civil law, must also be considered. The 
problem with the Brazilian approach is that the legislature did not prepare the 
legal system to receive a new concept. It could have done so by examining 
more comprehensively how common law legal systems and France have 
committed to the implementation and development of corporate criminal 
liability.  
 
47 Ibid. at 181. 
  
 
                                                
In France, the legislature, also influenced by Anglo-American legal systems, 
was careful and passed an adaptation law (Law 92-1336/ 1992) 
simultaneously with the new penal code.  It altered numerous legal texts in 
order to shape these other provisions in accordance with the changes brought 
to the new penal code.  In doing so, the French legislature thus prepared the 
whole legal system to receive the new changes and make them applicable and 
efficient. The Brazilian legislature was not so cautious and, although inspired 
by the French model, they did not entirely observe the French adaptation 
process. 
Chapter V of this law lays down the conduct that should be considered in 
crimes against the environment. The description of conduct does not 
distinguish between individual or collective conduct, although all persons are 
considered offenders. The hybrid character would not be a problem in other 
legal systems, yet in an extremely positivist legal system like the Brazilian, in 
order to be legitimate, each criminal conduct described in any statute has to 
state clearly who is its target, in other words, who is the potential author of the 
described crime.48 The Brazilian legislator should have followed the French 
example where the conduct to be attributed to a moral person is distinguished 
from  individual conduct.  
 
48 Although the scenario of the Brazilian system is becoming more hybrid, the 
interpretation and the application of the law is still done in a traditional positivist 
manner. It is believed that the law, especially the statutes, have normative power. 
Only what is regulated by the law is believed to legal validity, if a social fact is not 
described by the law, it does not produce any legal consequence. Morality and law 
are not necessarily connected. 
  
 
                                                
Although this law is restricted to environmental offences, it represents a 
benchmark for criminal liability of juristic persons. It is the first step in order 
to attempt to prosecute and punish corporations for criminal offences. If the 
law had been more carefully elaborated, it would represent a real change, but 
because of its flaws it is only an attempt. Considering the Brazilian 
perspectives, this effort is valuable and has to be taken as the starting point for 
future transformations. However, much more has to be done. As Silvina 
Bacigalupo states, the simple introduction in the legal system of a provision 
that refers to the criminal liability of a juristic person will not be the solution 
if the basis of such liability is not established. 49  
2.3.Brazilian doctrinal position  
Scholars, as Merriman points out, are the real protagonists of the civil law tradition.50 
Their comments, called doctrine are a very important, living source of law. The 
doctrine moulds the civil law system. Legislators and judges use concepts and ideas 
that have been examined and developed by scholars. Renowned scholars’ opinions, 
although they are not formal sources of law, carry significant authority. As Rene 
David and John Brierley stated:  
[D]octrinal writing establishes the methods by which law will be understood 
and statutes interpreted. There is, further, the influence that legal scholarship 
can exercise on the legislators themselves; often the latter merely give 
expression and effect to tendencies that have developed doctrinally, or enact 
 
49 Silvina Bacigalupo, La Responsabilidad Penal de Las Personas Juridicas (Barcelona: Bosch, 1998) 
at 30. 
50 John Henry Merrymam, The Civil Law Tradition, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1985) at 56  
  
 
                                                
laws which have been conceived by legal writers. (…) Legal writing 
stimulates the legislators to action; here, then, it is only a mediate source of 
law. But it also plays a role in the application of enacted law; in this respect, 
unless reality is distorted, it is difficult to contest its status as a source of 
law.51
The prevailing posture in Brazilian scholarship is not to accept criminal 
liability of corporations. 52 Some scholars do not even deeply analyze the 
issue; they completely reject the attribution of liability to juristic persons, 
arguing that the institution of such liability is an attempt to destabilize the 
criminal system.53 According to these scholars, the correct interpretation of 
the Brazilian Constitution does not lead to the conclusion that corporate 
criminal liability was embraced by Brazilian law.  
René Ariel Dotti, one of the strongest opponents of the attribution of liability 
to juristic persons argues that the assumption that the Brazilian constitution 
instituted this atypical kind of liability leads to the conclusion that such 
disposition is arrogant and arbitrary. He quotes Jean Cruet to support his 
argument:  ‘Everyday we see  society changing the law, but we have never 
seen the law changing society.’ 54 In this view, the legislature would have 
been arrogant and arbitrary if it assumed that it could change society by 
legislating such an issue as corporate criminal liability. Dotti also refers to the 
advocates of criminal liability of corporations as adventurous abolitionists; 
 
51 Rene David & John E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1985) at 148.[ David & Brierley] 
52 René Ariel Dotti, “A Incapacidade Criminal da Pesoa Juridica (Uma Perspectiva do Direito 
Brasileiro),”in Prado, Luis Régis ed., Responasabilidade Penal da Pesoa Juridica: Em defesa do 
Prinicipio da Imputação Penal Subjetiva( São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2001)141 at 144. [Dotti] 
53 Ibid. 
54 Dotti, ibid.  [translated by author].  
  
 
                                                
according to this author they vindicate the destruction of positive criminal 
law.55 This attitude against such innovative issue as corporate criminal 
liability is not surprising, especially in a civil law country. More conservative 
scholars usually believe that law is a rigid system where formal respect to the 
rules is vital. Consequently, the mere assumption that corporate criminal 
liability could be accepted is a threat to the positive ideal of law; it is a 
challenge to secular legal principles. 
Even with the prevalence of such preconceived ideas, the future of criminal 
liability of corporations in Brazil is not hopeless. There have been some 
voices that urge to the acceptance of corporate criminal accountability. This 
minority group recognizes that the statutory provisions were not successful in 
their endeavour, yet these statutes brought the issue of corporate criminal 
liability into discussion.  
According to Ives Gandra Martins, one of the main supporters of the 
attribution of corporate criminal liability, the actual constitution broke free 
from the principle that had dominated the Brazilian legal system: corporations 
could not be criminally responsible.56 Luis Paulo Sirvinkas adds that, by 
doing that, the Brazilian Constitution not only reflected the trends of modern 
 
55 Ibid. at 148. 
56 Ives Gandra Martins cited in  Sérgio Salomão Shecaria , ”A Responsabilidade penal da Pesoa 
Juridica e Nossa Recente Legislacao,”  in Luiz Flávio Gomes, ed., Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa 
Juridica e Medidas Provisorias e Direiro Penal (São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1999) 131 at 134  
  
 
                                                
law but also courageously detached criminal law from orthodox principles.57 
Damásio Evangelista de Jesus, an influential criminal law scholar, switched 
sides. In his manual of penal law, published in 1993 he emphasized that only a 
human being could commit crimes. Later, in an article published in 2002 he 
asserted that the maxim societas delinquere non potest should be overridden 
and that social changes justify the attribution of criminal liability to 
corporations.58    
2.4. Brazilian courts’ position 
Traditionally Brazilian courts do not legislate and have a limited interpretative 
function; they interpret the Statutes that are considered as the primary source of law. 
The judge’s function in a jurisdiction like Brazil can be considered narrow, 
mechanical and uncreative.59 The role of the judge is  as of a guardian of the rule of 
law; he or she ensures that the rule of the law is respected. It is not for the civil law 
judge to question or criticize the law. Accordingly, the judiciary has a complementary 
role; the legislative enacts rules that will be protected by the judiciary. Nonetheless, it 
would be too early to conclude that the judiciary has no importance for the 
implementation of corporate criminal liability in Brazil. Today, in civil law countries, 
there is a growing tendency to recognize the autonomous nature of judicial legal 
 
57 Luis Paulo Sirvinskas, “Pessoa Juridica e Responsabilidade Penal,” online: O Neófito 
<http://www.neofito.com.br> 
58 De Jesus, Damásio Evangelista, Direito Penal, vol I (São Paulo: Saraiva, 1993) 1999; “Breves 
Considerações Sobre a Responsabilidade Penal das Pessoas Jurídicas”, online: Complexo Jurídico 
Damásio de Jesus < www.damasio.com.br/novo/html/artigos/art_112 htm>.  
59 See Merryman, supra note 129 at 38. 
  
 
                                                
interpretation and Brazil is no exception to this trend. 60  As will be discussed below, 
some Brazilian judges, especially those of southern states such as Santa Catarina, Rio 
Grande do Sul and Paraná, have been going beyond the grammatical interpretation of 
statutes. They try not only to fill gaps in the legislative scheme by adapting the laws 
to reality, but also to interpret a statute more broadly. This less orthodox posture of 
the judiciary can promote the concept of corporate criminal liability in Brazil if 
judges start to interpret the Constitution and the Environmental Law more broadly so 
as to include juristic persons as potential criminal agents. 
Brazilian legislators were in the vanguard when they passed such legal texts as the 
Constitution and the Law 9605/98 admitting the possible attribution of criminal 
liability to juristic persons. Some Brazilian legal scholars have manifested an the 
acceptance of this type of liability; meanwhile, Brazilian courts have been almost 
inflexible. The majority of court decisions are still applying the criminal sanction to 
the individual and civil and administrative sanctions to the juristic person. 61  Justice 
Espirito Santo’s opinion in an environmental crime case corroborated this reality 
when he stated that because a juristic person cannot commit crimes its directors 
should be individually responsible for the crime.62 Justice Carvalhido in a decision of 
the Superior Tribunal of Justice of Sao Paulo argued that criminal responsibility can 
 
60 Arnaud (A.J), Les jurists face à la société. Du XIX siècle à nous jours (1975) cited in David & 
Brierley, supra note 130 at 147. 
61José Carlos de Oliveira Robaldo, “A Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Jurídica: Direito Penal na 
Contramão da História”, in Luiz Flávio Gomes ed., Responsabilidade penal da pessoa juridica e 
medidas provisorias de direiro penal ( São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1999) 103. 
62 TJ/ES (2 Turma)  – HC – Processo: 9702230047 – TRF200050355 – 06. 09. 1997. 
  
 
                                                
only and exclusively be attributed to the individual. 63In another decision this same 
Justice affirmed that the attribution of criminal responsibility to a juristic person is 
inconceivable, and it goes against the basis of legal state and criminal law that are 
vital to the life of a democratic society. 64Justice Dipp deciding for the Superior 
Tribunal of Justice of Pernambuco in a case about environmental crime stated that 
juristic persons are mere fictions and cannot be responsible for crimes.65  
However, a dissonant position was taken by the Federal Tribunal of Santa Catarina in 
2003. In a case about illegal extraction of minerals, the company that was extracting 
minerals without authorization was found guilty. Justice Castro stated that the 
company had to be punished because to attribute liability to its representative would 
allow the company to continue its criminal activities. According to  Justice Castro, 
criminal liability of juristic persons is in accordance with constitutional and penal 
principles since it is the expression and exercise of the principle of social justice and 
social interest which should prevail above other principles.66 This is still an isolated 
position, although it is important as the first judicial precedent for criminal liability of 
juristic persons. The conservative character of Brazilian courts does not indicate that 
this opinion will prevail, at least not immediately, yet this decision may influence 
future changes. 
 
 
63 STJ/PR (6 Turma) – HC 18338 – STJ000470366 – 06/08/2002  
64 STJ/SP (6 Turma) – HC 15051 – STJ000396822 – 06/03/2001 
65 STJ/ PE (5 Turma) – HC 21644 – STJ000505979 – 29/09/2003 
66 TRF/SC (4 Turma) – Ap Crim 2002. 71. 04. 002225-0- SC- 8 T. 06.0.2003 
  
 
                                                
2.5.The Minimal Penal Law movement and its consequences for corporate criminal 
liability in Brazil 
In some civil law systems, especially in Germany, Italy, Spain and Brazil, the denial of 
corporate criminal liability is particularly reinforced by the followers of the guarantist-
minimalist  movement who advocate for the minimal application of penal law.67 The  
theory of minimal penal law is a growing trend in Europe and Latin America. The 
minimal penal law movement has its roots in the declaration of Rights of Man and 
Citizens, 1789 that in  article 8 stated that “[t]he law shall provide for such punishments 
only as are strictly and obviously necessary, and no one shall suffer punishment except it 
be legally inflicted in virtue of a law passed and promulgated before the commission of 
the offence.” Minimal penal law is a theoretical movement against the demagogical and 
disruptive use of penal law. It argues that penal law must be used as ultima ratio and not 
as sola or prima ratio.68Accordingly, penal law should be resorted to when all others 
have proven insufficient to the solution of social imbalance. De Pinho explains that this 
 
67 The minimal penal law movement is based on the ideas of German criminologist Franz von Liszt. 
See Franz Von Liszt, Teoria Finalista do Direito (São Paulo: LZN, 2003); Tratado de Direito Penal 
(São Paulo: Russell, 2003).This movement is also called abolitionist theory and  the main precursor of 
this theory is Luigi Ferrajoli. See, Luigi Ferrajoli, Derecho y Razón (Madrid: Trotta, 1995). Minimal 
Penal Law is a growing trend in some European continental countries, especially Germany, Italy and 
Spain; it has also influenced some Latin American countries, including Brazil, Argentina and Chile.  
See G.Jakobs, La Imputación Objetiva en Derecho Penal (Madrid: Civitas, 1996); F. Muñoz Conde 
and M. García Arán Derecho Penal. Parte General (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, 1996); Muñoz 
Conde, “Principios Politicos Criminales que Inspiran el Tratamiento de los Delitos Contra el Orden 
Socioeconomico en el Proyeto de Codigo Penal Espanol de 1994” (1995) 11 Revista Brasileira de 
Ciencias Criminais, 11; Claus Roxin, Derecho Penal. Parte general. Tomo I. (Madrid: Civitas, 1997); 
Claus Roxin et al., Sobre el Estado de La Teoría del Delito (Madrid: Civitas,2000). 
68 Ultima ratio –  last expedient; sola  ratio –  only expedient; prima ratio –  first expedient [translated 
by author]. 
  
 
                                                
movement is a reaction to the law and order movement that was created in countries 
affiliated with the Anglo-Saxon legal system. 69
 The guarantist-minimalist advocates for the non-intervention of the State in the 
private lives of its citizens; as a result, crimes that represent more personal than social 
harm, such as defamation and drug use, should be regulated by administrative law. A 
more elaborated approach of minimal penal law is brought by Hassemer 70who 
suggests the creation of an intermediary law to control what he calls modern 
criminality. This intermediary law would be something in between criminal and 
administrative law.71 According to this position, the use of criminal law to punish 
corporations is not necessary, first because there is no purpose, and secondly because 
it is ineffective. In this viewpoint, the use of criminal law to punish corporations 
would be merely symbolic, and for that reason, unfair.72
 
2.6.Problems for the introduction of corporate criminal liability  
Resistance to the attribution of criminal liability to corporations is mainly, but not 
essentially, historical. The Brazilian legal system inherited the roman-germanic belief 
that only individuals commit crimes. This idea has been influential for the Brazilian 
 
69 Ana Cláudia B de Pinho.,  “Em busca de um Direito Penal Mínimo e de uma Redefinição de Papel 
para o Ministério Público” online: Revista de Direito Penal 
<http://www.direitopenal.adv.br/artigos.asp?pagina=9&id=250>. 
70Winfried Hassemer, Três temas de Direito Penal (Porto Alegre: Publicação da Escola Superior do 
Ministério Público, 1993) 59.  
71 Ibid. The intermediary law, as proposed by Hassemer, would be a mix between administrative and 
criminal law. It would be administrative in its nature but it would be enforced like criminal law. 
72 Guilherme José Ferreira da Silva, A Incapacidade Criminal da Pessoa Jurídica (Belo Horizonte 
Brazil: Del Rey, 2003) 109. 
  
 
criminal law and it has been the most important argument against corporate criminal 
liability. However, some other causes can be identified as crucial problems to the 
implementation of the concept of corporate criminal liability: the nature of the 
Brazilian legal system and the lack of systemized doctrinal construction.  
 Rigidity of the Brazilian legal system 
The Brazilian legal system is rigid.  Unlike common law legal systems, only statutes 
have the authority of law.  Precedents, doctrine and customs have their places as 
secondary sources of the law, but they do not carry the authority of the law. The 
introduction of a new concept must be in statutory form and usually preceded by 
extensive doctrinal debate. This process is believed to give a scientific character to 
the law. Accordingly, for the attribution of criminal liability to corporations to be an 
effective legal concept, it has to come through a statutory change, as an amendment 
to the Constitution and/or to the Penal Code.  
Lack of a systematic doctrinal construction 
If on one side the rigidity of the system makes it difficult for changes to take effect, 
on the other side, the lack of information or interest by the legislators make it even 
harder for changes to occur. Despite the fact that legislators have the real power to 
propose or approve changes to the legal system, they form their opinions under the 
influence of doctrine. Consequently, the lack of information and interest by the 
legislators is an effect of the lack of relevant doctrinal work. The weak doctrinal 
construction could be attributed to a myriad of factors, but for the purpose of the 
  
 
                                                
present analysis two important facts can be pointed to: 1) the relatively recent 
discussion about the issue of corporate criminal liability; and 2) debates centred 
exclusively on the nature of corporations. While in some common law countries 
discussions about corporate criminal liability date back more than a century, in Brazil 
debates on this issue have only become prominent in the last decade. The majority of 
the articles and books that have been written in Portuguese are not an extensive study 
of the issue.  Rather, they represent superficial discussions centred on the problem of 
the nature of the juristic persons.73  
Core issues of the attribution of criminal liability are simply ignored or neglected by 
Brazilian doctrine. Corporate criminal liability has not been seen by Brazilian 
doctrine as part of a broader context, i.e., little has been said about corporate crime 
and the need to use criminal law to deter corporate criminality. In addition to that, an 
examination of the necessary attributes to be a criminal agent has not been done. The 
nature of corporations is an important element for corporate criminal liability; 
however, alone it cannot justify this attribution. The fact that corporations are real 
entities does not automatically justify criminal liability.  Some other elements must 
be considered, such as the life of corporations, their ability to be moral agents, and 
their ability to act and to have mens rea. The following chapters are intended to be a 
 
73  De Sanctis and Shecaria defend the imposition of corporate criminal liability on the basis that 
corporations are real persons. On the other hand, Da Silva argues that corporations are fictional 
entities, and for this reason cannot commit crimes. [De Sanctis, Fausto Martin. Responsabilidade 
Penal da Pessoa Jurídica (São Paulo: editora Saraiva, 1999); Da Silva, Guilherme José Ferreira, A 
Incapacidade Criminal da Pessoa Jurídica (Belo Horizonte Brazil: Del Rey, 2003);  Shecaria, Sérgio 
Salomão, A Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Jurídica, 2 ed. (São Paulo: editora Método, 2003)] 
 
  
 
preliminary exploration of these questions as a foundation for future developments in 
Brazilian law. 
III. CORPORATE CRIME: A FRAMEWORK 
  
 
Introduction 
As part of the industrial (or corporate) era, corporate criminality is inherent in contemporary 
society. However, theoretically, corporate crime is still an obscure territory. Corporate 
criminality is a complex phenomenon that has started to be discussed and analyzed quite 
recently in comparison to traditional crimes. Criminal law and criminology have been almost 
exclusively focused on individual misconduct, especially in Brazil. Corporate crime is a 
relatively new topic for criminologists and it is still a controversial subject for legal theorists. 
More qualitative and quantitative analyses of corporate crime are needed. Since the subject was 
brought to public attention over 50 years ago, scholars have not agreed on a proper concept for 
corporate crime, nor have official data on the harm and cost caused by corporate crime been 
gathered. It is not the purpose of this work to focus on these issues or to claim an ultimate and 
refined examination of corporate criminality. Still, it is important to provide a general account 
of corporate crime and its consequences in order to further elaborate on corporate criminal 
liability. What follows is rather a superficial attempt to glance at corporate crime, its 
seriousness and costs, as a preliminary validation of our further claim for the use of strong 
controlling mechanism of corporate criminality in Brazil 
3.1. Conceptualizing corporate crime 
Problems associated with the attribution of criminal liability to corporations are not limited to 
the use of criminal sanctions against corporations or to the application of criminal law 
  
 
principles to corporate offenders; the very concept of corporate crime and the type of conducts 
that should be considered corporate crime are also problematical aspects of corporate criminal 
liability. Geis and Meier characterize the task of defining corporate crime as “an intellectual 
nightmare.”74 2 Divergent concepts and classifications of corporate crime add more fuel to the 
already hot debate about corporate liability, for they can either reinforce or contravene the 
attribution of criminal liability to corporations.  A dependable basis of corporate criminal 
liability relies on a proper concept and categorization of corporate crime. 
The terms corporate crime, white collar crime, organizational crime and occupational crime are 
often used interchangeably. Although close in meaning, these expressions do not suggest the 
same thing.75 Occupational crime is by far the least similar expression of this group of terms; it 
implies a completely different category of crimes. Occupational crimes do not refer to crimes 
committed by a corporate entity; instead, they refer to those crimes committed by the corporate 
employee not in favour of the corporation. Usually, but not necessarily, the corporation is the 
only victim. Examples of these crimes are embezzlement, employer theft, fraud, and misuse of 
company property. It is rather inappropriate to refer to the crimes committed by corporations as 
occupational crimes.  
A more common ground can be found between the expressions corporate crime and white-
collar crime. Indeed, these expressions are truly related. It was the designation white-collar 
crimes which brought attention to a different kind of crime ocurring in the corporate setting. 
                                                 
74 Geis and Meier cited in David O. Friedrichis,, “White Collar Crime and the Definitional Quagmire: A 
Provisional Solution” (1992) 4  Journal of Human Justice 6 at 6. 
 
75 It is worthy to note that other expressions are also used as reference to corporate crime: commercial crime, 
crimes of the powerful, crimes at the top, crimes of the suites, economic crime and elite deviance. 
  
 
The term white-collar crime has been employed for more than half a century. It was first 
coined by Sutherland, who called white-collar crime the “crime committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.”76 Despite its importance 
for criminology, this definition is too narrow and does not correspond to the reality of 
corporate crime. By putting too much emphasis on the individual offender and on his or her 
special attributes such as high social status or respectability and not on the conduct or on the 
harm caused by the criminal act, the term white-collar excludes or makes it hard to place non-
individual conduct in the same rank of offences.  Moreover, this expression does not clearly 
differentiate between individual intent and corporate intent. Without making any reference to 
the corporation, it neglects those behaviours that are influenced and triggered by corporate 
culture. The nomenclature is also too narrow since it restricts the criminal conduct to the 
actions of highly-stationed employees. Generally, white-collar crimes are associated with 
economic and financial crimes, and usually the offender acts to seek personal gain. This is also 
the meaning that the expression has in Brazil, where it is literally translated as “crimes do 
colarinho branco.” Because of the individual connotation carried in the label white-collar 
crimes, the expression corporate crime is preferable since it makes it easier to understand 
corporations as the agents of the misconduct and consequently as the proper entities that would 
be held responsible for the act. Corporate crime can be understood as a category of 
organizational crime. Organizational crime refers to the criminal conduct and activities of a 
wide range of organizations. Because a corporation is a kind of organization, corporate crime 
                                                 
76 Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1949) 9. 
 
  
 
would be included in this broader class of crimes. Corporate crimes can be understood as 
criminal activities engaged in by corporations for the corporations’ benefit as a whole.  
The term “corporate crime” is not common among Brazilian legal scholars; in reality, there is 
no proper term to refer to crimes committed by corporations. However, evidence suggests that 
it is just a matter of time until Brazilian scholars will import from English speaking countries 
the term corporate crime. Russel and Weissman’s book “Corporate Crime and Violence: Big 
Business Power and the Abuse of the Public Trust” was published in Portuguese with the title 
“crimes corporativos: O Poder das Grandes Empresas e o Abuso da Confiança Pública” what 
indicates a trend of incorporating corporate crime to the local legal vocabulary. 
 3.2. Classification of corporate crimes 
More difficult than the search for a proper definition of corporate misbehaviour is the 
classification of the kinds of acts that can be considered corporate crime. The classic dispute 
between Sutherland and Tappan about the role of crimes that could be classified as white collar 
crimes can be somehow adapted to the broader territory of corporate criminality.  Sutherland 
suggested a restricted role,77 covering a less heterogeneous range of offences while Tappan 
had a broader approach. Followers78of Sutherland’s position propose a critical or relativist 
conception of corporate crime; accordingly, corporate crimes would be only what legal theory 
                                                 
77 Sutherland’s concept is considered narrow by some authors: Pepinsky typifies such assumption in the argument 
that Sutherland’s concept is socio economic biased. (Pepinsky, Harold, “From White Collar Crime to 
Exploitation: Redefinition of a Field”, (1974) 65 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 225.) Acording 
to Braithwaite, Sutherland’s concept has become an imprisoning framework for contemporary scholarship 
(Braithwaite, John, “White Collar Crime” (1985) 11 Annual Review of Sociology 1, at 3). See also, Susan 
Shapiro, “Collaring the Crime not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of White- Collar Crime (1990) 55 
American Sociological Review 346. 
78 See e.g, H. Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, Washington, DC: National 
Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice; Pepinsky, H.E., 1974. “From White Collar Crime to 
Exploitation: Redefinition of a Field” (1974) 65 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 225. 
  
 
describes as a crime. Corporate crimes would be conduct that is defined, prohibited and 
punishable.79 On the other hand, supporters80 of Tappan’s conception consider an act to be 
criminal  if a criminal court has officially determined that the person or entity accused of 
violating the law has committed a crime. In harmony with this view, corporate crimes would 
be any act committed by corporations that are punished by the State, regardless of whether the 
act is punished under administrative, civil or criminal law.81 This broader definition of 
corporate crime would better suit the purpose of criminology since few harmful corporate 
illegalities or other wrongdoing fit Sutherland’s narrow legal definition of crime.82 However, 
for the purpose of criminal law and the attribution of criminal liability, corporate crime still has 
to fit the legal definition of crime, and for this reason, Sutherland´s view should be the basis of 
corporate criminal liability. Accordingly, criminal liability would be attributed to corporations 
only if corporations had engaged in conduct that is legally typified as a crime respecting the 
principle“nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege ” which is basic to Brazilian  criminal law.83
Considering the existing descriptions of crimes, it is possible to divide corporate crime into 
two large groups: property crimes, which cause only economic damage; and violent crimes, 
which cause injury, sickness, or death. Property crimes can affect competitors, governments, 
consumers and the general public. Some examples of crimes that affect competitors include the 
following: espionage; arson; patent copying; bribery and corruption to influence those in new 
or expanding markets, such as government officials in developing economies; price-fixing to 
                                                 
79 See  B. Grant Stitt, & David J Giacopassi,., “Assessing Victimization from Corporate Harms” in Michael 
B.Blakenship , ed., Understanding Corporate Criminality (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993) 57. 
80 See e.g. Shapiro, supra note 6.   
81 M.B. Clinard & P.C. Yeager, Corporate Crime (New York: Free Press, 1980) 16. 
82 Russell Mokhiber, , Corporate Crime and Violence: Big Business Power and the Abuse of the Public Trust (San 
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1989) 10. 
83 See art. 5°,II of the Brazilian Federal Constitution and art. 1° of the Brazilian Penal Code. 
  
 
squeeze out new competitors or to rationalize competition; and mergers or takeovers in 
violation of anti-monopoly legislation. Crimes that affect governments include: tax evasion or 
avoidance; illegal campaign funds to politicians; bribing state officials in return for lucrative 
employment; fraudulent information to prevent, influence, or repeal legislation; exporting 
illegal behaviour to another state where it is not illegal; and fraudulent billing of governments. 
Examples of property crimes that affect consumers and general public: fraudulent advertising, 
misleading sales behaviour; false labelling of products; manufacture or distribution of 
dangerous products; and selling goods at inflated prices and increased tax bill because of 
corporate tax avoidance schemes. 
The second group of crimes, referred to as violent crimes, is the one that generates more 
controversy. While most property crimes do not necessarily require proof of intent, for most 
violent crimes intention is an essential requisite.84 Legal scholars disagree on whether 
corporations lack the ability to form an intention or not. Violent crimes might affect 
consumers, workers and the public. Examples of criminal conduct that can injure, cause death 
or diseases to consumers include: false labelling of products; and manufacture or distribution 
of dangerous products. The Thalidomide Scandal and the Ford Pinto case are notorious 
instances of corporate crime against the consumer.85  Workers are also victims of corporate 
                                                 
84 It is important to highlight that although we consider environmental crimes as part of this group, usually in most 
jurisdictions they are strict liability offences. 
85 Thalidomide, a non-barbiturate hypnotic, was discovered in Germany in 1954. Satisfied by clinical trials that it 
was a safe and effective sedative and hypnotic drug, in October 1957 they advertised it as a sedative under the 
trade name Contergan. Within months it was being distributed under a variety of names in numerous countries 
through the world, both as sedative, and, in combination with substances like aspirin, to treat minor ailments such 
as colds, soughs and influenza. In Britain, for two years, it was available over the counter, as well as on National 
Health Prescription. In Germany it was sold over the counter without prescription. In 1958 Chemie Grünenthal 
ran intensive advertising campaigns extolling the merits of thalidomide, with particular stress on its alleged lack 
of toxicity and reinforcing that the medicine was completely safe for pregnant women and nursing mothers. In 
mid-1959 serious reports onward that thalidomide was responsible for toxic poly-neurits-nerve damage with 
  
 
criminality. Corporations usually endanger the health and lives of their employees by 
disrespecting or simply ignoring safety measures. The Imperial Food case illustrates how 
corporate crime can affect the workers. A fire in a plant run by Imperial Food in North 
Carolina claimed twenty-five lives. Investigation revealed that the plant had no alarms or 
sprinkler system and the emergency exists were locked. 86  Criminal conduct that affects the 
public can be exemplified by environmental offences such as air and land pollution, as well as 
depletion of scarce resources. Crimes that victimize the public are more difficult to assess than 
violent corporate actions directed toward consumers and workers. While it is clear that 
                                                                                                                                           
severe consequences. An increasing number of doctors and pharmacists wanted to put the drug on prescription 
because of these reports.  Despite this fact, the sales promotion continued unabated, with advertising leaflets 
containing phrases such as ‘non-toxic” and “completely harmless even for infants.” In April 1960, in an internal 
memorandum, Dr. Muckter, who was responsible for developing thalidomide, stated that everything should be 
done to avoid prescription enforcement on the drug since a substantial amount of the company turnover comes 
from over-the-counter sales. At that time, tahlidominde, represented 46 per cent of Chemie Grüntenthal’s total 
turnover. By 1961, nearly two and a half thousand cases had been reported to Chemie Grüntenthal. However, it 
was still possible to buy thalidomide over the counter. Shortly , the mounting speculation that thalidomide was 
also responsible for the unprecedent outbreak of foetal deformity in West Germany (and elsewhere) was 
hardening into evidence too compeling to ignore. Thalidomide was withdrawn from the market on 27 November 
191. On 8 March 1962, Richardson-Merrell withdrew its application to sell the drug in the United States, but not 
before pre-marketing trials by 1. 270 doctors ensured that over 20 000 patients, at least 200 of them pregnant, had 
taken it. Thalidomide was still on sale in Canada in April 1962, and was used in Japan for a year after it had been 
withdrawn in most other countries.[See e.g,  Harvey Teff and Colin Munro, “Thalidomide: The Legal Aftermath” 
(Westmead, England: Saxon House, Teakfiels Limited, 1976)] In Brazil, the withdraw occurred in 1965, four 
years after the withdraw in developed countries.[See online: Associação Brasileira dos Portadores da Síndrome de 
Talidomida< http://members.tripod.com/~abpstalidomida/historico.htm >].  
The Ford Pinto case refers to a series of cases involving the explosion of Ford Pintos due to a defective fuel 
system and other design flaws. In May of 1968, the Ford Motor Company, based upon a recommendation by then 
vice-president Lee Iacocca, decided to introduce a subcompact car and produce it domestically.  At that time there 
was strong competition for Ford in the American small-car market from Volkswagen and several Japanese 
companies in the 1960’s. To fight the competition Ford Pinto was designed and developed on an accelerated 
schedule. Before production however, Ford engineers discovered a major flaw in the cars design. In nearly all 
rear-end crash test collisions the Pinto's fuel system would rupture extremely easily.  Nevertheless, top Ford 
officials decided to manufacture the car anyway. Safety was not a major concern to Ford at the time of the 
development of the Pinto. The financial analysis that Ford conducted on the Pinto concluded that it was not cost-
efficient to add an $11 per car cost in order to correct a flaw.  In 1978 Ford was prosecuted for manslaughter after 
three teenagers that were passengers in a Ford Pinto died in a automobile crash[State v. Ford Motor Company, 
No. 5324 (Ind. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1978)]. It is questionable whether the defective fuel engine was the sole cause 
of the accident, but it certainly contributed to the deaths.[See also Daniel R Fischel and  Alan O. Sykes, 
“Corporate Crime”(1995-1996) 24-25 The Journal of Legal Studies 319 at 337]. 
86 Stephen E. Brown & Chau-Pu Chiang, “Defining Corporate Crime: A Critique of Traditional Parameters” in 
Michael B. Blakenship, ed.,  “Understanding Corporate Criminality: Challenges and Issues” in Understanding 
Corporate Crime (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993) 29 at 43. 
  
 
environmental pollution causes many health problems and deaths, it is difficult to establish the 
causal connection between specific illnesses and deaths and decisions by corporations to 
engage in illegal pollution.  
3.3.Seriousness of corporate crime 
Unrestricted corporate power generates immeasurable social damage. Since corporations are 
more influential than individuals, it has been shown that corporations are capable of doing 
greater harm than persons acting in their individual capacities.87 In a study conducted by 
Edwin Sutherland in 1949, it was found, among other things, that what he called “white-collar 
crimes” were as serious as the top street crimes and produced more harm than individual 
crimes. Although the panorama has changed since the study was done, and more empirical 
research is needed, it is not difficult to perceive that the problems pointed out by Sutherland 
persist today in a much larger proportion.88
Even though it may be impossible to determine precisely how many people are killed and 
injured as a result of corporate crime, as Coleman points out, claims that this kind of offence is 
harmless or nonviolent cannot be taken seriously.89 Because of matters of scale, corporations 
often possess the potential to harm more people.90 The Bhopal tragedy in India is an 
                                                 
87 Charles J. Walsh and Alicia Pyrich, “Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defence to Criminal Liability: Can a 
Corporation Save its Soul?” (1995) 47 Rutgers Law Review 605, 639. 
88 Sutherland, supra note 4. Despite its age this research still is a reference for today’s commentators. See e.g. 
John Braithwaite, “Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals” (1982) 73 The Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 723; Bruce Coleman, “Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?” (1975) 
29 Southwestern Law Journal 908.  Charles J. Walsh and Alicia Pyrich, "Corporate Compliance Programs as a 
Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?" (1995) 47 Rutgers Law Review 605;    
89 James W. Coleman, The Criminal Elite: The Sociology of White Collar Crime (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1985) 7 
90 M. Levi cited in Valerie P. Hans, “Attitudes Toward Corporate Responsibility: A Psycholegal Perspective” 
(1990) 69 Nebraska Law Review 159, 170. 
  
 
illustration of the greater potential of corporations to harm people.91  Mega power triggers 
mega crimes that result in mega harm.  
Corporate crimes are not just physically or financially harmful; they also break the moral 
support of a society. As F. Meier and J.F. Short add, corporate crime threatens the trust that is 
basic to community life. 92 Crimes committed by corporations trigger a general 
disillusionment. If the impunity of the powerful prevails, there is no hope for the powerless. It 
is perceived that the rules do not work for everybody. This feeling can erode a community. By 
virtually any criterion, then, corporate crime is the most serious crime problem.93  
3.4. Transnational corporate crime 
A peculiar and noteworthy characteristic of corporate criminals is their ability to 
commit crimes across the limits of national borders. This peculiarity is especially 
important for corporate crime control in Brazil. Corporate crimes are becoming more 
and more part of the international setting. This is mainly due to the phenomenon of 
globalization. With the rising of a new economic paradigm, corporations have found in 
developing countries the perfect place to commit illegalities. These kinds of crimes are 
called transnational crimes, and most of them occur in developing countries.94 
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to corporate criminality as they 
usually lack proper regulation and infrastructure to control the activities of 
                                                 
91 See e.g., “Bhopal: Absolutely Liable”, Economist, vol. 308, Issue 560, July 23 1988; “The Ghosts of Bhopal”, 
Economist, vol. 310, Issue 590, Feb. 18  1989. 
92 Mokhiber,supra 11 at 16. 
93 Coleman, supra note 18 at 7. 
94 Michael J.Gilbert  & Steve Russel, “Globalization of Criminal Justice in the Corporate Context” (2002) 38 
Crime, Law and Social Change 211. 
  
 
corporations. Developed nations tend to be tougher on corporate criminality whereas 
developing countries cannot afford to fight against corporations and risk to losing the 
economic “advantages” that corporations bring, such as more employment and support 
of social projects. Corporate attitudes like that are not only criminal, but also immoral, 
and for this reason alone criminal conduct of corporations should deserve particular 
attention and tougher control and sanctioning. 
The Shell case in Brazil is an example of this kind of criminal behaviour of 
corporations. In the seventies, the production of aldrin, diedrin and endrin by Shell 
Chemical Company was banned in the US, when it was detected that these 
organochlorine pesticides were carcinogenic and related to DDT. In 1977, a subsidiary 
of Shell Chemical in Brasil, the “Shell Química do Brasil,” started to produce these 
same pesticides - aldrin, dieldrin and endrin, three of the 12 P0Ps condemned by the 
Stockholm convention -  at the Recanto plant, in a residential area of the city of 
Paulínia in the state of São Paulo.The sale of these agricultural toxins was banned in 
Brazil in 1985, but production for export continued until 1990.In 1993, when Shell was 
selling various of its unites to Cyanamid, an environmental inspection was conducted in 
the Recanto plant. The inspection reported not only contamination of the land and of 
the river Atibaia but also a toxicological exam showed that 80 percent of the residents 
of the nearby area presented varying degrees of chronic diseases because of the 
  
 
contamination of the area. Shell faces a lawsuit, but still has not been held criminally 
responsible. 95
Gilbert and Russell advert to the harm that transnational crimes inflict on developing 
countries, and in their seminal work, “Globalization of Criminal Justice in the 
Corporate Context” they call for an international control of corporate crime as a matter 
of global justice. There is no doubt that the only way to control corporate criminality, 
especially transnational criminality, is to deal with such issues globally. However, for 
this to happen, a large number of countries, specially developing countries like Brazil, 
need to be aware of corporate crime and, most importantly, aware of the effectiveness 
of criminal law to control such deviance.  
3.5. Cost of corporate crime 
There are no official data on corporate crime in common law jurisdictions; governmental 
agencies do not bother to collect statistics on such issues. This is not different in Brazil. The 
lack of information on corporate criminality would be understandable in developing countries 
where commonly any data are very difficult to obtain and where, in most of the cases, 
corporations cannot be criminally liable; however, this is also a reality in developed nations. 
Unofficial research has shown that corporate crimes are not only more harmful than street 
crimes but also more costly.96 The economic cost of white-collar crime is vastly greater than 
                                                 
95 Victims of  the contamination are suing Shell in Brazil. See Mario Osaya, “Shell Group may face lawsuit in 
Brazil”, online: Terramérica, Medio Ambiente y Dessarolo, < 
http://www.tierramerica.net/2001/0826/iarticulo.shtml>.  
96 This type of data are published by public interest organizations, like citizenworks, directed by Ralph Nader., 
online: Citizenworks <http://www.citizenworks.org> 
  
 
the economic cost of street crime.97 The costs of corporate crime cannot be quantified, but it is 
estimated that in the Unites States it costs $ 1.5 trillion annually.98  Lee Drutman, in an article 
published in Los Angeles Times in 2003 reports that: 
[U]sing conservative numbers, issued by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for instance, 
criminologist Jeffrey Reiman, a professor at American University, estimated that the total 
cost of white-collar crime in 1997 was $338 billion. The actual cost is probably much 
greater. For instance, the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 
estimates that health-care fraud alone costs up to $100 billion each year. Another 
estimate suggests that the annual cost of antitrust or trade violations is at least $250 
billion. By comparison, the FBI estimated that in 2002, the nation's total loss from 
robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson was almost $18 billion. 
That's less than a third of the estimated $60 billion Enron alone cost investors, pensioners 
and employees.99
 
Even with no official data, it is not very complicated to reach the conclusion that corporate 
crime is more costly and causes more damage than individual. It is a simple matter of 
proportion. Corporations have more power, have fewer limits, and the results of their actions 
are larger, both negatively and positively. It is also clear that the more we know about 
corporate crime and how to control it, the less likely crimes would occur. Nonetheless, it 
does not seem that corporate crime will become an official issue, at least not until 
corporations are challenged by effective policies and sanctions. 
                                                 
97 Coleman, supra note 17 at 7. 
98 Unknown, “Cost of Corporate Crime: $ 1.5 Trillion Annually,” online: The Foundation for Tax Payers and 
Consumers Rights <http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/corporate/fs/fs003284.php3> 
99 Lee Drutman,  “Corporate Crime Acts Like a Thief in the Night” Los Angeles Times (4 November 2003) 
B.13. 
  
 
IV-  CONTROLLING CORPORATE CRIME: THE NEED OF 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
 
Introduction  
The harm caused by corporations can be measured by the power that they have. One 
way to control their power and to reduce the harm that they cause is by controlling 
their misbehaviour through effective sanctions. The role of criminal law is to bring 
corporate power to face criminal conviction for wrongdoing by making society aware 
of their crimes and by properly deterring them from committing crimes. The present 
criminal law has made attempts to effectively punish corporate wrongdoing, but the 
issue is still controversial and needs to be deeply analysed. It is necessary to employ a 
wider view of criminal law and of corporations in order to reconstruct criminal law 
and not to overlook its potential to be a better means of corporate punishment. 
Criminal law can actually contribute to the rearrangement of the chaotic social 
unbalance.  
4.1. Criminal sanctions and their role in controlling corporate crime 
The rationales for imposing criminal sanctions are the touchstone of criminal law. 
Philosophers, sociologists and legal scholars have continually questioned the use and 
efficacy of criminal sanctions. Why and how we should punish are everlasting 
uncertainties. Every answer is an attempt to place punishment as a reasonable device 
that is functional for a certain time frame. When the offender is a corporation, the 
  
 
  
 
                                                
difficulties of answering these core questions are larger and, for some commentators, 
they are insuperable. The use of criminal law to control corporate misbehaviour is an 
easy target for strong opposition. As Brickey points out, “one detects a current sense 
of uneasiness regarding the appropriate role and scope of corporate criminal 
liability.”100 The efficiency and utility of criminal sanctions against corporate entities 
are disbelieved and constantly attacked by an extensive number of critics.  
Some critics argue that corporate criminal liability serves no purpose. Their 
supporting arguments are numerous and diverse; they range from the inadequacy of 
criminal law principles to the inefficiency of the existing criminal law sanctions to 
deter corporate misbehaviour. It is believed that the only justifiable rationale to 
impose criminal sanctions against corporations is deterrence, but criminal sanctions 
are ill suited for this aim. The critique comes from two different fronts; one stream 
alleges that corporations are not susceptible to deterrence while another stream 
believes that they are but there is no need to use the criminal law apparatus. The 
former position believes that monetary penalties are the only sanctions that can be 
used, and monetary penalties do not deter corporations. The latter position maintains 
that civil liability covers many of the features that criminal liability does. 
At first sight, these challenging arguments might sound convincing, but they cry for a 
re-evaluation.  The reasons for not accepting the opposite views are twofold: this sort 
of comparison between civil and criminal law is undoubtedly oversimplistic, and 
 
100 Kathleen F.Brickey, “Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and Observation”  (1983) 
60 Washington University Law Quarterly 393 at 394. 
  
 
                                                
regarding corporate crime, criminal law cannot be seen through a traditional 
panorama. It requires going beyond traditional theories of deterrence and 
punishment.101 These theories must adapt to a new reality. It is pertinent to analyze 
the differing arguments, to question whether 1) the conventional rationales for 
criminal enforcement can be used to justify imposition of criminal penalties on 
corporations; 2) the criminal stigma is socially desirable; and 3) the options of 
criminal sanctions are efficient.  
4.1.1.  Retributivism as a sound principle for punishing corporations 
Deterrence might be the main goal of corporate punishment, but it is not the only one. 
Although discussions about the efficacy of criminal liability are mostly restricted to 
an analysis of their deterrent effect, some arguments can be made for their retributive 
character. The restorative and communicative character of criminal sanctions is as 
important as deterrence. Recognizing the fact that criminal sanctions imposed on 
corporations also carry a retributive function is a crucial step to break from the old 
conception that corporations have no personality. 
Retribution has been widely criticized as a justifiable rationale for imposing criminal 
sanctions to corporations.   The argument that the incorporeal nature of corporations 
immunizes them from retributive justifications for criminal liability and punishment 
is commonplace. The crux of this reasoning arises from the assumption that it is 
 
101 Gross cited  in Gilbert Geis  & Ezra Stotland, eds., White Collar Crime: Theory and Research 
(London: Sage Publications, 1980) at 73. 
  
 
                                                
impossible to attach blame to a corporate body102 because a corporation is not a 
person, it has no mind and it lacks the capacity to suffer moral condemnation. 103 In 
addition, it is stated that no retributivist parameter to impose punishment can be 
established because there is no balance between society and a corporate offender. 
These arguments are far from being persuasive and just reveal a narrow and orthodox 
view of criminal law and of the corporate entity itself. Kantian’s traditional 
retributivist ideas are taken for granted to justify this opposition. The pure Kantian 
retributive theory might be problematic when used to explain the use of criminal 
sanctions to punish corporations because it is essentially individualistic. It is built on 
concepts such as dignity and rational choice, notions that by their nature belong 
exclusively to individuals. According to the Kantian retributive approach, only people 
are free agents capable of making decisions; only people are rational agents, and if 
they do wrong, they deserve mistreatment. By punishing these offenders, society 
would be paying them pack for what they did. Thus, anthropomorphization would be 
the only way to attribute moral characteristics to an incorporeal entity. By doing that, 
corporations would still lack a personality of their own. 
The view that corporations are not persons and cannot be subjects of blame loses its 
meaning when facing a broader approach of corporate identity. The moral element 
that lies behind corporations’ misbehaviour might be different from the moral 
 
102 Comments, “The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability” (1982) 73 The Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology 582 at 583-85 (asserting that retributive theory is inapplicable in corporate 
context because corporations cannot be morally blameworthy).  
103 Ibid. at 584.  See also Daniel R  Fischel and Alan O. Sykes, “Corporate Crime”, (1996) 24-25 The 
Journal of Legal Studies 319 at 323 ;Comments, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, (1978) 69 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 40 at 41-42 . 
  
 
element that elicits individual misconduct, but it is still a moral element. Corporations 
are living organisms that create their own ways of working, acting and making 
choices. The board of directors, managers and other employees are, at the same time, 
distinct from the corporation, yet also highly influenced by and part of the culture that 
is inherent in each corporate environment. Corporations have their own identity, 
separate from their members, and this fact alone makes it possible to attach blame and 
censure to them. 
A corporation can be considered as similarly situated as an individual. It has a 
discrete identity within a community and expressive potential, that is to say, it 
objectively can be viewed as having an identity apart from its owners, managers, and 
employees to which expressive conduct can be ascribed. The identity of the 
corporation is also an important factor to attribute criminal responsibility under 
retributive principles.  
The “just desert” theory, a variant of the traditional retributive approach is also apt to 
justify the imposition of criminal punishment on corporations. This theory is based on 
the idea that the justification of punishment is to be found in its intrinsic character as 
a deserved response to crime. It asserts that the punishment should fit the crime, i.e, 
there has to be  proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the culpability 
of the offender. This account of retributivism would have a particular effect on 
corporate punishment. Considering that corporate crime can be much more serious 
  
 
                                                
than street crimes, according to this r104ationale, the punishment of corporations 
would consequently be harsher. 
If deterrence can never be regarded as the sole justification for criminal liability, it 
should not be seen as the only rational of corporate criminal liability.105 Naturally, of 
course, one does not need to limit the alternative justifications of punishment to 
purely retributive or purely utilitarian perspectives.106 Corporations, like individuals, 
deserve and should be morally condemned when they violate others’ rights. They are 
able to know what is and what is not a morally appropriate behaviour. Even in the 
corporate context, moral condemnation remains a valid aim of the criminal law.107  
4.1.2. Denunciation as an aim of corporate punishment 
Criminal punishment also has a communicative aspect and therefore a symbolic 
significance. 108
It carries an important meaning not only for the offender but also for the society: it 
communicates to offenders the censure or condemnation that they deserve for their 
 
104 See Andrew Von Hirsch, “Doing Justice: The Principle of Commensurate Deserts” in Hyman 
Gross and Andrew Von Hirsch (editors), Sentencing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), at 
243-256. 
105 See Charles Walsh & Alicia Pyrich “Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defence to Criminal 
Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?” (1995) 47 Rutgers Law Review 605 at 638 (Arguing that 
deterrence is not the sole aim of criminal sanctions- there is also a retributive aspect); Lawrence 
Friedman, “In Defence of Corporate Criminal Liability” (1999) 23 Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 833 at 841 (Retribution, too, has long been seen as providing normative support for criminal 
liability regimes). 
106Thomas, Charles W. & Hepburn, John R, Crime, Criminal Law and Criminology (Dubuque, Iwoa: 
WM. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1983) 426. 
107 Friedman, supra note 6 at  834. 
108See e.g. N. D. Walker, “The Ultimate Jusitification: Varieties of the Expressive Theory of 
Punishment” in Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Rupert Cross (London: 
Butterworths, 1981) at 109-121; Bernard E. Harcourt, “Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: 
Exploring the Relationship Between The Moral Limits of Criminal Law and The Expressive Function 
of Punishment”. 
  
 
                                                
crimes; and, it makes it clear to society what are its values and that its values are 
being protected. 
The expressive character of the punishment has a special implication for corporations. 
The symbolism that the imposition of a criminal sanction carries as an expression of 
society attitudes of resentment and indignation can be powerful enough to provoke a 
change in the corporation’s attitude.  
a)  Desirability of criminal stigma 
Criminal stigma is one of the most powerful effects of criminal law. It is said to be an 
effect and a sanction. As an effect, it is attached to other criminal sanctions and, as a 
sanction, it intends to attack the image of the corporation, the inner and public image. 
For those who challenge corporate criminal liability, criminal penalties imposed on 
corporations are believed to carry no or very little stigma because corporations as 
inorganic entities cannot be the subject of blame.109 In addition, it is said that 
stigmatization can cause some collateral effects; nevertheless, these consequences are 
not enough to represent a threat or even a real punishment because this reputational 
loss would refer just to the reluctance of others, such as customers and workers, to 
deal with the corporations in the future.110 Those arguments, however, miss the 
central point that corporations are not inorganic entities and they do have an internal 
“moral” code. They do care about their image, and as a result criminal stigma can be 
a useful tool to control their behaviour.  
 
109 Richard A. Posner., Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1992) 422. 
110 V.S. Khanna, “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?” (1996) 109 Harvard 
Law Review 1477 at 1500. 
  
 
                                                
Brent Fisse111 mentions that three reasons underlie the rivals’ arguments against the 
stigmatizing effect of criminal penalties on corporations: corporations are not 
appropriate subjects of blame, corporate crimes are not unwanted, and corporations 
cannot feel stigmatized by punishment. Fisse opposes these propositions, arguing that 
when society blame corporations, it is condemning the fact that people within the 
organization collectively have failed to avoid the offence to which corporate blame is 
attached. He also states that corporate offences can be unwanted in the same way that 
individual crimes are unwanted, and even to a passionate degree. Finally he concludes 
that business corporations typically attach considerable importance to having a good 
public image. For that reason, corporations are more likely to react positively to 
criminal stigma by attempting to repair their images and regain public confidence. 
The primary factor governing the efficacy of the stigma as a sanction is public 
awareness of the fact that a conviction has been registered. Kramer refers to moral 
opprobrium; according to his postulates, “the moral opprobrium” of society increases 
when a corporation is stigmatized by the imposition of a criminal penalty.112 When 
moral opprobrium is employed with respect to a human being, it has meaning in 
terms of his or her prestige as a neighbour, an employer, an employee or one in whom 
to place one’s trust. When it is employed in relation to a corporation, moral 
opprobrium has meaning in the terms of corporate image. It appears that a stained 
corporate image may result from criminal conviction, and that may trigger a variety 
 
111 Brent Fisse, “Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and 
Sanctions” (1983) 56 Southern California Law Review 1141 at 1147-1154. 
112 Notes and Comments, “Increasing Community control over Corporate Crime – A Problem in the 
Law of Sanctions”,  (1961- 1962) 71 Yale Law Journal 281 at 287, n. 35. 
  
 
                                                
of undesirable outcomes, such as the loss of present or future customers, stockholders 
and employees, or a public clamour for closer government regulation.  
Criminal stigma works together with other penalties, especially fines. If the fine alone 
seeks only economic effects, criminal stigma adds non-financial values that must be 
targets of corporate punishment as well. The profit loss can be a consequence of 
stigmatization, but it is certainly not its main objective. In harmony with Leigh`s 
conclusion that “It has been argued that the fine (…) must not be viewed in isolation. 
The social stigma associated with conviction must also be taken into account. 113  
There is no reason to believe that criminal stigmatization would not affect 
corporations. Society views corporations as capable of committing unwanted or 
morally offensive acts. Corporations can be held responsible and can be stigmatized 
as responsible agents. Therefore, criminal stigma deserves serious consideration as a 
device to deter corporations.  
As stated previously, corporate punishment and corporate responsibility are 
intrinsically correlated issues. The benchmark for the development of these fields is 
the nature of corporate entities, i.e., whether corporations are a reality or a fiction. It 
is sufficient to say that corporations as a reality, have moral values, image, and 
intention. Subsequently, corporations can be stigmatized and can be held responsible 
for their own criminal conduct. This echoes the main assumption of the present work: 
 
113L. H. Leigh, The Criminal liability of Corporations in English Law (London: Lowe & Brydone, 
1969) at 159. 
  
 
                                                
that corporations are blameworthy agents, and can, on a compelling basis, be 
responsible for their acts. 114
 
4.2. Criminal sanctions as potential restraints 
The imposition of an effective sanction to a corporate offender is crucial to the 
institution of corporate criminal liability.  The attribution of criminal liability would 
be in vain if the sanctioning mechanism available were not able to deter and to punish 
the corporate offender. Criminal fines lead the list of sanctions available, but other 
options are workable, such as publicity, equity fines and probation. Although 
monetary deprivation is a significant restraint factor, the most important deterrent 
aspect of criminal sanctions is stigmatization. The stigma that accompanies each 
criminal sanction is the ultimate deterrent against corporate crime.  
4.2.1. Criminal fines 
Criminal fines have traditionally been the penalty used against corporations. This is 
due to the deep-rooted belief that corporations are no more than profit-seeking entities 
and the only way to effectively punish them is to directly affect their takings. 
Theoretically, this systematic reasoning that underlies the imposition of criminal fines 
on corporations seems to be plain, yet when it comes into practice, the facts do not 
correspond to this idyllic construction. Opponents of corporate criminal liability 
 
114 A more compelling approach is delineated on chapter 8, where the question of corporations as  
moral persons is scrutinized.  
  
 
                                                
argue that there is no need for criminal fines if civil monetary penalties have the same 
function.  It is also largely said that, as presently administered, corporate fines lack 
credibility as profit-diminishing sanctions because they fail to penalize corporate 
offenders to the maximum extent possible115 and higher fines would produce 
overdeterrence that generates overspill and extortion. Some points must be addressed. 
First, corporations are primarily, but not exclusively, profit-seeking entities. Thus, 
civil fines would not be suited to deal with the other non-financial values of corporate 
conduct. In order to better punish corporations, the aim of fine must be reconsidered. 
Secondly, a fact to be considered is that certainty of punishment has a more deterrent 
effect than severity of punishment. Thirdly, the argument that criminal fines can 
cause overdeterrence and overspill is valid but mostly shortsighted.  
The most important reflection to be done when dealing with criminal fines as a 
corporation’s punishment is that their aim is not exclusively to diminish the profit of 
the corporate offender. Although criminal fines ostensibly deal with monetary values, 
it does not mean that other values are not at stake. Non-financial values must be 
considered as a goal of criminal fines. As Braithwaite states, “while a great deal of 
crime is committed for the sake of corporate profit, a great deal is not.”116Criminal 
fines can compensate, punish, deter and reeducate the offender. More important than 
the financial loss that they implicate is the message that they send to the offender and 
to the community.  
 
115 “Criminal fine as presently administered is totally ineffective as profit diminishing sanction” [Notes 
and Comments, supra note 12 at 285]. 
116 John Braithwaite, “Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry” (London: Routledge Kegan 
Paul plc, 1984) at 331. 
  
 
                                                
Because of this comprehensive role, criminal fines are preferable to civil fines in 
order to punish corporate misconduct. Criminal sanctions add an extra factor for cost 
benefit analyses: they present social and economic aspects not found in civil 
penalties.117 Criminal penalties are perceived as being greater deterrents than civil 
fines because criminal prosecutions and penalties carry a social stigma; it is this 
idiosyncrasy that distinguishes criminal and civil penalties.  
Critics speculate that if the cost of the fine is too low, it does not prevent corporate 
misbehaviour. It is believed that in a great number of cases, the punishment would 
appear as nothing, compared with the profit of the crime. If the cost of the fine does 
not affect the “pocket” of the corporation, criminality will still persist as the better 
choice. When the punishment is established which reaches only to a certain fixed 
point, the advantage of the crime may surpass the threat of the fine. It is generally 
accepted that small fines imposed on corporations can be as little more than “fees for 
licenses to engage in illegal activities.”118  
On the other hand, it is generally thought that severe penalties are not unsusceptible 
to failure and also produce serious problems. It is assumed that high fines that are 
disproportional to the harm caused don’t serve the deterrent purpose as well. As 
Fischel ascertains, “[S]anctions uncalibrated to the level of harm can have a quite 
pernicious effect when the target of a sanction is a corporation.”119 It is thought that 
 
117 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 6 at 635. 
118 Developments, “Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions” 
(1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 1226 at 1366. 
119 Ibid. at 323.  
  
 
                                                
costly fines may not impede corporate misbehaviour. This situation can cause 
overdeterrence and, consequently, it can result in harmful effects; it can affect third 
parties such as employees and most likely the consumer. 
At least two consequences are caused by overdeterrence: overspill and extortion. The 
first effect is said to be caused by the tendency for corporate penalties to fall most 
heavily on the least culpable. It is believed that the costs of a high fine have a 
propensity to spill over onto parties who cannot be considered blameworthy. This 
effect is explained by the analogy: “when the corporation catches a cold, someone 
else sneezes”.120 The parties that might be affected by the fine are the stockholders, 
bondholders and other creditors, lower echelon employees and the consumers. 
Stockholders and bondholders can suffer a reduction in the value of their dividends 
and securities. The work force of lower echelon employees might be the first affected 
group within the corporation. When the fine is enough to threaten the solvency of the 
company or at least to cause the shut down of a production line, the immediate 
response can be a cost-cutting operation through layoffs of lower echelon employees. 
The consumers may seem to be the most remote party, but they might also suffer the 
 
120 Coffee gives an example of how the value of the fine is an important standard: “For example, if a 
corporation having $10 million of wealth were faced with an opportunity to gain $ 1 million through 
some criminal act or omission, such conduct could not logically be deterred by monetary penalties 
directed at the corporation if the risk of apprehension were below 10%. That is, if the likelihood of 
apprehension were 8%, the necessary penalty would have to be $12.5 million (i.e., $ 1 million times 
12.5, the reciprocal of 8%). Yet such a fine exceeds the corporation’s ability to pay. In short, our 
ability to deter the corporation may be confounded by our inability to set an adequate punishment cost 
which does not exceed the corporation’s resources [Coffee Jr.,  John C, “No Soul to Damn: No Body 
to Kick’: An Unscalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment” (1981) 79 Michigan Law 
Review 386 at 401]. 
  
 
                                                
consequences of a high costly fine. For example, the excess of the fine can be 
recovered from the consumers in the form of high prices.   
The second effect, extortion, is assumed to be the reflection of the impact of large 
fines on the innocent corporation. The corporation, when faced with a gigantic fine, 
may have little choice but to settle and to surrender its opportunity to go to trial on the 
merits of its case. In short, an innocent corporation may be driven to settle.  From the 
economic point of view, the rational choice for the innocent corporation charged with 
a violation depends very much on the possible sanction.121 Yet, there is a safeguard 
for this.  It would be improper for a judge to accept a guilty plea if the case cannot be 
proved, and it is unethical for a defence lawyer to enter a guilty plea for a client if the 
client is innocent. However, in a case where the facts are sufficiently unclear such 
that there might have been a reasonable doubt about guilt, a corporation might choose 
not to contest this case had it gone to trial, and in this situation, it is not a completely 
innocent corporation. 
There is no doubt that high fines generate problems and might not be optimally 
efficient; however, the critique is limited, especially when one considers the 
connection between overdeterrence and shareholders and consumers. When the 
shareholders pay for the shares, the potential fines are reflected in the price that they 
pay. When corporations make profits from offences, which are not discovered, 
shareholders will directly benefit.  Shareholders must bear the responsibility for their 
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risks in return for the right to eject management whom they find unsatisfactory.122 It 
is not convincing to say that consumers would be directly affected by high fines. In 
highly competitive industries, a company cannot afford to put up prices in such an 
arbitrary fashion lest it lose sales to its competitors. In the case of oligopolies, 
corporations have to absorb the cost of fines because they do not directly control the 
price of their products.   
The arguments against the use of fines to punish corporations are unsound; they 
overlook the fact that certainty of punishment has a more deterrent effect than 
severity. The exclusive focus on the size of penalties is the result of a reductionist 
view of criminal sanctions, particularly criminal fines. Especially with corporations, 
this is a recurring argument, because of misconceptions about the nature and role of 
corporate entities. The likelihood that a corporation might be caught, made criminally 
accountable and be convicted is a bigger threat than the imposition of a high fine. 
What a fine represents is a more potent restraint than its value.  
Nevertheless, it is also a mistake to infer that the size of the fine is of no deterrence. 
High fines per se do not deter if they will not likely be imposed. On the other hand, 
small fines might not be a threat even when they will be certainly imposed. It has to 
be equilibrium, a point where the certainty and the amount to be paid work together 
as an effective restraint. It is tricky and intricate to calculate a fine which is both fair 
and effective. The objectives that are being pursued by the fine and an objective 
method of calculating fines are points that must be considered. As Chesterman 
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observes, “any pecuniary penalty, therefore, must balance the need to appear 
“substantial’ against the concern that it cannot be so large as to do any real damage to 
the company.123” 
Each jurisdiction has established its own parameters to calculate a fine imposed on a 
company. In France, the fine is calculated as a multiple of the individual fine for the 
same offence. In contrast, in Switzerland maximum fines are stipulated, and in 
Canada and Denmark there is no maximum limit.124 The methods to better calculate a 
fine thus must be improved; this echoes the criticism of Gunter Heine: “the law 
should more accurately define the intention of the penalty, and make explicit its 
underlying policy on deterrence and compliance.”125
Criminal fines are not unflawed; as with the whole field of corporate criminal liability 
they still need to be developed. If in some part they seem unsuitable for this end, on 
the other hand they can be adequate and efficient. Even the commentators who admit 
the ineffectiveness of criminal fines as a profit diminishing sanction, still call for its 
retention.126 Taking into account its deficiency, a helpful solution would be to 
combine it with other sanctions. Exclusive reliance on the fine is too simple and 
restricts its potentiality to deter corporate crime. Equity fines and other alternative 
sanctions seem to be valuable options.  
 
123 Chesterman, Simon, “The Corporate Veil, Crime and Punishment” (1994) 19 Melbourne University 
Law Review 1064 at 1073. 
124 Heine, Gunter “Sanctions in the Field of Corporate Criminal Liability” in Albin Eser, Gunter Heine 
and Barbara Huber eds., Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities – International 
Colloquium Berlin 1998, 237 at 242. 
125 Ibid. at  244. 
126 Notes and Comments, supra note 12 at 287, n. 17. 
  
 
                                                
4.2.2. Alternative sanctions 
After the dissipating effect of the applicability of criminal fines has been evaluated, it 
must be determined whether or not any criminal sanction, regardless of its nature – 
monetary or nonmonetary - can be effectively directed against corporations. As Fisse 
brilliantly states,  
[T]the question whether corporations can be punished in a just and effective 
way cannot be answered with certainty given the primitive state of existing 
knowledge. It is flat-earth thinking, however, to suppose that the range of 
options begins and ends with fines.127
A better approach would be to refine the idea of the corporation as a person. 
Corporations must be seen holistically, not just as profit seeking entities. This is the 
spinal cord for developments in the arena of corporate criminal liability.  Some 
suggested sanctions are equity fines, formal publicity and probation.128 It is not the 
scope of the present work to deeply analyze the issue of punishment and question 
what the optimal sanction would be; for this reason, the basic features of these three 
proposals will be briefly outlined.  
The equity fine is formulated to reshape severe penalties. The logic behind this 
sanction is the following: if a severe fine needs to be imposed in order to control 
 
127 Fisse, supra note 11 at 1242. 
128 Other penalties are also suggested: corporate rehabilitation, corporate quarantine, liberal 
construction of existing statutes and regulation, disqualification, behavioural sanctions, 
etc…[Comments, supra note 45 at 56]; Fisse also brings out community service, redress facilitation 
and managerial intervention as other options to existing penalties [Fisse, supra note 11 at 1234]. 
  
 
                                                
corporate misbehaviour, the fine should be imposed not in cash, but in the “equity 
securities of corporations.”129 As Coffee explains,  
[T]he convicted corporations should be required to authorize and issue such 
a number of shares to the state’s crime victim compensation fund as would 
have an expected market value equal to the cash fine necessary to deter 
illegal activity. The fund should then be able to liquidate the securities in 
whatever manner maximizes its return.130  
It is argued that an equity fine will not cause the company to suffer a cash crisis and 
that the burden will fall primarily on shareholders rather than employees, consumers 
or creditors because it is not paid out of liquid assets. The shareholder wealth is 
diluted, so the owners of a company might be encouraged to exercise control over 
management, producing a rehabilitative effect. “The equity fine simply subdivides the 
corporate pie into more and smaller pieces, and then redistributes a limited number of 
the pieces.”131
Regarding adverse publicity, there is no question that it produces harmful effects for a 
corporation. Corporations tend to take their public images very seriously. They 
cannot escape the incalculable effects which a conviction may have on the public 
attitude toward them. This publicity can be spread by the media and also by a 
government agency. The former can sometimes be based on unclear facts and might 
not be impartial in all cases, but still demonstrates that publicity can directly affect a 
corporation. The latter is a more trustful source and for that may gain public 
 
129 Coffee, supra note 20 at 413. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. at 416. 
  
 
                                                
confidence and reaction more easily. Formal publicity emanating from an 
administrative or judicial source has considerable credibility.  
Under the proposal of formal publicity, corporations would be required to give some 
sort of notice of a criminal conviction to the general public, or at least to those who 
might be financially interested. The notice could take the form of advertisements in 
appropriate media, or required clauses in contracts and other corporate documents.132 
As Dunford highlights, “the aim of exacting a formal publicity sanction must be more 
than simply to inflict monetary loss, for that can be done by the fine.”133 The 
objective of formal publicity is beyond profit grounds. It aims to make public the 
tarnished image of the corporation.  Yet, in spite of this fact, the financial damage to a 
corporation for injury to its corporate reputation can exceed the economic loss from 
fines. This proposition might not seem very sound at first sight, but it is really 
compelling when one thinks about the reaction of consumers and investors and even 
about the inner reaction of the corporation to this kind of exposure.  
Media publicity is not the only kind of publicity that works. Other types have been 
applied here and there but have lagged behind the aims of these proposals. The data 
show that it is an important step in corporate criminal liability. The greater hope for 
effective deterrence is the adverse publicity that accompanies the punishing of a 
corporation rather than the punishment per se.134
 
132 Comments, supra note 5 at 52. 
133 Louise Dunford and Ann Ridley, “No soul to be damned, No Body to be Kicked: Responsibility, 
Blame and Corporate Punishment” (1996) 24 International Journal of The Sociology of Law 1 at 14. 
134 Braithwaite, supra note 16 at 333. 
  
 
                                                
[I]n a recent empirical study of the impact of adverse publicity crises 
on seventeen major corporations, loss of corporate prestige, as distinct 
from financial loss, was found to be a significant concern of 
executives in all but two cases.135  
Finally, probation can also be added to the group of effective sanctioning against 
corporations. Customarily, probation is a soft sentencing option, a disposition in lieu 
of a punitive sentence.  As a criminal “penalty,” probation acquires a more punitive 
feature as an injunctive punitive order and deviates from its original goals. The terms 
of probation may require, for example, reduced fines to be paid to the federal treasury 
and the corporation to make restitution to the injured parties. In some circumstances, 
it may entail performance of community services by donating funds or providing 
services. Also, probation can involve organizational reform orders as managerial 
intervention that would require preventive policies or procedures to be modified or 
introduced to guard against repetition of an offence. Probation is mostly a 
rehabilitative device but still produces to a lesser extent deterrent and retributive 
effects. It is a way to uphold the conviction of the corporate criminal without holding 
the stigmatizing effect of it. Although probation does not engage directly in the 
profit-diminishing goal, some financial loss might be detected if the corporation 
needs to undertake measures to obey the probation order. 
In Canada, section 732. 1 (3.1) of the Criminal Code deals with probation orders and 
lists a number of additional conditions that a court may prescribe following the 
conviction of the corporate offender. These conditions include among others, to make 
restitution to a person for any loss or damage that they suffered as a result of the 
 
135 Fisse, supra note 11 at 1153. 
  
 
                                                
offence; and/or to establish policies, standards and procedures to reduce the 
likelihood of the organization committing a subsequent offence. The same statute also 
prescribes sentencing guidelines for corporate offenders in section 718.21. This 
section specifies a number of factors that should be taken into consideration when a 
court imposes sentence on a corporation, some of these factors are related to the 
conduct of the corporation after the commission of the offence like any restitution 
that the organization is ordered to make or any amount that the organization has paid 
to a victim of the offence and any measures that the organization has taken to reduce 
the likelihood of it committing a subsequent offence.136
There is no ideal sanction that can be securely used for punishing corporations; all 
sanctions have their flaws. But, the imperfections of the existing sanctions do not 
mean that they are not effective. It is not true that no sanction is better than a deficient 
sanction. The sanction should be chosen in each specific case. 
Criminal law has been under attack when it comes to its appropriateness and 
efficiency to control corporate criminality. In order to justify corporate criminal 
liability it is important to deconstruct the notion that any legal device must be totally 
appropriate and effective. The search for an ultimate solution for the problem of 
corporate criminal liability has been the greatest impediment for hopeful advances in 
this area. Once the idea of a perfect solution is discarded, criminal law appears to be 
more adequate. The claims that corporations cannot be punished because of the 
inadequacy or inefficiency of criminal law lose their credibility if it is accepted that 
 
136 Canadian Criminal Code, Sections 732. 1 (3.1) & 718. 21. 
  
 
partial satisfaction and efficiency are better than nothing. Civil and administrative law 
can and should replace criminal law in many areas. The minimal penal law theory 
seems to be an optimal solution for the problem of the excessive use of criminal law. 
However, in the case of corporate crime, neither civil nor administrative law seems to 
offer a better solution than criminal law. In addition, the argument that criminal law 
would be excessively used has no merit. Because corporate crime is not minimal, it 
has serious consequences and for that reason argues for strong legal control, that only 
criminal law can offer.  
  
 
                                                
V. ASSESSING COMMON LAW THEORIES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY  
 
 
Introduction 
The endorsement of criminal liability of corporations has largely been a twentieth 
century judicial development, influenced by the “sweeping expansion”137 of common 
law principles. The majority of theories of corporate criminal liability are typical of 
common law developments, they have been constructed on a case-by-case basis. 
Despite their importance, these theories have proved to be ineffective, for their lack 
of strong theoretical basis and their individualistic roots. Examples of these models 
are the agency theory and, in a more elaborate form, identification and aggregation 
theories. 
5.1. Agency Doctrine 
The agency theory was first developed in tort law and gradually “was carried over 
into the criminal arena.”138 According to this theory, the corporation is liable for the 
intents and acts of its employees. Vicarious liability (or respondeat superior) is 
commonly employed in the United States. In other jurisdictions, this theory is 
restrictively established in relation to some strict liability and hybrid offences that 
deal with matters such as pollution, food, drugs, health and safety at work but not to 
mens rea offences. 
 
137 Harvey L. Pitt, and Karl A Groskaufmanis., “Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A 
second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct” (1990) 78 The Georgetown Law Journal 1560 at 1560. 
138Nicolette Parisi, “Theories of Corporate Criminal Liability (or Corporations Don’t Commit Crimes, 
People Commit Crimes)” in Hellen Hochstedler, ed., Corporations as Criminals - Perspectives in 
criminal justice 6 (New York: Sage Publications, 1984) 41 at 44. 
  
 
                                                
The agency theory is based on the premise that criminal violations normally entail 
two elements, actus reus and mens rea. Since corporations are considered to be 
purely incorporeal legal entities, they do not posses any mental state and the only way 
to impute intent to a corporation is to consider the state of mind of its employees. The 
theory encompasses a simple and logical method of attributing liability to a corporate 
offender: if corporations do not have intention, someone within the corporations must 
have it and the intention of this individual as part of the corporation is the intention of 
the corporation itself. 
Courts in the United States, where the theory is widely used, have developed a three-
part test to determine whether a corporation will be held vicariously liable for the acts 
of its employees. First, the employee must be acting within the scope and course of 
her employment.139 Secondly, the employee must be acting, at least in part, for the 
benefit of the corporation, yet it is irrelevant whether the company actually receives 
the benefit or whether the activity might even have been expressly prohibited. 
Thirdly, the act and intent must be imputed to the corporation.140  
 
139 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491-495 (1909) (finding 
corporation liable because it acts only through its agents or employees whose knowledge and purpose 
may be attributed to the corporation); United States v. Photogrammetric Data Serv., 259 F 3d 229, 242 
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a corporation can act through the conduct of its agents). 
140 See In re Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 396(5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the imputation of knowledge 
is a creature of necessity); United States v. One Parcel of Land, 965 F. 2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(stating agent’s knowledge of illegal act may be imputed to corporation if agent was “acting as 
authorized and motivated at least in part by an intent to benefit the corporation” (citing Zero v. United 
States, 459 U.S. 991 (1982)). 
  
 
                                                
Scope of Employment  
The requirement that an employee must be acting within the scope of his or her 
employment is met if the employee has actual or apparent authority to engage in the 
act in question.141 Actual authority exists when a corporation knowingly and 
intentionally authorizes an employee to act on its behalf. 142 In New York Central 
Railroad,143 the first Supreme Court case holding a corporation criminally liable, the 
corporation was convicted of violating the Elkins Act where a general and an 
assistant traffic manager paid rebates for shipments of sugar. The agents acted within 
the scope of actual authority because they were authorized to set up freight rates. 
Therefore, they acted within the scope of authority conferred upon them by the 
corporation. In United States v. Investment Enters., Inc., the company was convicted 
of violating obscenity laws where the corporation's president conspired to transport 
obscene videos in interstate commerce. The president's unlawful acts could be 
imputed to the corporation because he was an "undisputedly authorized agent."144
A corporation’s liability can be extended to acts performed within the agent’s 
apparent authority. Apparent authority is defined as the authority that has not been 
 
141 See United States v. Investment Enter Inc., 10 F. 3d 263, 266 (5th Cir.1993) (stating that a 
corporation is criminally liable for the unalwful acts of its agents, provided that the conduct is within 
the scope of the agent’s authority, whether actual or apparent); Meyers v. Bennet Law Offices, 238 F. 
3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir 2001) (rejecting fact that employee acted outside scope of authority because 
employee had at least apparent authority to take actions). 
142 See New Hampshire v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A. 2d 530, 535 (N.H. 1997) (stating actual 
authority exists when “the principle explicitly manifests its authorization for the agent to act”) 
(citations omitted). 
143 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co, supra note 3 at 481-489. 
144  Investment Enters., Inc., supra note 5 at 266. 
  
 
                                                
expressly agreed but can be understood by a third party from the context of the 
agent’s acts. It is the  
[A]uthority which an outsider could reasonably assume that an agent 
would have judging from his position within the company, and the 
responsibility previously entrusted to him, and the circumstances 
surrounding his past conduct. 145  
The question of whether an employee acted in the scope of his or her authority is 
differently determined by each source of law and factual framework. Federal courts 
have constantly held that a corporation may be liable for the actions of its agents 
regardless of the agent’s position within the corporation.146 These Courts have found 
that an employee’s act can bind the corporation even where the corporation has 
implemented policies prohibiting the behaviour. When an employee’s conduct is 
contrary to the company’s compliance policies and specific directives, the company 
can still be held liable. 147 The company can prove that it has established corporate 
policies in an effort to reduce crime, but this does not prevent a court from finding it 
criminally liable. The existence of an effective compliance policy will not provide an 
 
145 See United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741 F. 2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating apparent 
authority is authority “which outsiders would normally assume the agent to have, judging from his 
position with the company and the circumstances surrounding his past conduct” (quoting Cont’l 
Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F. 2d 137, 151 (6th Cir. 1960)). 
146 See In re Hellenic Inc., supra note 4 at 395 (recognizing that although courts generally agree that 
the actions of high managerial officials may be imputed to corporations, courts are not in agreement 
with respect to actions of lower level employees; decisions in such cases should  be based on scope of 
employee’s responsibilities rather than his official rank within company). 
147 See United States v. Portac Inc., 869 F 2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming company’s conviction 
although supervisor of agent who committed infraction had expressly told agent that company did not 
permit violations of law) (citing United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F. 2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 
1792)); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F. 2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) (‘The fact that 
many of [employees’] actions were unlawful and contrary to corporate policy does not absolve 
[defendant] of legal responsibility for their acts”). 
  
 
                                                
absolute defence from criminal liability,148 but the company may qualify for a 
reduced penalty.   
The concept of “scope of employment” is common and has broad interpretations; 
thus, courts have held that even non-employees conduct can be attributed to be as the 
corporation’s action. In United States v. Parfait Powder, it was held that independent 
contractors might act for the benefit of the corporation thereby exposing it to criminal 
liability.149  
Many states have adopted specific legislative strategy to deal with corporations that 
requires criminal acts be committed by “high managerial agents” in order to trigger 
liability.150 This position closely resembles the identification theory. In some states, 
however, the rule is that the actions taken by a corporation’s agents need not have 
been ratified by the corporation’s directors, officers, or other high managerial agents 
in order to be chargeable to the corporation.151
 
148 Dan K. Webb et al., “Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability,”  
(1994) 49 Bus Law 617 at 624 cited in Matthew E. Beck & Matthew E. O’Brien, “Corporate Criminal 
Liability (annual white collar crime survey)” (2000) 37 American Law Review 261 at 268, n.37. 
149 See United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008, 1009-1010 (7th Cir. 1947) (affirming 
conviction of company for violations of Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act committed by its 
independent contractor),the defendant entered into an independent contractor agreement in which the 
contractor would manufacture and distribute the defendant’s cosmetic products. Unbeknownst to the 
defendant, the contractor used ingredients that had not been approved under the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act. The defendant argued that since the contractor, and not the defendant company had 
committed the crime, the defendant corporation should not be liable. The Seventh Circuit rejected 
these arguments stating that these were the risks the corporation bore when it assigned manufacturing 
and distribution responsibilities to the contractor. 
150Some States that have adopted this standard: Arizona, Tennessee, Utah, Iowa, Texas, Arkansas, 
Ohio, Washington. 
151 Zeta Chi Fraternity supra note 6 at 535 (“The criminal conduct need not have been ‘performed, 
authorized, ratified, adopted or tolerated by the corporation[‘s] directors, officers or other ‘high 
managerial agents’ in order to be chargeable to the corporation.” (quoting Com. V. L.A.L. Corp., 511 
N.E. 2d 599, 601 (Mass. 1987)). 
  
 
                                                
A stricter standard can be found in the Model Penal Code. The Code requires, as an 
additional element that the commission of the offence be 
 [A]uthorized, requested, commanded, performed or 
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high 
managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation within 
the scope of his office or employment.152  
By differentiating the ascription of liability based on the actions of agents and based 
on the actions of high managerial agents, the Code directly distinguishes between the 
ability of managerial employees and lower employees to understand and prevent 
crime.153
Benefiting the Corporation 
The second element of corporate criminal liability according to the theory of 
vicarious liability is that the act benefits the company. The benefit need not be real, 
yet potential. As Hall points out, “for this requirement, the corporation need not 
actually receive a benefit; the employee’s mere intention to bestow a benefit 
suffices.”154 It is not necessary that the employee be primarily concerned with 
benefiting the corporation since many employees act primarily for their own personal 
 
152 US Model Penal Code [sections] 2.07 (1) (c) (1962). 
153 Model Penal Code § 2.07 (1) (c) (1962) and § 2.07 (4 (b (1962). 
154 Joseph Hall ”Corporate Criminal Liability (Thirteenth Survey of White Collar Crime)” (1998) 35 
American Criminal Law Review 549 at 554. See Zero v. United States, 689 F. 2d 238, 242 (1st Cir. 
1982) (holding that employee must have been “motivated at least in part by an intent to benefit the 
corporation”; United States v. Automated Med. Labs., supra note 11 at 407 (“[W]hether the agent’s 
actions ultimately redounded to the benefit of the corporation is less significant than whether the agent 
acted with the intent to benefit the corporation). 
  
 
                                                
gain.155 Although the corporation did not actually gain from the action156 or the agent 
violated a company policy,157 liability may still be imputed to a corporation. 
5.2 Identification Theory 
The doctrine of identification is the traditional method by which companies are held 
liable in most countries under the principles of the common law.158 The limitations of 
the agency theory led to the construction of a direct liability theory. This theory was 
developed as an attempt to overcome the problem of imposing primary, as opposed to 
vicarious, corporate criminal liability for offences that insisted on proof of criminal 
fault.159 In Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v. Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd,160 Viscount 
 
155 City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F. 2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Bainbridge Mgmt., 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16686 at *15 (N.D. III Sept. 5, 2002) (“To impute liability 
a[n] agent must have intended to benefit the corporation or partnership, not merely his own interests.”). 
156 Automated Med Labs., supra note 11 at 407 (“[I]t is not necessary for an agent’s actions to have 
actually benefited the corporate entity.” (citing Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d 905 (4th 
Cir. 1945)).  
157 Portac Inc., supra note 11 at 1293 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming company’s conviction although 
supervisor of agent who committed infraction had expressly told agent company did not permit 
violations of law (citing United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F. 2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972)); 
Automated Med. Labs., supra note 11 at 407 (holding company liable for acts of its employees despite 
the fact many of acts were contrary to company policy). 
158 See e.g. Tesco Supermarket v. Nastrass [1971] 2WLR 1166: England; Hamilton v. Whitehead 
(1988) 166 C.L.R. 121: Australia; Canadian Dredge Dock Co Ltd v The Queen (1985) 19 D. L.R (4th) 
314: Canada; Nordik Industries Ltd v Regional Controller of Inland Revenue (1976) 1 N.Z.L.R 194: 
New Zealand.  
159 Matthew Goode, “Corporate Criminal Liability,” online: < 
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/26/gppde.pdf> 
160 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v. Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705. Lennard’s Carrying 
Company, Limited was the owner of  a steamship. This ship was loaded with benzene. The Asiatic 
Petroleum Company, Ltd was the purchaser of this cargo. Whilst in the course of her voyage from 
Novrossik to Rotterdam the ship and her cargo were destroyed by fire. The Asiatic Petroleum company 
brought an action against the owners of the Steamship for damages for loss of the cargo. The managing 
director of Lennard’s Carrying Company was the registered managing owner and took an active part in 
the management of the ship on behalf of the owners. He knew or had the means of knowing of the 
defective condition of the boilers, but he gave no special instructions to the captain or the chief 
engineer regarding their supervision and took no steps to prevent the ship putting to sea with her 
boilers in an unseaworthy condition. The Court of Appeal held that the owners had failed to discharge 
the onus which lay upon them of proving that the loss happened without their actual fault or privity. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Haldane fashioned a model of primary corporate criminal liability for offences that 
require mens rea that would later be known as the identification theory. In the light of 
Haldane’s judgment:  
[A] corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own 
any more than it has a body of its own; its active and 
directing will must consequently be sought in the person of 
somebody, who for some purposes may be called an agent, 
but who is really the directing mind and will of the 
corporation; the very ego and centre of the personality of 
the corporation.161
As in the agency theory, the identification theory relies on an individual to attribute 
liability to a corporation. However, while the former doctrine simply imitates tort 
principles, the latter adjusts these principles to the reality of corporate misconduct. 
Furthermore, the identification theory introduces the personification of the corporate 
body. According to this theory, the solution for the problem of attributing fault to a 
corporation for offences that require intention was to merge the individual within the 
corporation with the corporation itself. Unlike the agency theory, the individual 
employee is assumed to be acting as the company and not for the company.  The 
theory de-emphasized the need for the development of vicarious liability. The agency 
theory has now been considered as unjust and lacking in defensible penal rationale.162  
Guilty mind 
The main underlying principle of the identification theory is the detection of the 
guilty mind, the recognition of the individual who will be identified as the company 
 
The Steamship company appealed  but the Court of Appeal decision was affirmed by the House of the 
Lords. 
161 Lennard at  713. 
162 See Goode, supra note 24.  
  
 
                                                
itself, who will be the company’s very ego, vital organ, or mind. Tesco Supermarket 
v. Nastrass,163 is the leading authority in this area. Tesco Supermarket was a large 
chain store which was charged with an offence against the Trade Descriptions Act 
1968164 by selling goods to consumers at a price different than had been announced. 
The prosecution concerned the advertisement of soap powder at a reduced price. A 
shop assistant had mistakenly placed normally priced soap powder on the shelf. The 
manager had failed to ensure that the powder was available at the advertised price. 
There was a defence of due diligence which could be pleaded by the company, unless 
the manager’s lack of due diligence could be attributed to the company.165 The 
question was whether the manager of the store could be identified with the company 
via the common law doctrine, or in other words, what natural person or persons are to 
be treated as being the corporation itself. 
The House of Lords held that the manager was not a person of sufficiently important 
stature within the corporate structure to be identified as the company for this purpose, 
and since there had been due diligence at the level of top management, the company 
could use the defence. The metaphor used by Lord Denning in an earlier case was a 
reference in this decision: 
 
163Tesco Supermarket v. Nastrass [1971] 2WLR 1166. [Tesco] 
164  Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s. 20 (1): “Where an offence under this Act which has been 
committed by a body corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent and connivance 
of,…any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate, …he as well as the 
body corporate shall be guilty of that offence…” 
165 Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s. 24 (1):“In any proceedings for an offence under this Act it 
shall…be a defence for the person charged to prove-(a) that the commission of the offence was due 
to…the act or default of another person,…and (b) that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised 
all due diligence to avoid the commission of such an offence...” 
  
 
                                                
A company may in many ways be likened to a human 
body. It has a brain and a nerve centre which controls what 
it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in 
accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the 
people in the company are mere servants and agents who 
are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be 
said to represent the directing mind and will of the 
company, and control what it does. The state of mind of 
these managers is the state of mind of the company and is 
treated by the law as such.166
The manager of the store was not considered as the mind of the store. Instead, he was 
regarded as a servant, the hands of the store. In order to give some guidance for the 
problem of who is to be considered as the corporation itself for the purposes of 
imputing liability, some standards were articulated in Tesco Supermarket v. Nastrass. 
Lord Reid stated that, 
 [N]ormally the board of directors, the managing director and 
perhaps other superior officers of a company carry out the functions 
of management and speak and act as the company.167  
Viscount Dilhorne explained that in his view “a person who is in actual control of the 
operations of a company or of part of them and who is not responsible to another 
person in the company”168 would be the directing mind and will of the company. 
Lord Pearson underscored this reasoning adding that the constitution of the company 
concerned should be taken into account in order to indicate if the person is in a 
position of being identifiable with the company.169
 
166 Tesco, supra note 57at 1177, quoting Denning L.J, in H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. T. J. 
Graham & Sons Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 159 at 172.  
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid at 1192. 
169 Ibid at 1195. 
  
 
                                                
Tesco’s criterion is still the most frequently used for determining whose corporate 
agent can be identified as the embodiment of the corporation itself. According to 
these established pattern, the guilty mind, the “ego” or ‘brain” of the company must 
be a “vital” organ of the company, an individual who is sufficiently senior within the 
corporate structure to represent, metaphorically, the mind of the company. Generally, 
the guilty mind can be identified with the board of directors, the top officers of the 
corporation, those who are delegated responsibility, and those that have duties of such 
responsibility that their conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the 
corporation.   
The array of personnel whose acts can be imputed to the company varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Australian courts have shown a marked tendency 
to apply Tesco principles. Some American states and the American Model 
Penal Code also accept this approach.170 In England, where the principles 
were molded, the Tesco standard is strictly followed, yet it can be shaped 
differently in every situation. For example, in Meridian Global Fund 
Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission,171 Lord Hoffman172 stated 
that in each case the court had to fashion a special rule of attribution for the 
particular substantive rule.173Canadian courts adopted a broader view of the 
 
170 American Model Penal Code § 2.07(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) stating that the corporation’s 
agent is a “senior managerial agent.”  
171 Meridian Global Fund Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500 PC 
172 Lord Hoffman cited in Grantham, Ross,” Corporate Knowledge: Identification or Attribution,” 
(1996) 59 The Modern Law Review at 733. 
173 Although Clarkson refers to Lord Hoffman decision as an ameliorated identification doctrine, Ross 
Grantham  considers that Lord Hoffman rejected the identification approach, and suggested that 
principles of agency are but one aspect of the true principle upon which a company is bound, that of 
  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Tesco principles and stretched the set of personnel that can be identified with 
the company itself.174  The wider Canadian position can be contrasted with 
the restricted English application of the doctrine of identification, established 
in Tesco.  In Canadian Dredge & Dock175 the distinctive posture is clearly 
defended in a comparative ground:  “The application of identification rule in 
Tesco, supra, may not accord with the realities of life in our country.”176 Then 
it is said that the simple size of Canada means that corporations may be 
widespread, and consequently may have a decentralized control, which 
implies that the directing minds and will can be found in different geographic 
locations. Estey J. stated that: 
This must be a particularly so in a country such as Canada where 
corporate operations are frequently geographically widespread. 
The transportation companies, for example, must of necessity 
operate by the delegation and subdelegation of authority from the 
corporate centre: by the division and subdivision of the corporate 
brain; and by decentralizing by delegation the guiding forces in 
the corporate undertaking.177
Bill C-45, enacted on November 7th 2003,  extends the concept of directing mind; it 
uses the expression “senior officers" to include everyone who has an important role in 
setting policy or managing an important part of the organization’s activities.178For 
crimes of negligence, the bill proposes a departure from the concept of directing mind 
when it states that mental element of the offence will be attributable to corporations 
 
attribution (see CVM Clarkson, Corporate Culpability, online: < cmvc1@leicester.ac.uk>, and Ross 
Grantham, Corporate Knowledge: Identification or Attribution, 59 The Modern Law Review 1996) 
174 See e.g., R. v. Canadian Dredge & Dock Ltd. (1985) 10 CCC (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
175 Canadian Dredge and Dock, supra note 35. 
176 Ibid at  313.  
177 Ibid at 312-313.  
178  S.C. 2003, c. 21, s. 2, now ss. 22.1 and 22.2 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. 46. 
  
 
                                                
and other organizations through the aggregate fault of the organization’s “senior 
officers” (which will include those members of management with operational , as 
well as policy-making, authority).179
 
 
5.3. Aggregation theory 
Over the past decades the corporation’s internal structures have been altered and 
expanded. Large modern corporations are no longer set up with a clear, pyramid-like 
hierarchal structure of authority and power. On the contrary, modern corporations 
have multiple power centers that share in controlling the organization and setting its 
policy. The complexity of this new setting has created some challenges for the 
imposition of criminal liability to corporations under the traditional approaches. 
Sometimes power and influence are extremely diffused in the corporation context so 
that it is almost impossible to isolate the responsible individual whose intention could 
be attributed to the corporation itself. The aggregation or collective knowledge 
doctrine was developed as a response to this puzzling scenario.  
The aggregation theory is grounded in an analogy to tort law in the same way as the 
agency and identification doctrine. Under the aggregation theory, the corporation 
aggregates the composite knowledge of different officers in order to determine 
liability. The company aggregates all the acts and mental elements of the important or 
 
179 Ibid.  Section 22.1 (b) 
  
 
                                                
relevant persons within the company to establish whether in toto they would amount 
to a crime if they had all been committed by one person.180 According to Celia Wells, 
“aggregation of employees’ knowledge means that corporate culpability does not 
have to be contingent on one individual employee’s satisfying the relevant culpability 
criterion.”181
The theory of aggregation is a result of the work of American Federal Courts. The 
leading case is United States v. Bank of New England,182 where the bank was found 
guilty of having failed to file CTRs (currency transactions reports)183 for cash 
withdrawals higher than $10, 000. The client made thirty-one withdrawals on separate 
occasions between May 1983 and July 1984. Each time, he used several checks, each 
for a sum lower than the required total, none of which amounted to $10, 000. Each 
check was reported separately as a singular item on the Bank’s settlement sheets. 
Once the checks were processed the client would receive in a single transfer from the 
teller, one lump sum of cash which always amounted to over $10,000. On each of the 
charged occasions, the cash was withdrawn from one account. The Bank did not file 
CTRs on any of these transactions. Each group of checks was presented to a different 
teller at different times.  
 
180 Clarkson, supra note 67. 
181 Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) at 156. 
182 United States v Bank of New England. (1987) 821 F. 2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert. Denied, 484 U.S. 943. 
183 The Currency Transaction  Reporting Act ( 31 C. F. R  § 103.22 91986) requires banks to file 
Currency Transaction Reports within fifteen days of customer currency transactions exceeding 
$10,000. 
  
 
                                                
In this case, the question was if any knowledge and will could be attributed to the 
corporate entity. The trial judge found that the collective knowledge model was 
entirely appropriate in such context, and stated as much:  
In addition, however, you have to look at the bank as an institution. As such, its 
knowledge is the sum of all the knowledge of all its employees. That is, the 
bank’s knowledge is the totality of what all of the employees knew within the 
scope of their employment. So, if employee A knows of one facet of the 
currency reporting requirement, B knows another facet of it, and C a third facet 
of it, the banks know them all. So, if you find that an employee within the scope 
of his employment knew that the [reports] had to be filed, even if multiple 
checks are used, the bank is deemed to know it if each of the several employees 
knew a part of the requirement and the sum of what the separate employees 
knew amounted to the knowledge that such a requirement existed.184
The partisans of collective knowledge explain that the difficulty of proving 
knowledge and wilfulness in a compartmentalized structure such as a corporation 
should not be an impediment to the formation of the corporation’s knowledge as a 
whole. According to these positions, it is not essential that one part be aware of the 
intention and act of the other part for the formation of aggregate knowledge. In Bank 
of New England, it was explained that: 
Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific 
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those 
components constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation. It 
is irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an operation 
know the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the 
operation.185
 
184 Bank of New England at 855. 
185 Ibid at 856. 
  
 
                                                
This theory appears to combine the respondeat superior (vicarious liability) principle 
with one of “presumed or deemed knowledge.”186 Even if no employee or agent has 
the requisite knowledge to satisfy a statutory requirement needed to be guilty of a 
crime, the aggregate knowledge and actions of several agents, imputed to the 
corporate executive, could satisfy the elements of the criminal offence.  
In spite of the wide interpretation of the aggregation theory employed in Bank of New 
England decision, American courts have been careful with the application of this 
ruling. Some federal courts have had a narrower understanding, and distinguished 
collective knowledge from collective intent or collective recklessness. According to 
this version, the attribution of mens rea or intent or recklessness to a corporation 
necessarily depends on the full development of this culpable state of mind in one of 
the corporation’s employees. Contrary to the Bank of New England decision, 
American courts understand that a corporation could not be deemed to have a 
culpable state of mind when that state of mind is not possessed by a single employee. 
In Inland Freight Lines187 it was clarified that corporate collective knowledge and 
collective criminal intent do not necessarily have the same meaning. 
The idea of aggregate knowledge is fundamental to the notion of  corporate fault; it 
represents a departure from the paradigm that intention must come from a single 
individual. However, as to be expected, the rupture with old concepts is not  brusque, 
 
186 Ronald L Dixon, “Corporate Criminal Liability” in  Margaret. P Spencer and  & Ronald R Sims, 
eds, Corporate Misconduct (Westport, US: Quorum books, 1995) 41 at 52.  
187 Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F. 2d 313 (10th cir. 1951) at  315-316. This case 
involved the Commerce Act’s prohibition against maintaining false time logs for the drivers.  
  
 
which is the reason why individualism is still present in the collective knowledge 
theory. Corporate fault is the fault of the group and not of the corporation itself.  This 
fact does not take merit away from the aggregation theory. Common law theories 
have been the necessary bridge between the individualistic and organizational 
approaches. They are bringing back to life principles of criminal law that have 
prevailed before the prevalence of the principle that only individuals commit crimes. 
In all of these theories, corporate fault is still traced back to an individual or a group 
of individual, yet they allow the attribution of criminal liability to corporations. 
  
 
                                                
 
VI.  THE NATURE OF CORPORATIONS: CORPORATIONS AS REAL 
AND AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES 
 
 
Introduction 
Different theories  about the nature of corporations have been determinants of the 
position taken by theorists of corporate criminal liability.188 As Brummer notes, “a 
theorist’s view of the nature of the corporation often disposes him or her to advocate 
a particular kind of theory of corporate responsibility.”189Theories of corporate 
criminal liability are an extension and a reflection of values and concepts developed 
by studies on corporate life and behaviour. Before the discussion of the theories of 
corporate criminal liability, an incursion to some ideas on the nature of corporations 
is in order.  This chapter will succinctly describe a few models proposed in different 
disciplines such as law, economics, and sociology. In spite of the fact that each of 
these disciplines approaches the issue of corporate life and behaviour in its own way, 
a combined analysis converges to create a more compelling image of the corporation.  
6.1. Theories of Legal Personality  
Theories of legal personality were created to solve problems of property and rights in 
civil law. Because organizations were growing in number and influence, the Romans 
 
188 David Millon highlights that theorizing about “what corporations are” has in fact occupied a great 
deal of home-grown mental energy and has played an important role in arguments about concrete 
questions of corporate criminal liability  [David Millon., “Theories of The Corporation” (1990) Duke 
Law Journal 201, 201).  
189James J. Brummer, Corporate Responsibility and Legitimacy: An Interdisciplinary Analysis (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1991) 71.  
  
 
                                                
had to create legal theories to regulate these groups. Leicester observes that “[t]he 
idea that a social group can have a personality, albeit a special sort of personality, is 
one of the great organizing devices of legal art.” 190  However, theories of legal 
personality are often considered irrelevant to modern legal debate.191 Theories of 
corporate criminal liability do not show an explicit or consistent commitment to one 
particular theory of legal personality; they have developed with little or no attention 
to debates about the legal personality of corporations. Despite this independence of 
theories of corporate liability from theories of legal personality, it would be somehow 
precipitous to reject the influence of the former in the development of the latter. 
Whether we regard a corporation as a fiction or a reality has clear implications for the 
theory of legal liability to be adopted.  
The very substance of the corporate body is controversial, with the ensuing debate 
generating a variety of principles and theories. According to W. H. Jarvis, “it would 
be difficult to find any area of legal speculation that has given rise to as much 
analytical jurisprudence as that of corporate personality.”192 As a result, theories of 
corporate personality are numerous and diverse.193 The differences among some of 
 
190 Leicester C. Webb, ed., Legal Personality and Political Pluralism (Victoria: Melbourne University 
Press, 1958), v.  
191 “According to Dewey and Hart, this is a question which is irrelevant in the day to day solution of 
practical problems.” (L.H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (London: 
Lowe & Brydone, 1969) at 6. Bonham and Soberman, also call attention to the fact that legal theories 
of personality can not interpret adequately the phenomenon of juristic personality (D. Bonham & D. A. 
Soberman, “The Nature of Corporate Personality” in  Jacob Ziegel, ed., Studies in Canadian Company 
Law, v. 1 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) 3 at 15. 
192  W. H Jarvis, “Corporate Criminal Liability: Legal Agnosticism” (1961) Western Law Review 1 at 
9.  
193 Wolff affirmed that the number of theories was assessed at 1938 at 16 [Martin Wolff, “On the 
Nature of Legal Persons” (1938) 54 Law Q. Rev. 494, at 494)]. 
  
 
                                                
these theories sometimes are a matter of degree rather than substance; 194 hence, the 
analysis will be restricted to two major groups of theories that have attracted the most 
attention: fiction and reality theories. 
6.1.1. Fiction theory 
Fiction theory is a creation of Roman law, advocated by German scholars of the 19th 
Century, and still prevails today.195 According to this theory, legal entities are 
considered abstractions; they are “artificial beings, invisible and intangible.” 196 In 
harmony with the fiction theory “just human beings can be subjects of legal relations, 
but a legal entity can be treated as a person through abstract means,”197 to facilitate 
certain functions. Legal personality is attributed merely for legal and business 
convenience.  
This theory asserts  that legal entities are creations of the law, and possess only those 
properties conferred by the law. In this view, corporations, as legal entities, are 
considered to be constructs of law and not natural phenomena. 198 The fiction theory 
 
194 A similar observation is made by Bonham and Soberman, the authors state that the theories of 
corporate personality have been refined into numerous sub-theories but none of the sub-theories really 
illuminates the subject and all of them inevitably led back to either of the two main opposing theories, 
but mainly to the fiction theory (Bonham and Soberman, supra note 5 at 7). 
195According to Savigny, Roman lawyers were the creators and strict adherents of the fiction theory; 
Sailleiles argues that fiction theory was essentially an invention of modern times. See Frederick Hallis, 
Corporate Personality: A Study in Jurisprudence (London: Oxford University Press London- 
Humphrey Milford, 1930) at 3. 
196 Jarvis, supra note 6 at 11. 
197 F. M. Sanctis, Responsabilidade Penal da Pessoa Jurídica  (São Paulo, Brazil1: Saraiva,  1999) at 
8. 
198 Harry Glasbeek, “Wealth by Stealth” (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002) at 7. 
  
 
                                                
does not assert that the law recognizes pre-legally existing persons, “it maintains that 
the law creates all of its own subjects.”199  
The view that corporations are not real entities has serious implications for the 
attribution of liability. This very notion that corporations are not real entities lies 
behind attacks to corporate personhood and corporate criminal liability. For the 
asserters of this anti-corporate criminal liability position, corporations could never be 
held criminally liable because they are merely artifices created by law.  In addition, it 
can be argued that as non-humans, mere fictions, corporations can not have a state of 
mind, nor can they carry out an act.200 “It [a corporation] cannot act; it cannot think. 
It can only do so when some real people, with flesh and blood and a mind, do so on 
its behalf.”201 The fictionist argument makes it easy for corporations to evade 
criminal liability. Celia Wells concludes that fiction theory can be an accomplice in 
the corporation’s lack of accountability.202  
6.1.2.  Reality theory  
Reality theory emerged as a reaction of sociological jurisprudence to the rigid and 
positivistic notion of persona ficta offered by the fiction theory. The reality theory 
resides in Germanic legal tradition; it was developed in the first half of the nineteenth 
century in order to influence some imminent modifications to the German Civil Code. 
 
199Peter A. French,. Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984) at 35. 
200 See eg. Glasbeek supra note 12;  
201 Glasbeek , ibid  at 12.  
202 Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) at 83. 
 
  
 
                                                
The basic assumption of the reality theory is that corporate bodies are real persons as 
opposed to the notion espoused by the fictionists that corporate bodies are legal 
creations. According to the reality theory, the law merely recognizes the existence of 
corporate bodies rather than creating the corporate entities.203 The crucial point in the 
reality theory of legal personality is that juristic persons come to be the result, not of 
a creative act of the legislator, but of a living force of historical or social action.  
This theory admittedly encompasses a view at least superficially more open to 
corporate criminal liability because it recognizes the existence of a corporate will. 
This same view is shared by supporters of corporate criminal liability in civil law 
jurisdictions,204 and it is implicit in at least two common law theories of corporate 
criminal liability, i.e. identification theory and aggregation doctrine. Gierke, the 
father of reality theory, states that “a universitas [or corporate body]…is a living 
organism and a real person, with body and members and will of its own. Itself can 
will, itself can act…it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will.”205 However, the 
mere defence of a collective will does not take the realistic approach much further 
than the fiction theory. When the realistic theory asserts that juristic persons are not 
fictions, but real persons, alive and active, independent from its members, it seems to 
 
203 Eliezer Lederman, “Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex Triangle” 
(1985) 76 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 285 at 295. 
204 Guilherme José Ferreira da Silva, Incapacidade Criminal da Pessoa Juridica (Belo Horizonte, 
Brazil: Del Rey, 2003) at 40. 
205 Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (1908) xxvi (translated and prefaced by Maitland) 
cited  in John Dewey, “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926) 35 Yale Law 
Journal 655 at 658. 
  
 
                                                
be breaking free from an orthodox individualistic view.206 Indeed, it denies the 
ontological individualism carried by the fiction theory, but is still rooted in another 
form of individualism – methodological individualism.207 As a result, the mental state 
of the corporation is deemed to be reduced to the mental state of its members; the 
corporation’s mental state is nothing more than the grouping of individual’s mental 
states.  
6.2. Economic models of the firm 
Theories of economic organizations are grouped to explain the economic behaviour 
of organizations; studies focus on such issues as competition, maximum corporate 
growth under uncertainty, and efficient forms of organizations.208 These theories are 
driven almost exclusively by market-relationships; however, some of these 
approaches can be significantly stretched to also embrace some aspects of the non-
market social relationships and to have some impact on the ascription of criminal 
liability to corporations. Three important notions will be briefly considered: the 
 
206 A. Mestre, Las Personas Morales Y Su Responsabilidad Penal. (Madrid: Gongora, 1930)  at 40 
cited in Sheila J. S de Sales, “Anotações Sobre o Princípio societas delinquere non potest no Direito 
Penal Moderno: Um Retrocesso Prático em Nome da Política Criminal?” in Luiz Régis Prado, ed. , 
Responasabilidade Penal da Pessoa Jurídica: Em Defesa do Princípio da Imputação Penal 
Subjetiva”(São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2002) 197 at 202.[translated by author]. 
207 “methodological individualism, also called explanatory reductionism, according to which all laws 
of the “whole” (or more complex situations) can be deduced from a combination of the laws of the 
simpler or simplest situation (s) and either some composition laws or laws of coexistence (depending 
on whether or not there is descriptive emergence). Methodological individualists need not deny that 
there may be significant lawful connections among properties of the “whole” but must insist that all 
such properties are either definable through, or connected by laws of coexistence with, properties of 
the ‘parts’” [Robert Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: The 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 566]. 
208Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) at 60. [Fisse and Braithwaite, “Corporations”].  
  
 
                                                
rational actor theory, the agency of the firm theory, and the concept of bounded 
rationality.  
6.2.1. Rational actor model 
In economics, the rational actor model describes both human and non-human 
behaviour. The word rational is understood here as having strictly a mathematical 
meaning; it denotes that making a choice is equivalent to solving mathematical 
optimization problems. Under the rational actor standard, corporations and 
individuals are not all that different: it is argued that corporations self-consciously 
attempt to pursue values just as human agents do.209 The corporation is considered to 
be a set of feasible production plans directed to achieve a well-specified goal - profit 
maximizing - with respect to which it reaches optimal decisions. The corporation will 
mechanically carry out the owner’s will, and it will serve his/her interest, which is, 
the maximization of profit.210 It is assumed that corporate behaviour is determined 
and controlled by the price mechanism. Corporate actions are uniquely determined by 
the market conditions in conjunction with the market production frontier.211
The rational actor conception does recognize that corporations can have intentions, 
and consequently that corporations can be subjects of corporate liability. Corporate 
intention is to be found in the corporate policies that are designed to maximize profit. 
 
209 Thomas Donaldson, Corporations and Morality (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982) 
at 27. 
210Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1986) at 17.  
211 Ibid. 
  
 
                                                
However, the model of a unitary rational actor is unrealistic because it accords a very 
limited role to the significance of social structure or social relations. It portrays 
corporations akin to mechanistic human decision-makers rather than to a complex 
organism, composed of many individuals, many products, many decisions, many 
values, and many goals.212 The analogy to human beings offers a limited and 
distorted picture of the corporation and corporate behaviour.  
6.2.2.   Agency theory of the firm 
The separation of ownership and control of large-scale organizations has greatly 
influenced economic theory. The agency theory of the firm was created in this new 
context. The agency theory of the firm depicts the corporation as a fiction, a nexus or 
web of contracts.213  In contrast to the idea of rational actor, the agency theory does 
not consider the organization an individual.  Jensen and Meckling define this theory 
as: “a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the 
conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may “represent” the 
organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual 
relations.”214 This theory draws attention to the fact that contractual relations with 
employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and others are an essential aspect of the 
 
212 Byrne and Hoffman, Efficient Corporate Harm, cited in Fisse and Braithwaite, supra note 22 at 74.  
213 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, ibid at 75. 
214 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 at 311. 
  
 
                                                
firm.215 As a result, the organization’s behaviour would be the product of a complex 
equilibrium of all these contractual relations - like the behaviour of a market.216  
One important aspect of the agency theory of the firm is that it takes a more practical 
view of the role of individuals within organizations. Whereas the utilitarianism of the 
rational actor theory fails to take into account the distinction between individuals, the 
contractarian viewpoint emphasizes this distinction. It recognizes that the interests of 
the owner and those of the manager might differ and might even be conflicting. The 
goal of the owner is wealth maximization. Therefore, for the owner, benefits or costs 
are primarily relevant in financial terms. For the agent, benefits or costs are relevant 
in both financial and nonfinancial terms.217 It is argued that because the manager 
deals with the day-to-day operations of the firm, she or he also is presumed to have 
information about the firm’s profitability that the owner’s lack.218 The manager will 
have other goals in mind beyond the owner’s goals. 
We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal (s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers 
there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal.219
Granted this strength, the agency model has a very myopic view of the nature of the 
corporation. Under this standard, corporations cannot be considered responsible 
 
215 Ibid. at 310.  
216 Ibid. at 311. 
217Peter Mukherji  and Jisong Cui, “Inside the Firm: Socioeconomic versus agency perspectives on 
Firm Competitiveness”  (1999) 28  Journal of Socio Economic 295 at 296.  
218Oliver Hart, “An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm” (1989) 89 Columbia Law 
Review 1757 at 1759.  
219Jensen and Meckling, supra note 28 at 308. 
  
 
                                                
agents because they are portrayed as fictions, simple tools to serve individual ends. 
Corporation action and corporate responsibility are reducible to its members. In 
addition to that, the exclusive focus on the contractarian nature of the firm, gives a 
unilateral and an imperfect view of corporate life. It is assumed that the agents will 
act according to their desires or preferences. In the end, the agency model has the 
same error as rational actor theory: it does not take into account sociological aspects 
of the organization.  
6.2.3.  Bounded Rationality  
The concept of bounded rationality is an alternative approach to the neoclassical 
notion of rationality advocated in the rational actor model. Bounded rationality 
recognizes the limits that are imposed upon rationality by system complexity.220 
Dequech defines bounded rationality as an expression “used to denote the type of 
rationality that people (or organizations) resort to when the environment in which 
they operate is too complex relative to their limited mental abilities.”221 
Accordingly,it is argued that rationality does not determine behaviour: 
[W]ithin the area of rationality behaviour is perfectly flexible and adaptable to 
abilities, goals, and knowledge. Instead, behaviour is determined by the 
irrational and nonrational elements that bound the area of rationality. The area 
of rationality is the area of adaptability to these nonrational elements.222
 
220 Herbert Simon “Barriers and Bounds to Rationality” (2000) 11 Structural Change and Economic 
Dynamics 243 at 244.  
221 David Dequech, “Bounded Rationality, Institutions and Uncertainty” (2001) 35 Journal of 
Economic Issues 911 at 912. 
222Herbert Simon cited in Augier Mie, “ Simon Says: Bounded Rationality Matters” online: SAGE 
Publications  <http://jmi.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/10/3/268.pdf > 
  
 
                                                
The notion of bounded rationality is considered to be constructed through the 
following assumptions. The first assumption is that people or organizations often 
pursue multiple objectives, which may be conflicting. This assumption rejects the 
neoclassical idea that organizations pursue only one single goal that is profit-
maximatizion. Another important assumption is that the alternatives from which to 
choose in order to pursue the objectives are not previously given to the agent, who 
thus needs to adopt a process for generating alternatives. Then, the decision maker 
adopts a satisfying rather than an optimizing strategy, searching for the solutions that 
are good enough or satisfactory given certain aspiration levels.223
The theory of bounded rationality is an important contribution to the field of 
economic behaviour of corporations and ultimately to the issue of corporate liability. 
The recognition that corporations are complex systems and that this complexity 
influences corporate behaviour is a step forward to a more realistic approach to 
corporate life. However, the bounded rationality concept fails to provide an adequate 
explanation of corporate behaviour. It shares the same narrow view as the agency 
theory. It overemphasizes the decision-making process and, as result, the intention of 
the corporation would be found in this process, and the key individuals that take part 
in the decision-making would be responsible for the corporate behaviour. 
 
223 Dequech, supra note 35 at 912. 
  
 
                                                
6.3. Organizational theory models 
Organizational theory is the fruit of observations about organizational life and 
behaviour made mainly by sociologists, administrative theorists, and philosophers. As 
Dan-Cohen synthesizes, “organization theory is an important repository of systematic 
observations about organizations.”224 Various metaphors or models have appeared in 
this field to describe organizations.225  For the purpose of the present analysis, four  
main metaphors will be summarized: the machine metaphor, the organic metaphor, 
the brain metaphor, and the collage metaphor.226  
6.3.1. Organizations as machines  
Organizations as machines or organizations as tools of management are metaphors 
used to picture what is currently known as the bureaucratic model of organizations. 
According to this view, corporations should be looked upon simply as private 
 
224 Dan-Cohen, supra note 25 at 21.  
225  Although organizational theorists make use of a wide range of metaphors to define organizations,  
it is important to advert to the danger of a strictly metaphoric understanding.  Mary Jo Hatch observes 
that “because metaphor depends upon identification of the similarities between non-identical things, 
when you use metaphor to understand one thing in terms of another, you de-emphasize or even ignore 
the often considerable differences between them. Thus, it is easy to get carried away with a new 
perspective, overextending the metaphor by taking it to ridiculous extremes.” [Mary Jo. Hatch, 
Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1997) at 55]. However, the limitations of metaphors do not make the metaphorical knowledge 
less important. Gareth Morgan argues that in recent years organizational theorists have come to 
recognize the importance of metaphors and realized that viewing organizations on the basis of new 
metaphors makes it possible to understand them in new ways adding rich and creative dimensions to 
organization theory [Morgan, Gareth, “Paradigms, Metaphors, Puzzling and Problem Solving in 
Organization Theory” (1980) 25 Administrative Science Quarterly 605, at 615). [Morgan, 
“Paradigms”]. 
226 Some other metaphors have been developed: the metaphor of  organizations as theaters,  the 
metaphor of organizations as political arenas,  the cybernetic metaphor, the metaphor of loosely 
coupled system and the population ecology system metaphor.  Ssee e.g. Morgan, ibid at 615-616; and, 
Linda Smircich,, “Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis” (1983)  28 Administrative 
Science Quarterly 339 at 340. 
  
 
                                                
instruments that are created to serve economic and social purposes.227 In order to 
achieve these purposes, organizations are expected to operate with mechanical 
precision in the same way as machines do. Organizations are designed as machines 
and their employees are in essence expected to behave as if they were parts of 
machines. Hence, this metaphor employs a static viewpoint; it is an analysis of 
organizations as closed and self-contained systems, whose dominant characteristic is 
that it ignores the environment.228
In the light of the machine metaphor, the concept of corporations as members of the 
class of formal organization was developed. As formal organizations, corporations 
are believed to be planned units, deliberately structured for the purpose of attaining 
specific goals.229 Because corporations are considered goal-pursuing machines, the 
rationality of corporations would be purposeful. In this view, corporations could not 
be moral agents; like machines they would act mechanically and exist to achieve their 
goals without evaluating their actions or goals. Corporations would be seen as mere 
instruments or tools, and should not be treated as distinct agents that can act on behalf 
of themselves.230 The only moral agents in such a context would be some key 
individuals, responsible for decision-making processes, not those who would operate 
and control the mindless machine.  
 
227Brummer, supra note 3 at 63. 
228 Stephen P Robbins, Organization Theory: The Structure and Design of Organizations (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall Inc., 1983) at 10.  
229 Donaldson, supra note 23 at 23. 
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6.3.2. Organizations as organisms or systems 
The term organism, as Morgan highlights, has come to refer to any systems of 
mutually connected and dependent parts constituted to share a common life and 
focuses attention upon the nature of life activity.231 Whereas in the machine metaphor 
the concept of organization is a closed and static structure, in the organism metaphor 
the organization is a living entity in constant flux and change, interacting with its 
environment in an attempt to satisfy its needs.232 Organicism contends that the whole 
is greater than the sum of the parts.233
The organicism perspective has influenced other significant models such as the 
teleological, nonreductivist, interdependence, systems and population-ecology 
models.234 This approach builds on the principle that organizations, like organisms, 
are “open” to their environment and must attain a proper relation with that 
environment if they are to survive.235 The unique characteristic of this perspective is 
the recognition of the implications of the environment for organizational life. 
According to this perspective, organizations are directly and continually influenced 
 
231 Morgan, “Paradigms,” supra note 39 at 614. 
232 Ibid.  
233 “Organicism is a theory that applies the notion of  an organic unity, especially to things that are not 
literally organisms. G. E Moore proposes a principle of organic unities, concerning intrinsic value: the 
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Moore applies the principle in arguing that there is no systematic relation between the intrinsic value 
of an element of a complex whole and the difference that the presence of that element makes to the 
value of the whole.” [Audi, supra note 21 at 636]. 
234 Brummer, supra note 3 at 65-66. 
235 Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (London: SAGE Publications, 1986) at 
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by their external environment through legislation, market forces, technological 
developments, and so on.236  
In the same way as the machine metaphor, the organic perspective is based on the 
notion that the purposes of the parts are largely determined by the functions they 
assume in the whole, like a role-play. However, the advocates of the organic model 
do not grant that the functions that the members assume are so impersonal that this 
disqualifies the assignment of individual responsibility.237 Because the organicists 
believe in the interrelationship of the parts, they assert that the individual members 
also contribute to the whole. Nonetheless, as Brummer explains, for the advocates of 
the organic model, collective responsibility is something over and above the 
responsibilities of individuals within the organization.238  
6.3.3. Organization as brains 
Under this perspective, organizations are portrayed as centers of information 
gathering and processing, intelligent decision-making, and self-correction.239 Being 
centers of information gathering and processing means that corporations can receive 
information from their members and from the external environment and also 
distribute information internally and externally. It is also conceived that corporations 
are intelligent decision makers.  
 
236 Arthur G. Bedeian, Organizations: Theory and Analysis, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The Dryden Press, 1983) 
at 4. 
237 Brummer, supra note 3 at 67. 
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One important feature of the brain metaphor is the assertion that brain-like 
organizations would have the ability of self-correction. The ability of self-correction 
is better explained by the holograph metaphor. Holography demonstrates in a very 
concrete way that it is possible to create processes where the whole can be encoded in 
all the parts, so that each and every part represents the whole; 240 as a result, each part 
is able to do the activities of other parts, reflecting the whole. 
The advocates of the brain-like metaphor do not all agree that corporations are 
distinct moral agents. Goodpaster advocates that corporations are distinct from their 
agents, and have distinct moral agency.241 French shares this same position, asserting 
that corporations are both the holders and administrators of moral rights, and 
consequently they can act in behalf of their rights in ways not reducible to the actions 
of their members.242 Patricia Werhane considers corporations dependent moral 
agents.  According to  this view, corporations manifest distinct intentional actions, 
but this collective intent is dependent upon the separate intentions of their 
members.243
6.3.4. Organizations as collage 
The collage metaphor for organizations is the fruit of postmodern thinking; it holds 
multiple perspectives and uses parts of different theories to form a new work worthy 
 
240 Morgan, “Images,” supra note 49 at 80. 
241 Kenneth E Goodpaster., “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility,” in Tom Regan, ed., Just 
Business: New Introductory Essays in Business Ethics (New York: Random House, 1984) 292  at 301. 
242 French, “Collective,” supra note 13 at 38. 
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Prentice-Hall, 1985) at 56. 
  
 
                                                
of display in its own right. The art of collage, from which this metaphor comes from, 
consists of the ability to put together bits of materials and to form a new entity worthy 
of having a life of its own. When organizational theorists construct their collage 
model, they use pieces of old theories along with the knowledge and experience they 
have collected in their lifetimes to create a new theory.244  
The collage metaphor cannot be conceived as a completely new metaphor, yet it is 
not a repetition of the theories used.  It can be viewed more as an interpretative and 
creative tool than a model in itself. This metaphor attempts to harmonize multiple 
views in order to set an image of the corporation closer to its reality. It is therefore 
not surprising that this view reintroduces interest in contradiction, ambiguity, and 
paradox. 245  
The collage metaphor offers a fresh perspective on organizational theory, and a viable 
way out from the impaired view trap. As a post-modern approach, it does not 
advocate a grand discourse to replace old theories, yet it is argued that the possibility 
of employing “more eyes, different eyes”246 to understand the reality of corporations 
is needed. Morgan reinforces the importance of pluralism, employed by the collage 
metaphor, when he claims that “conscious and wide-ranging theoretical pluralism 
rather than an attempt to forge a synthesis upon narrow grounds emerges as an 
 
244 Hatch, supra note 39 at 54. 
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Blackwell Publishers, 1998) at 385. 
  
 
                                                
appropriate aim. Different metaphors can constitute and capture the nature of 
organization.”247
6.4.  Corporations: a metaphor 
Each model or theory constructed to explain the nature of corporations contributes 
uniquely to an image of the corporation, which might vary from an individualistic to 
an extremely holistic portrayal of the corporation. For that reason, it seems logical to 
assume that the perspectives on the nature of the organization are to some extent 
subtle reproductions or mere extensions of the old debate between individualism 
versus collectivism. Legal theories of personality, economic theories of the firm, and 
organizational theories, gravitate around this same debate. The individualistic 
principles advocated in the legal fiction theory are replicated somehow in agency 
theory of the firm and in the machine metaphor. A more realistic approach, still 
founded in methodological individualism, can be found in the reality theory, the 
rational actor theory, and brain-like metaphor. Finally, the metaphors of the 
organization as an organism and as a collage take a more holistic approach. Simply 
put, there are three main portrayals of the corporation: (1) as an abstraction that has 
human features; (2) as a collection of individuals; or (3) as a system. The picture 
chosen will determine the fate of corporate liability. If corporations are abstractions, 
there is no place for corporate liability. As a collection of individuals, corporations 
can have mens rea, but the mental state will be reducible to the individuals. Because 
each model was created in different contexts and by different perspectives, they don’t 
 
247 Morgan, “Paradigms,” supra note 39 at 612. 
  
 
all overlap, but by some means they are complementary.  A more compelling image 
of the corporation will be the one that encapsulates and harmonizes the different 
views. The image of the corporation as a system offers a more palatable view as the 
mental state can be found in corporate culture. Nonetheless, this metaphor must be 
interpreted more broadly as to comprehend parts of other viewpoints.  The 
combination of the organic metaphor and the collage approach offers a sound starting 
point for the allocation of corporate mens rea, and consequently, it generates more 
sound models of ascribing liability to corporations. 
  
 
                                                
VII. CORPORATIONS AS MORALLY RESPONSIBLE AGENTS 
 
 
Introduction 
Responsibility has numerous facets and shades. The variety of meanings makes it 
impossible to give a definition of responsibility. Ordinarily, responsibility is 
attributed to an agent (usually a person) due to a behaviour or misbehaviour. To 
ascribe responsibility is for some person to identify another person as the cause of a 
harmful or untoward event, because of some action that was performed by that other 
person, and in light of the fact that the person identified occupied a certain type of 
position, role or station and cannot support an acceptable defence, justification, or 
excuse for the action.248A general concept, such as the one given by Marek Järvik, 
corroborates the link between responsibility and behaviour:  “responsibility is a 
phenomenon closely connected with behaviour or its consequences.” 249  Ascription 
of responsibility has at least two distinct senses, causal and moral.250 In the causal 
 
248 Peter A. French, ed., “A World without Responsibility” in The Spectrum of Responsibility  (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991) 2. 
249 Marek Järvik, “How to Understand Moral Responsibility?” (2003) 7 Trames 147. 
250 Wolf talks about a third kind of responsibility, a kind that she calls 'practical responsibility'. 
According to her, "We use the practical sense of responsibility when our claim that an agent is 
responsible for an action is intended to announce that the agent assumes the risks associated with that 
action. In other words, the agent is considered the appropriate bearer of damages, should they result 
from the action, as well as the appropriate reaper of the action's possible benefits. The practical sense 
of responsibility is easily confused with the moral sense, since it is easy to confuse damages with 
punishment and benefits with morally deserved rewards." [ Susan Wolf, “The Legal and Moral 
Responsibility of Organizations” in J. R Pennock  and  J. W. Chapman (eds.) Criminal Justice 27 
Nomos XXVII, 267. at 276] 
sense, or in what Cooper calls “causally operative,”251 responsibility is attributed 
merely in relation to a primary cause of an event. When the connection between the 
agent and the event goes beyond mere causality, responsibility is attributed in the 
moral sense. The moral sense is central to the analysis of criminal liability and social 
responsibility.  
7.1. Causal responsibility  
Causal responsibility is the minimal form of agency, a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the ascription of criminal liability. Even an individualist would accept 
that corporations are causally responsible for wrongdoings. Whereas causality is 
sufficient to justify corporate responsibility for civil wrongs and statutory offences, it 
is not sufficient to justify criminal liability for mens rea offences, which are the vast 
majority of criminal law offences in both legal systems, civil and common law.  At 
least two factors can render causal agency unsatisfactory for ascriptions of criminal 
liability: its generality and externality. While causal agency can be ascribed to all 
sorts of “agents,” events, things, non-human animals and to irrational underdeveloped 
humans, “[i]t does not signal a class of things that might properly be described as 
moral agents, or members of a moral community.” 252 In addition, the evaluation of 
causal agency is conditioned exclusively by external elements and it does not allow a 
moral assessment of the wrongdoer.  
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7.2.  Moral responsibility 
Whereas the ascription of causal responsibility seems to be unproblematic, ascriptions 
of moral responsibility are more complex. Generally speaking, when we describe 
someone or something as a morally responsible agent, we mean that we recognize 
such an agent as bearing characteristics of the sort that allow membership in the 
moral community. Historically in the western tradition there has been two main 
approaches to the analysis of moral responsibility, merit-based and consequentialist. 
According to the merit based view, an agent is held morally responsible only if it is 
deserved. The consequentialist view sustains that moral responsibility is ascribed 
only if it is likely to lead to a desired change in the agent.   
In the last 50 years, revisionists’ alternatives to the merit-based view have prevailed, 
especially the reactive-attitude concept of responsibility advocated by Strawson. 
According to the merit-based interpretation of responsibility, an agent is morally 
responsible for certain behaviour if this behaviour elicits a particular kind of response 
from others, or what is called reactive attitudes.253 In harmony with this 
understanding, Cooper argues that when used in its moral sense, responsibility is 
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related to attitudes of blame, reward and punishment. 254 Also, in Susan Wolf’s 
words, 
To claim that an agent is morally responsible is to claim that he or she 
is liable to deep blame or praise, that he or she is capable of being 
guilty or heroic, that he or she is capable of deserving credit or 
discredit for what he or she does.255
At first sight, there is nothing extraordinary in attributing blame, or, responsibility to 
corporations. On the contrary, corporations seem to be already labelled as moral 
agents since they are popularly blamed and held responsible for their wrongdoings. 
There is no doubt that from the public perspective corporations are morally judged. In 
the face of corporate wrongdoing, it is not unusual to have public manifestations of 
disapproval of  the corporation. Also, at the other extreme, when corporations do 
good actions, corporations are often praised for such deeds. As Christopher Meyers 
has noted, “our society does at least partially respect a corporation’s status in the 
moral community.”256 However, when it comes to business ethics and criminal law, 
the ascription of responsibility to corporations is not so straightforward.257 Theories 
of moral responsibility are focused on the individual human being, which restricts the 
entry in the moral community of any entity that is not a person. 
                                                 
254 Cooper, supra note 4 at 255.  
255 Wolf supra note 3 at 276. 
256 Christopher Meyers, “The Corporation, Its Members, and Moral Accountability” in Thomas I. 
White, Business Ethics: A Philosophical Reader (Toronto: Maxwell MacMillan Canada, 1993) 251 at 
255. 
257 “[t]he prima facie case for counting corporations as moral agents is remarkably strong. It may even 
appear odd to question corporate moral agency since both ordinary discourse and the legal tradition 
seem to have such status already” [Thomas Donaldson, Corporations and Morality (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1982) at 20].  
  
 
It has often been thought that moral status should be tied to the 
condition of “personhood.” The idea has been either that only persons 
are moral patients or that only persons possess a special moral status 
that makes them (morally) more important than nonpersons.258
If criminal liability is going to be ascribed to the corporate body, the criminal liability 
theory must find a way out of this individualistic “entrapment.” The use of the 
doctrine of vicarious liability is an exception to the moral agency principle; it 
attributes criminal liability to corporations with no preoccupation with the finding of 
corporate intentionality.  The identification theory creates an artificial device through 
which it is assumed that the moral status of the corporation is the same that as of the 
individual member. Lederman calls this process “imitation.”259 In fact, by 
personifying the corporation, the moral responsibility to the corporate body is 
mirrored, or “imitates” the moral responsibility of the individual member. The 
aggregate theory also avoids the problem of corporate moral agency by assuming that 
the corporation is a moral agent because its members are.  
7.2.1. Criteria for moral agency 
There are some conditions that an agent has to have in order to be part of the moral 
community. Accounts of responsible agency require that a responsible agent satisfy 
certain epistemic conditions and certain conditions of control.260 The epistemic 
conditions can be generally described as rationality, i.e., the responsible agent is self-
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aware, is able to weigh the reasons for the act, is cognizant of and is able to act within 
established moral guidelines, and is responsive to reasons to adjust or amend his 
behaviour in light of these guidelines.261 In sum, to be blameworthy, the agent must 
be capable of reasoning and of distinguishing between right and wrong. The 
conditions of control or “alternative possibilities control” guarantee that the agent acts 
freely and has authority over his acts. Although each theory of moral agency sets its 
own requirements, the majority mirror these basic assumptions: rationality and 
autonomy. These conditions have been established to focus on human beings. The 
assumption is that  
[I]f we are to have any assurance that our moral judgments are legitimate, 
we must apply them to subjects who are capable of forming beliefs, 
having desires and adjusting their behaviour in  light of their beliefs and 
desires.262
It is due to this anthropomorphic bias that moral status is constantly denied to corporations. 
The conditions might change, but most of them are tailored to individuals. Even though the 
use of words such as rationality, belief and desire only demonstrate that corporations are 
not welcome to the moral community, these individual criteria can and should be guides to 
ascriptions of moral responsibility; however, they must not be understood as the paradigm 
of moral status. Different entities have different moral status.  
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7.2.2. Perspectives on corporate moral responsibility 
a) Corporations are not moral agents 
The view that corporations cannot be conceived as moral agents is coherent with the 
prevailing notion that only rational and autonomous human beings can be subjects of moral 
evaluation and can be able to engage in morally wrong behaviour. In other words, only 
rational and autonomous human beings are moral agents. 263 This perspective leads to at 
least two different conclusions: 1) corporations are not and could never be considered 
moral agents and 2) that for functional reasons the moral status of the individuals can be 
transferred or considered as that of the corporation. These functional reasons could be for 
example, the need to punish corporations for offences that require proof of mental state 
(agency).The former position has been strongly advocated by opponents of corporate 
criminal liability, especially in civil law countries. The former hypothesis, less orthodox 
than the latter, is the basis for the identification and aggregation theories. Although these 
two outcomes are interpretations of the same premise (that only individual human beings 
are intentional agents), they lead to distinct solutions for the problem of corporate criminal 
liability.  
The more orthodox interpretation of the Kantian ideal of rational and autonomous man as 
the exclusive member of the moral community is advocated by scholars such as Velazques, 
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Corlett, Mander and Rescher, as well as by the majority of civil law scholars. 264 Whereas 
corporations are portrayed as a fiction or as real entities (the machine-like type) they are 
always considered dependent on their individual members, with no autonomous or separate 
existence. In both cases, corporations would lack the requirements to be a moral agent, i.e., 
rationality, autonomy and ability to be part of a moral relationship. 
Ladd supports the view that corporations are not real by comparing corporations to 
Greek myths. “[T]here are striking resemblances between the belief that corporations 
are real persons and the Greek mythology that took Apollo to be a real person. (Both 
are immortals!).” 265 With regard to the attribution of moral responsibility, which he 
refers to as “the fixation of responsibility argument”, he considers it unnecessary, 
since vicarious liability and civil law can be effective.266 Under this approach, 
corporations join the group of the disqualified for moral agency (e.g., animals, 
corporations, infants, and the insane) from being the kinds of agent that are capable of 
being morally responsible. 267
For H. L. Hart, corporations are morally neutral entities. In this view, Hart states that 
they are engaged in productive activities that only harm persons, their property and 
the environment incidentally. As corporations are programmed to act in certain ways, 
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their wrongful acts are not committed with mens rea268 To attribute moral 
responsibility to corporations in this case would be what Horowitz calls “ ethical 
group fetishism” since there is no such thing as group morality, or group agency, but 
only individual mental states. 269 In the end, both lines of argument would converge 
to the conclusion that it is not only impossible to conceive of a corporation as a moral 
agent, but also unnecessary. In this sense, Keeley affirms the suggestion that 
organizations be considered moral persons is an unhelpful development in moral 
philosophy.270
It is central to this viewpoint that corporations also lack autonomy, either because 
they are designed for specific purposes or because their goals are limited to the goals 
to the individual members. Either way they lack the capacity to choose their actions. 
Essentially, corporations are limited to be profit-driven entities, with no choice 
besides this. According to Friedman, there is but one social responsibility for 
corporate executives: they must make as much money as possible for their 
shareholders. This is a moral imperative. Executives who choose social and 
environmental goals over profit - who try to act morally - are, in fact, immoral.271 
Debora Spar reiterates, “[C]orporations are not institutions that are set up to be moral 
entities…They are institutions which have really only one mission, and that is to 
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increase shareholder value.”272 Joel Bakan calls corporations “psychopathic 
creatures.” According to him, 
 [T]he corporation can neither recognize nor act upon moral reasons to 
refrain from harming others. Nothing in its legal makeup limits what it can 
do to others in pursuit of its selfish ends, and it is compelled to cause harm 
when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Only pragmatic concern 
for its own interest and the laws of the land constrain the corporation’s 
predatory instincts, and often that is not enough to stop it from destroying 
lives, damaging communities, and endangering the planet as a whole.273
Opponents of corporate moral agency also deny that corporations have any moral 
obligations. In harmony with this, it is said that “[o]nly people have moral obligations 
(…) Corporations can no more be said to have moral obligations than does a building, 
an organization chart, or a contract.”274  Or, as Ladd explains, “[T]hey cannot have 
moral responsibilities in the sense of having obligations towards those affected by 
their actions because of the power they possess.”275
William Horoz also rejects the idea that corporations can be part of a moral 
relationship; however, he emphasizes the lack of special feelings, in this case, guilt. 
He assert the thesis that the notion of moral responsibility connects more tightly with 
the notion of guilt than with the notion of shame. The reason why corporations cannot 
be morally responsible is that they would never have the sense or belief that they are 
in fact responsible.276
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According to the prevalent Strawsonian view of moral responsibility, which is 
focused on ‘reactive attitudes,’ someone is morally responsible only if she is an 
appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes of others. A more orthodox 
interpretation of moral responsibility refutes the idea that corporations can be target 
of reactive attitudes.  As Fischer and Ravizza advocate, “[W]e do not have attitudes 
such as resentment or love toward them; rather, we view them from a more detached 
and uninvolved – a more objective - perspective.”277  
Proponents of the identification and aggregation theories have provided a less 
conventional reading of the principles of moral responsibility that have allowed the 
acceptance of corporations in the moral community. However, it is believed that the 
moral status conferred on corporations is only apparent; in the end, the conditions that 
allow corporate membership in the moral community are those of the individual 
members. It is still asserted that it is legitimate to pass moral judgments on an action 
if, and only if, it is performed by an individual.278 It is assumed that it is logically 
impossible for an entity such as a corporation to have intentions that were not first 
owned entirely by employees or agents of the corporation. Accordingly, just as the 
actions of an organization are a function of the actions of the individual members, the 
                                                                                                                                           
family – or government- has done, and not because of anything one has done oneself; and in such cases 
the feeling of shame need not (although it may) involve some obscure, irrational feeling that one is 
somehow responsible for the behaviour of one’s family or government. There is no doubt that people 
can feel guilty (or can believe they feel guilty) about things for which they are not responsible, let 
alone morally responsible. But it is much less obvious that they can do without any sense or belief that 
they are in fact responsible.( William Horosz, The Crisis of Responsibility (Norman Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1975) 9. 
277 Fischer & Ravizza, supra note 6 at 6. 
278 R. S. Downie, “Responsibility and Social Roles” in Peter A. French , ed., Individual and Collective 
Responsibility (Rochester, Vermont: Schenkman Books, 1998) 117 at 177-118. 
  
 
responsibility of the organization is a function of the responsibility of the members. 
As Susan Wolf explains (although she does not support this position): 
If an organization has done something for which it deserves blame, 
then some of its members have done something for which it 
deserves blame. If an organization has done something for which it 
deserves praise, then some of its members have done something 
for which it deserves praise. 279
The identification theory is a true invitation for a membership in the selected club of 
moral agents; it is, indeed, relatively successful, but paradoxically it maintains the 
restricted patterns of moral responsibility since it creates an artifice through which the 
moral status of the individual is believed to be the moral status of the corporation.   
b)  Corporate Personhood 
The idea of full corporate personhood was first developed by Peter French as the core 
argument of his model for corporate criminal liability, “the responsive adjustment 
model.” Although this approach has been the target of strong critique, it has also 
attracted a few sympathizers such as Goodpaster, David Ozar and Shridar.280 
According to this view, corporations are believed to be analogous to individuals. 
With no meaningful distinction between corporate and human personhood, 
corporations are viewed as full-fledged moral agents who may intend and behave 
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independently of their members, yet like their members.281 The rationale behind the 
anthropomorphization is that corporations are made up of individuals and develop 
some human qualities.282
Corporations are believed to be rational, autonomous agents with a unified conscience in 
the same Kantian mold that individuals are said to be. Furthermore, in keeping with this 
view, rationality would suffice to permit ascriptions of corporate moral responsibility. Peter 
French argues the view that to be a methaphysical person is only to be a moral one. In his 
words, “ to understand what it is to be accountable, one must understand what it is to be an 
intentional or a rational agent and vice-versa.”283  
Goodpaster uses concepts that carry deep humanistic meanings to assert his ideas. He 
explains that the main components of morality are rationality and respect,284and that these 
components are manifested in the four main elements of moral responsibility: perception, 
reasoning, coordination and implementation.285 He attempts to explain how all of these 
elements are manifested in the corporation and how they contribute to morally responsible 
decision-making.286 The central point of his argument is the development of what he calls 
“the principle of moral projection.” This principle states that we can and should expect no 
more and no less of our institutions (taken as moral units) than we expect of ourselves (as 
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individuals). To sum up, the concept of corporate responsibility could then be seen as the 
moral projection of the concept of responsibility in its ordinary (individual) sense. 287
The advantage of full corporate moral personhood is that it makes it easy for 
corporations to be accepted in the moral community, since corporations are said to be 
like the same rational beings that are already members of the community. Causality, 
intentionality, ability to be a part in a moral relationship and individuality comes into 
the package offered to the members of the moral community, and being a new 
member, corporations would have all of them.  
The decision-making process plays an important role in defining the intentional element for 
the fully moral personhood approach; it is believed that the proper place for the allocation 
of mens rea is within the decision making structures.288 Decision-making might become 
implicit, in the form of informal rules, or more explicit, through formal provisions that will 
guide the process of decision-making.289 Informally, corporate internationality could be 
found in the “understood but unwritten set of values or principles that make up the ‘culture’ 
of a corporation.”290 Formally, on the other hand, corporate intentionality would come in 
formal rules such as corporate ethical codes, guidelines for internal compliance, specific 
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corporate incentives and others.291 More generally, French says that corporations 
intentionality is to be found in the set of operating policies:  
 By policies what is meant are rather broad, general principles that 
describe what the corporation believes about its enterprise and the way it 
intends to operate. Policies contain basic belief and goal statements 
regarding both the what and the how of corporate life, but they are not 
detailed statements of appropriate methods.292
 
c)  Objectivist account of moral responsibility 
It is a basic principle of responsibility that the agent also be an intentional one, or to 
be consistent with the terminology used here, that the agent be a moral one. 
Nonetheless, exceptions to this principle are not uncommon. In our daily life, we do 
attribute responsibility for unintentional action and this attitude is not strange to 
criminal law as well. As Mackie puts it, there is a tendency for the law to move closer 
to the intentionality principle, or as he calls it, the “straight rule.” However, he adds 
“there is also a contrary tendency to add to the list of offences for which there is strict 
liability, where someone is held responsible for actions for results he did not intend 
(…).”293It is based on this ‘contrary tendency’ that some scholars have encountered a 
tangential solution to deal with the attribution of moral responsibility. 
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The essence of an objective account of moral agency is that “actions have a real and 
objective moral quality.”294Consequently, judgments of responsibility do not depend 
on incursions into the agent’s intention. The morality (or immorality) of the 
behaviour is conceptually linked to the commission of certain acts. Moral agency or 
intentionality is not conceived “as some mysterious inner dimension of experience 
that exists independently from acting in the external world.”295 Hence, the problem of 
establishing the moral quality of an action is thought of by the objectivist as being a 
problem of fact.  
Even though “orthodox subjectivism” is the dominant approach to moral and criminal 
responsibility, objective standards of responsibility are evident in the use of strict 
liability for criminal offences, where mere negligent conduct is enough to establish 
criminal liability. In these cases, the agent is held criminally liable for being 
negligent. The main concern behind the use of objective standards  is purely 
utilitarian: the creation of optimal liability and sanctioning regimes. Fisse and 
Braithwaite,  Kevin Gibson, Denis Thompson and Larry May are supporters of the 
use of the objective responsibility regime with corporate wrongdoing.296
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The holistic model proposed by Fisse and Braithwaite suggests that corporations 
could be held criminally liable for their failure to react to a imposed duty, to its 
negligence to observe what has been imposed. There would be no need to find a 
intent or an intender since the failure to do what was imposed is enough to justify the 
imposition of liability. This failure would symbolize corporate culture, in such case a 
culture of negligence. The corporation would be considered morally responsible if it 
is shown that its culture had allowed or condoned a negligent behaviour that has 
caused harmful consequences. 297
The advantage of the objective approach is that liability can be easily ascribed to 
corporations since the proof of an unlawful act would suffice to attribute liability. 
Larry May justifies his position arguing that sufficient conditions for negligent fault 
are much easier to establish than sufficient conditions for intentional fault when 
groups are said to act. And, indeed, to establish responsibility on the basis of an act is 
less complicated than to establish it in relation to a mental state. Another point that is 
usually raised in favour of the use of objective standard of liability is that 
“corporations rarely, if ever, act maliciously.” 298   
Without the need to prove intent, there are fewer conditions of responsibility to be 
satisfied. It would still be important to prove causality, but there is no need to track in 
other conditions for moral responsibility such as rationality, autonomy and reactive 
attitudes. As Gibson puts it, 
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The key difference is that in terms of moral accountability we only have to 
find an entity which has a set of norms, and not necessarily one which has the 
ability to formulate intentions and carry them out.299
 
d) Distinctiveness of corporate moral agency 
At first sight, it seems that the fate of corporate moral agency is to be taken to 
extremes: either corporations have no moral status whatsoever, or their moral agency 
is conceived as being just like individual agency. This does not include the tangential 
option of disregarding moral agency. All these views offer at best an incomplete 
analysis of the corporate reality and of conditions of moral agency.  Corporations are 
members of the moral community: they are a special kind of member. Since 
corporations and individuals are ontologically different, it does not make sense to 
require that corporations have the same moral status as individuals do. This belief is 
reflected in the work of authors such as Paine, Tollefson, Metzger and Thompson, 
Donaldson and Wilmot. 300
We might call this approach to corporate moral agency, moderate, as opposed to the 
individualistic view of moral responsibility and to the view that anthropomorphizes 
corporations. For this moderate approach, moral agency is considered important for 
ascriptions of responsibility, which also excludes the exclusive objective approach. 
Indeed, the idea that corporations are in a category all their own is not alone as an 
exception to the principle that only human beings are moral agents; a similar debate is 
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held with regard to artificial entities. 301 By the same token,  advocates of animal 
liberation argue that animals have a moral status and that humanism is analogous to 
theories that illegitimately base moral status on race, gender, or social class.302 
Whether or not these other claims are sustainable is not what matters here, but the 
simple fact that the “humanity” of moral agency is being questioned from other 
perspectives is a sign that the exclusivity of human beings as moral agents is not an 
absolute truth.  
Despite the differences, the perspective that corporations are a different kind of moral 
agent shares the same basic premise as that of full corporate personhood. 
Corporations are believed to be able to behave autonomously and intentionally. 
Corporations are not an aggregation of individuals with no moral capacities of their 
own. What differentiates these two approaches is their proximity with the human 
being model of moral agent. While the moral personhood theory identifies 
corporations with individuals, the intermediary perspective respects the differences 
between corporations and individuals. 
There is no reason to maintain that corporations ought to fulfill all the requirements 
of moral agency. Individuals do not fulfill them completely, yet they are still 
considered moral agents. Donaldson argues that only two conditions would be 
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necessary to configure the moral agency of corporations: (1) The capacity to use 
moral reasons in decision-making; (2) The capacity of the decision-making process to 
control not only overt corporate acts, but also the structure of policies and rules.303 
He lays down two important requirements, rationality and autonomy. The use of the 
word rationality is problematic since there is no decision that is completely rational. 
In the case of corporations, cognitive abilities would better describe the ability of the 
entity to weigh and be guided by values. If autonomy is understood in a more 
relativistic way, there is no problem to require this condition from corporations. It 
would be critical however, to add another condition, the ability to generate reactive 
attitudes. This last condition seems to have a special place in the case of corporate 
moral status.  
Erick Richardson starts his analysis of corporate moral agency by stating that the 
dilemma as to whether or not corporations should be considered as moral agents as 
human individuals is false. He opts for an alternative explanation that lies in between 
the fully-fledged moral person and non-moral person model.304 The notion of a false 
dilemma is very insightful since there is no need to choose between the two choices 
available if a third substitute for these alternatives is available. The third option is to 
treat corporations as limited moral agents. G.J. Warnock notes that the fact that moral 
agency is exclusively attributed to human beings is merely a contingency. Humanity 
is not a condition of moral status. Some characteristics that human beings happen to 
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have enable them to be qualified as moral agents. Consequently, if we prove these 
very characteristics are not absolute and we can find something similar in non-human 
entities, there is nothing that impedes these entities from also being  part of the moral 
community.305
A primary objection to corporate moral agency is that corporations do not think and 
they are not able to weigh their reasons. Moreover, in reality, corporations do not 
have minds and do not think, yet they are not impaired in making moral judgements 
or reasoning in making choices. While they do not think, they have cognitive 
capacities, capacities to be sensitive and responsive to complex reasons for and 
against various actions. As culture producing and culture propagating entities, they do 
develop different levels of sophistication in justifying and rationalizing organizational 
action.306 This is not to say that they develop a monolithic thinking; on the contrary, 
as open systems there is a lot of contradiction in corporations. In fact, this is the same 
for human beings as well, and they are still considered moral agents. What is 
primordial here is to accept that corporations develop values and reasoning to explain 
their behaviour that are shared by its members. 307
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Another important condition for moral responsibility ascriptions is autonomy, i.e., 
that the agent has the ability to have moral control of the acts. The autonomy 
principle should not be taken for granted since it is more an allusion to the ideal 
Kantian human being than a reality. Whether individuals have the freedom to choose 
their acts is highly controversial, even though individuals are still held responsible for 
their actions. There is no reason to require that corporations meet a condition that 
even individuals do not meet completely. Corporations are not free to choose their 
conduct, i.e, corporations are also subjected to internal and external influence. While 
they do follow specific and pre-determined goals, they are able to choose how to 
achieve the goals. And moral judgments are applied in such decisions. Donaldson and 
Wilmot advocate that corporations do not have the same autonomy that individuals 
are believed to have, but they have a second-order autonomy available.308
Finally, the allegation that corporations do not trigger reactive attitudes is not 
convincing. The ability to elicit a reaction in others is less controversial than 
opponents of corporate moral agency suppose. Almost everyone has experienced 
some kind of reactive attitude against corporations. Despite the fact that they are not 
human, people do have feelings about them. People’s reaction against Wal Mart 
because of its policies of minimum wages for employees is well documented. In the 
Thalidomide case, an angry reaction against Chemie Grunenthal was instinctive. Or, 
as Denis Thompson illustrates, when people have blamed Hooker Chemical for 
dumping hazardous chemical waste at Love Canal or the Niagara Falls Board of 
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Education for permitting a school to be built on the site, we are partly condemning 
past and present officials of the corporation and the board. 309 Every corporate 
misconduct, like human misconduct, will trigger a reaction in others. The fact of 
being a human being might even be a good thing, since we usually associate 
corporate crime with greed what is usually conceived in an immoral category per se. 
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VIII. CORPORATE CULTURE: THE PLACE OF THE MENTAL 
ELEMENT  
 
 
Introduction 
Problems associated with the attribution of criminal liability to corporations are not 
merely confined to uncertainties about the potential effectiveness of criminal law as a 
device to control corporate misbehaviour; another controversial aspect of corporate 
criminal liability is the allocation of the mental element of the criminal offence. 
According to the classical notion of criminal law, both actus reus and mens rea are 
essential requisites in order to attribute liability to an agent. If a corporation is to be 
held liable for its criminal conduct, the corporation must be a responsible actor and a fit 
subject for the applicable penal sanction. Whether a corporation can or can not be a 
responsible actor is the touchstone of theories of corporate criminal liability. As 
Fergunson comments, “the central issue that arises in attaching criminal liability to a 
corporation is the theoretical difficulty of attributing a culpable mental state (or mens 
rea) – a required element of most criminal offences – to non-human, artificial 
entities.”310  
Differences among theories of corporate liability are the result of conflicting views of 
the proper place or person  to locate the subjective element or mens rea of the offence. 
The principle that corporate mens rea should be found within the individual members 
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of the corporation coexists with a distinct standard which argues that mens rea can 
legitimately be found in the corporation itself. Contrasting with these two trends, the 
orthodox position that there can be no such thing as corporate mens rea is still very 
alive in civil law jurisdictions and somehow resurrected in common law systems. 311 
Holistic models of corporate criminal liability maintain that corporations have an 
independent will that can be found in their culture. A more compelling approach to 
corporate criminal liability should take into account not only the influence of corporate 
culture in the decision-making process; it is essential for a sound approach to be based 
on corporate culture as an active and independent power that creates and shape the 
corporate will.  
8.1. Corporate action 
From the two elements required to characterize criminal conduct,312 actus reus and 
mens rea, the physical and the mental elements, it is to the mental element that critics 
raise their eyebrows.  The act element in corporate misconduct does not generate any 
substantial debate. One could think that this might be either because the corporation’s 
ability to act is not questionable or it is assumed that corporations cannot act at all. 
Although the first assumption is the correct one, it is worthwhile to outline some 
aspects of corporations’ ability to act. 
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A common argument against corporate action is that they do not fulfill the actus reus 
requirement because they can only act when some real people, with flesh and blood and 
a mind, do so on their behalf.313 It is obvious that to say that a corporation acts is to say 
that in this action there is a human being involved, or that it is a human act. In fact, the 
traditional ascription of criminal liability is rooted in authorship, i.e., responsibility can 
only be ascribed to the author of the action, the person who has performed or caused 
the act. And, as Sistare puts it “[I]f sacrosanct, this [act] doctrine should preclude 
liability for the conduct of others.”314 However, this is not the case, because the 
principle of authorship is not sacrosanct. Criminal liability has been ascribed in 
situations where the act of one person is attributed as the act of another person, as in the 
case of criminal liability for negligence, strict liability offences or vicarious liability 
offences. Thus, ascriptions of criminal liability to corporations do not infringe 
principles of criminal law because corporation can be held responsible for the acts of 
their members. It can be said that “corporations have the peculiar property of only 
being able to act vicariously.”315 Since corporations are not like individuals, their 
ability to act does not need to be similar to individual ability to act.  
Not all actions of the corporate members can be attributed to the corporation for the 
purpose of criminal liability. It is critical that some features be identified in the action, 
like the influence of corporate culture and the relationship between the author of the 
action and the corporation. The action must be performed in virtue of practices, 
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regulations or customs of the entity, in other words, that the act be a result of the 
culture of the corporation. In Cooper’s words, “[I]f we are to blame a group for actions 
performed by members of it, this must be in virtue of some practice, mores, rules, or 
“way of life” which characterizes the group. 316 In addition to that, there must exist a 
relationship between the author of the act and the corporation. Laufer proposes a test to 
determine the reasonableness of attributing an action to the corporate entity that is 
based on the strength of the relationship between the agent and the corporation. This 
test is similar to the test used in the identification theory. Consequently, it generates the 
same problem: it restricts the acts for which the corporation could be held responsible. 
There is no need to create new requirements to attribute the act of the individual to the 
corporation in the case of criminal liability. Since corporations can only act through 
their employees, it is reasonable to apply the same principle as for vicarious liability 
theory, i.e., that the agent has acted in the scope of his or her authority.  
8.2. Corporate mens rea 
Ascriptions of criminal liability require that the agent had acted intending to do wrong, 
or in a reckless or negligent way. The maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea 
which can be translated as an act is not criminal in the absence of a guilty mind is a 
distinctive feature of criminal law. There are only few exceptions to this principle, 
usually statutory offences and often in the field of regulatory offences. It prevails in 
both common law and civil law legal systems that to characterize an offence, mens rea 
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must be present and contemporanous to the actus reus.  Accordingly, in order to 
attribute criminal liability to a corporate entity corporate mens rea must be found.  
Mens rea is usually characterized as a guilty mind or psychological element of the 
offence. This individualistic flavour of the concept mens rea can be traced to the 
origins of the word mens, which means mind and it has been reinforced by the 
individualistic tone of  modern criminal law. As well, this very traditional conception 
of mens rea results in most of the problems of attributing criminal liability to 
corporations. A common argument against corporate criminal liability is that 
corporations do not have minds and consequently would never fullfill the mens rea 
requirement. Indeed, corporations do not have minds, and need not have them. Starting 
from this premise, theorists such as French, Fisse, Braithwaite and Bucy developed the 
notion that the mental element of corporate misconduct can be found in the corporation 
culture.317 The culture of the corporation would be the cognitive element where it is 
possible to find the mens rea of the corporation.
8.3. Corporate culture  
Hatch states that “organizational culture is probably the most difficult of all 
organizational concepts to define.”318Corporate or organizational culture is a relatively 
new concept. The acceptance of culture as a social variable was imported from 
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anthropology and has become prominent in organizational studies literature since 
1970.319 In the following decade the idea of corporate culture was introduced in the 
field of corporate criminal liability studies by Brent Fisse and since then it has 
influenced various alternative approaches.320 The belief that corporations can have a 
supraindividual property challenges the prevailing notion that all group macroscopic 
concepts are in principle definable in terms of individual behaviour and allows a shift in 
the focus in the search for a guilty mind, from the individual members to the 
corporation itself. 
Anthropologists define culture in many ways. Generally, culture could be described as 
a way of life of a group of people, “a complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, 
art, law, morals, customs and any capabilities and habits acquired by a …[person] as a 
member of society.”321 In organizational studies, culture is usually said to represent 
what is popularly known as  “the way things are done around here.” 
The concept of culture given by John van Maanen comprises all aspects of culture that 
are relevant to the allocation of mens rea:  
Culture refers to the knowledge members of a given group are thought 
to more or less share; knowledge of the sort that is said to inform, 
embed, shape, and account for the routine and not-so-routine activities 
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of the members of the culture…A culture is expressed (or constituted) 
only through the actions and words of its members and must be 
interpreted by, not given to, a fieldworker…Culture is not itself 
visible, but is made visible only through its representation.322
The theory developed by Edgar Schein has become an influential paradigm to 
understand organizational culture.323 According to this model, corporate culture would 
occur on three levels: artefacts, values and norms. On the surface, we would find 
artefacts, the most accessible element of a culture. Gagliard defines artefacts as follow:  
 [T]he visible expressions of a culture, including therewith (as well as 
objects and the physical arrangements) patterns of behaviour (such as 
rituals) on the one hand, and, on the other, abstract productions or 
mental representations (such as stories).324  
Symbols or artefacts are considered important means of communicating corporate 
culture because they “enable us to take aim directly at the heart of culture.” 325 Symbols 
would reveal what is tacitly known and yet not clearly communicated by an 
organization’s members.  
Underneath artefacts would lie values and behavioural norms. Although closely 
associated, values and norms are different cultural concepts. Values are key 
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determinants of attitudes, which in turn affect work-related (and all other) behaviour. 
They affect the decision-making process and serve as parameters for individual 
behaviour. 326 Norms of behaviour or rules would be the series of formal rules, written 
or unwritten, which are primarily created by individuals, but become structures 
standing over and above people.  
By formal rules, we refer to those expectations and requirements, 
either written or unwritten, that are routinely associated with the 
pursuit of organizational purposes, activities, or goals that are 
perceived as legitimate or “normal.” 327  
Yet, this picture of a rational and coherent series of formal rules is not compatible with 
the reality of corporations. Mills and Mills advert to the parallel existence of informal 
rules, which develop alongside and sometimes contradict formal rules.328 Finally, at the 
core of the corporation’s culture we would find beliefs and assumptions. Beliefs or 
assumptions are the hidden, deepest and most subjective element of culture that are not 
directly knowable even to some of the corporations members. 
When applied in criminal law, corporate culture does not necessarily reflect all the 
nuances that are important for managerial studies. The connection between culture and 
productivity is not a primary concern for ascriptions of corporate liability. For criminal 
law the question of whether a culture is “bad” or “good” comes prior to the question of 
                                                 
326Richard W. Stackman, Craig C. Pinder & Patrick E. Connor, “Values Lost” in Ashkanasy, Neal M., 
Wilderom, Celeste P.M & Peterson, Mark F., eds., Handbook of Organizational Culture & Climate 
(London: Sage Publications,2004) 37 at 38. 
327 Jean C. Helms Mills & Albert J. Mills, “Rules, Sensemaking, Formative Contexts, and Discourse in 
the Gendering of Organizational Culture” in Neal M. Ashkanasy, Celest P. M Wilderom & Mark F. 
Peterson, eds., Handbook of Organizational Culture & Climate (London: Sage Publications,2004) 55 
at 59. 
328 Ibid at 60. 
  
 
whether it is “strong” or “weak.” As opposed to managerial studies, for the ascription 
of criminal liability it is the moral aspect of the corporate culture that matters. 
Managerial studies focus on the relationship between corporate culture and 
productivity; the moral aspect of corporate culture is neglected.   
Not all alternative models of corporate criminal liability share the same basis for 
allocating mens rea in the corporate culture. Reactive Corporate fault and Constructive 
fault models rely on the notion of culture as a whole. In the Principle of Responsive 
Adjustment, French applies the rules of behaviour approach to assess corporate mens 
rea. The corporate ethos approach focuses on values as the appropriate vehicle to find  
mens rea. When legal scholars talk about corporate culture, they usually refer to the 
culture as a whole and have not chosen a specific manifestation of culture to be the 
proper place for the allocation of mens rea. In the end, however, all converge in the 
conclusion that organizational culture is a property of the corporation and it influences 
corporate behaviour. It does not matter which explanation for culture is used.  What is 
important is to recognize that corporate culture is the cognitive element of the 
corporation. It is not reducible to individuals and that pertains to both observable and 
ideational aspects of organizational behaviour.329  
                                                 
329 Richard E Kopelman., Brief, Arthur P & Guzzo, Richard A., “The Role of Climate and Culture in 
Productivity” in Schneider, Benjamin, ed. Organizational Climate and Culture (Oxford: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, 1990) 282. 
 
  
 
IX. HOLISTIC MODELS FOR THE ATRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY TO CORPORATIONS  
 
 
Introduction 
The majority of theories of corporate criminal liability are typical of common law 
developments. The traditional theories have been constructed on a case-by-case basis. 
They simply suggest the transferring of civil law principles into the criminal law; they 
were not originally created to the criminal area, they are civil in nature. Also, they rely 
on the individual to attribute liability to a company. Examples of these restrictive 
models are the agency theory and, in a more elaborate form, identification and 
aggregation theories. 
The literature points to advancement with regards to the mainstream common law 
standards of attributing criminal liability to corporate entities. These new developments 
propose a new conceptual paradigm for identifying and proving corporate intent.  
According to these models, the mens rea of the corporate offender can be found in the 
corporate structure itself.  
These innovative archetypes to attribute corporate criminal liability recognize that the 
realities of complex corporate organization and the dynamic of organizational 
processes, structures, goals, cultures and hierarchies shape and differentiate each 
corporation. For this reason, each corporate entity is believed to have a distinct and 
  
 
identifiable personality independent of specific individuals who control or work for the 
organization.  
Due to the evidence that corporations have their own identity and personality, the 
inappropriateness of the derivative forms of attribution of criminal liability appears to 
be axiomatic. In keeping with this reality, the holistic models not only contradict the 
traditional theories, but intend to construct a more compelling method of attributing 
criminal liability to corporations. This rationale is employed in the Australian Criminal 
Code Act, and it is proposed in relation to a corporate manslaughter offence in 
England.330
Generically, the alternative models of corporate criminal liability propose a method to 
ascribe criminal liability to corporations by taking into account the corporate life, its 
organization, and its culture. Because the subject of corporate criminal liability is 
dynamic and has been widely discussed, it is very difficult to label all these proposed 
methods. Some propositions present only small variations and do not substantially 
differ from the main models. This chapter summarizes five core doctrines which are 
based on a holistic view of the corporation. These doctrines are: proactive fault, 
reactive corporate fault, responsive adjustment, corporate ethos and constructive 
corporate liability.331 Prior to the analysis of these doctrines, it is important to clarify 
                                                 
330Section 12 of Australian Criminal act; Clause 4, draft involuntary homicide bill, Law Comission 
Report 239 (1996) 
331 Denis Thompson also proposes a model of ascribing liability that resembles the holistic model. 
However, because in the end this model reflects much more an individualistic approach, it does not 
deserve to be included in the category of holistic models. Yet, this singular approach is worthy of note. 
The author recognizes that there is something beyond the individuals in a corporate setting, he 
describes corporate culture as a group of routinized and specialized behaviour that is not reducible to 
  
 
what holism is and why this concept have being employed in corporate criminal 
liability. 
 
9.1. Holism 
A series of models have been proposed by common law scholars as an alternative to the 
existing theories of corporate criminal liability. Celia Wells refers to this widening 
form of  attributing primary liability to corporation as holism; she explains that 
although anthropomorphic image infusing is unhelpful if it is taken to imply that the 
mind cannot be responsible for the body, this psychological metaphor could be used as 
the basis for a form of liability which better reflects the reality of the corporate 
organization 332The expression holism, borrowed from physics, seems to comfortably 
                                                                                                                                           
individuals. Thompson argues that ‘the very characteristics of organizations [specialization and 
routinization] that make it difficult to hold individuals criminally responsible for isolated crime make it 
possible to hold them responsible for reiterated crime.” According to this position, the holistic claim 
does not seem warranted. “The mistake the structuralists make is to take an overly static view of 
organizational behaviour, looking at only one crime at a time. If we adopt a more historical 
perspective, routinization and specialization can actually aid the ascription of personal responsibility. 
Because organizations develop routines, their mistakes recur in predictable ways; their designs may 
not be dark but their crimes are reiterated. The patterns of pathology known to theorists of 
organizations can be, and often are, as well known to those who work in organization. Higher officials 
may not be aware of specific crimes in their organization, but they know, or should know, that certain 
structural conditions (such as discretion in enforcing overly strict standards) give rise to organizational 
corruption. Individuals who could be expected to know about these conditions and take steps to correct 
them could be morally blameworthy and in some cases properly subject to criminal sanctions.” 
Thompson simply transfers the duty to deter criminal behaviour from the state to higher echelon 
employees. These employees should be criminally responsible as opposed to the corporation because 
they would have failed to predict the criminal behaviour that could be predicted by the observation of 
routine zed and specialized activities of the corporation. (Denis F. Thompson, “Criminal 
Responsibility in Government” in J. R Pennock  and  J. W. Chapman, eds., Criminal Justice 27 Nomos 
XXVII, 201.) 
332 Celia Wells,Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) at 156-157. Celia Wells however identifies the aggregation doctrine as a holistic model, what 
can be misleading. The aggregation doctrine may have some holistic character when it attempts to 
view corporations as a whole, but it is still reductionist when it assumes that the whole is the sum of its 
  
 
fit these set of theories that advocates that the corporation will is a whole and not 
exclusively reducible and determined by that of its members. For holistic theories of 
corporate criminal liability, we want to refer to this set of theories that has evolved as a 
critique of traditional theories of corporate criminal liability.  They are founded on 
holistic principles and have also proposed that the will of the corporation does not need 
to be found in an individual mind but in the corporation’s complexity and life. 
The holistic approach represents a departure from a narrow perspective to a more 
comprehensive one, one which recognizes that corporations are supra-entities not 
reducible to individuals. The traditional theories of corporate criminal liability are 
accompanied by the view that every group is, in principle, definable in terms of 
individual behaviour.333 In other terms, the corporation seems to break down into a 
small system or an individual, which implies that corporations are in the end reducible 
to individuals. As Floyd emphasizes,  
A ‘whole’ is said to be different from its ‘parts’ or even from their 
summation. Yet, since it is made up only of these parts and cannot 
exist without them, the whole cannot be sharply and 
unambiguously distinguished as a ‘thing’ from the ‘thing’ that are 
its parts except by a purely intellectual artifice.334
                                                                                                                                           
parts and has no independent existence. For that reason, I prefer not to include the aggregation doctrine 
as part of the holistic models but as an adjacent to these approaches. 
 
333 May Brodbeck, ed., “Methodological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction” in Readings in the 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968) 280 at 286. 
334 Floyd Allport, “Legal Complexities of Group Activity” in Braybrooke, David, ed., Philosophical 
Problems of the Social Sciences (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd, 1965) 27 at 31. 
  
 
In this way, it would be inconceivable that supraindividual group properties could be 
meaningfully attributed to things or events.335 The influence of holistic ideas that 
originated in physics and influenced a wide number of social sciences, including 
psychology, sociology, philosophy and law, made it possible to transcend an orthodox 
individualistic view and to offer alternatives more harmonized with the reality of 
organizations. 
The acceptance that corporations are not merely an aggregation of individuals made it 
possible for holistic theories of corporate criminality to revolutionize this long-time 
honored belief of criminal law and to step into a new dimension of perceptions about 
corporate criminal liability. The models proposed by Fisse, French, Bucy and Laufer 
are not impeccable and they need not to be; the great merit of these models, however, is 
not in what they might achieve in practical or theoretical terms but in what they have 
questioned and articulated. 
 
 
                                                 
335 Brodeck, supra note 47 at 286. 
  
 
9.2. Holistic models 
9.2.1. Reactive Corporate Fault Model336
The notion of reactive corporate fault proposed by Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite is 
the best-known cultural or organizational approach.337 As with the collective 
knowledge theory, this model was developed to face the modern and complex corporate 
structures that are neglected by the traditional theories. Instead of extending the notion 
of vicarious and identification theory, the reactive corporate fault model proposes a 
rupture from the restrictive individualistic and derivative character of those theories. 
The reactive corporate fault model was fashioned to be “responsive of non-prosecution 
of corporate managers”338and resulted from the application of the existent theories by 
focusing on the search for the corporate intent. 
                                                 
336 Laufer refers to a similar model called Proactive Model or Proactive Corporate Fault  (PCF) .This 
model was first proposed in Developments in the Law – Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate 
Behaviour Through Criminal Sanctions (1979) 92 Harv. Law Review 1227. Later it was discussed in 
relation to reactive corporate fault or reactive corporate mens rea in Brent Fisse, Restructuring 
Corporate Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and Sanctions (1983) 56 S. Cal. L. Rev 1141 at 1200. 
Most recently, PCF was incorporated into the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations.  
According to PCF standard, corporations are liable when they fail to make reasonable efforts to 
implement policies and practices that prevent crime.  This same basis of attributing liability to 
corporations is advocated by RCF model, however, Proactive fault is assessed as fault prior to the 
commission of the offence and Reactive fault is assessed thereafter. Evidence of reasonable efforts to 
prevent crime commission would come from: (1) the development and implementation of safeguards 
to prevent crime commission, and (2) the delivery of clear and convincing prohibitions of criminal 
behaviour. In order to avoid a finding of proactive fault, senior executives and top management would 
order outside audits, compliance reports, and engage in or supervise periodic internal assessments. 336 
[William S. Laufer, “Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds” (1994) Emory Law Journal 647 at 
665][“Corporate Bodies”] 
337 The theory of corporate blameworthiness and consequently the construction of the notion of 
reactive corporate fault was first elaborated in Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, The Allocation of 
Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability (1988) 11 Sydney 
Law Review 469. 
338 Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1993) at 158. 
  
 
Under corporate reactive fault, corporations make themselves responsible for 
investigating and reporting on internal discipline following an offence, and also 
enforcing that responsibility. If the actus reus of an offence has been committed by or 
on behalf of a company, a court should be empowered to order the company to conduct 
its own investigation to ascertain who was responsible. The corporation would 
investigate the offence, carry out the appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the 
individuals or sector of the company directly responsible, and it would return a detailed 
and satisfactory compliance report to the court. The burden of the investigation would 
be placed on the corporation. Also, the corporation would have the responsibility to 
take appropriate disciplinary measures and corrective steps to ensure the wrongdoing 
does not reoccur.  
According to Fisse and Braithwaite, reactive corporate fault may be broadly defined as 
unreasonable corporate failure to devise and undertake satisfactory preventive or 
corrective measures in response to the commission of the actus reus of an offence by 
personnel acting on behalf of the organization.339 If the company takes appropriate 
measures, no criminal liability will be imposed. Criminal liability will only be imposed 
on the company if it fails to comply adequately with the court order.  
Under this model, the culpability of the company will not be assessed at the time of the 
crime. The liability of the company will be attributed when the company  fails to react 
appropriately to the wrongdoing or when it fails to respond satisfactorily to the 
                                                 
339 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability (1988) 11 Sydney Law Review 469 at 505.  
  
 
commission of the external elements of an offence such as where no action is taken to 
rectify the situation.340 The corporation would be vicariously responsible for the 
external elements of the offence committed by its employee, but not for the internal 
elements (mens rea). The internal element would be found in the corporation policy of 
non-compliance or a failure to take reasonable precautions and to exercise due 
diligence.341
This model has a “dual corporate and individual focus.”342 It does not advocate the 
abandonment of criminal prosecution of individuals responsible for corporate crime. 
Rather, it accepts that individuals have responsibilities parallel to collective 
responsibilities. One of the strategies of the reactive fault approach is to  
maximize the allocation of responsibility to all who are responsible, be 
the individuals, subunits of corporation, corporation, parent 
corporations, industry associations, gatekeepers such as accountants and  
indeed regulatory agencies themselves.343
Due to the possibility of corporate distrust, Fisse and Braithwaite propose some 
measures that can maximize a corporation’s agreement to rearrange its internal 
discipline. These measures can be grouped into three steps: the first is to provide an 
array of sanctions that offer a powerful disincentive against corporate non-compliance 
with the terms of an internal discipline order; the second is to designate individual 
representatives of the company as parties responsible for complying with the terms of 
                                                 
340 Brent Fisse, Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal Law and Corporate Liability To 
Monetary Penalties,  ( 1990) 13 UNSW Law Journal 1 at 14. 
341 Brent Fisse, “The Attribution of Criminal Liability to Corporations: A Statutory Model” (1991) 13 
Sydney Law Review 277 at 279 
342 Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1993) at 164. 
343 Ibid at 163. 
  
 
the internal discipline order; and, the third is to provide mechanisms for monitoring 
compliance, again as part of the order that requires internal disciplinary action to be 
taken.344
The proposed sanctions that corporations would face if they fail to undertake internal 
disciplinary action would observe a pyramidal enforcement list from informal methods 
of promoting compliance and civil monetary penalties (corporate and individual), to a 
higher degree of criminal liability (individual and corporate) including community 
service, fines and probation authorized for individual offenders, adverse publicity 
orders, community service, fines and probation for corporate offenders; finally, at the 
top of the pyramids would be escalated criminal liability (individual and corporate), 
with jail authorized for individual offenders, and liquidation (corporate capital 
punishment), punitive injunctions, and adverse publicity orders for corporate 
offenders.345
a) Critique of the reactive corporate fault model 
 Neglecting the mental  element 
The Proactive Corporate Fault Model (PCF) and Reactive Corporate Fault (RCF) 
overlook the need of a mental state associated with the criminal act and exclusively 
endorse the criterion of negligence. Both patterns of corporate criminal liability refer to 
the failure of the corporation to respond adequately to a duty to care. According to the 
Proactive Corporate Fault Model, criminal liability will be ascribed when corporate 
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practices and procedures were inadequate to prevent the criminal act. Reactive 
corporate fault is based on the same premise; however, it reallocates the focus of 
liability from fault prior to the time of the actus reus to fault in reaction to the actus 
reus. The failure to react is not evidence of a mental state in relation to the offence.346  
The commission of an offence for failing to react correctly after the occurrence of some 
event, while conceivable, does not settle the question of whether the commission of an 
initial actus reus in itself constitutes an offence. This can only depend on whether this 
is some fault prior to or concurrent with the commission of this actus reus. To view the 
matter otherwise would amount to allowing the corporation a free ride or a “free  actus 
reus”. At most, reactive corporate fault can serve as proof of intention, recklessness or 
negligence at the time of the occurrence of a second actus reus.347
Temporal fallacy 
According to the RCF model, the liability of the corporation would be determined on 
the basis of a failure to react and not on the basis of an act, i.e., when a corporation 
commits a crime, liability is not determined by this criminal act; liability can be 
ascribed if the corporation fail to accept and take on corrective measures after the 
crime. The rationale for this expedient is that the ascription of the corporation’s liability 
solely on the basis of attitudes prior to or contemporaneous with the commission of the 
actus reus might obscure the fact that sometimes inappropriate reactions of companies 
                                                 
346 See e.g, William S. Laufer and Alan Strudler, “Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of 
Vicarious Liability” (2000) 37 American Criminal Law Review 1285, 
online:<http://web1.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/895/658/44940293w1/purl=rcl_EAIM_0>. 
347 Anne Marie Boisvert, “Corporate Criminal Liability – A Discussion Paper,” online: 
<http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/99pro/ecrliab.htm> 
  
 
after they have done something harmful are also blameworthy conduct that is 
condemned by public opinion. In keeping with this reasoning, it makes complete sense 
to hold companies liable in the event that they fail to undertake remedial measures once 
the actus reus of an offence has been committed.  
While for a purely utilitarian approach the RFC expedient of attributing liability might 
make sense, at least in a theoretical level; it does not accord with retributive nor 
expressive theories of punishment. The imposition of a sanction for a crime in virtue of 
the lack of or inappropriateness of reaction after the commission of this crime would 
not be “deserved.” The blame would be attached to the crime not considering the crime 
but what happened after it.   It is a primary requirement of justice and social order that 
crimes be punished, and the RFC does not meet this requirement; it leaves the original 
criminal conduct unpunished. The symbolic function of the punishment would also lose 
its significance. In fact, the “social reprobation” would simply be ignored. The RFC 
model constructs a parallel system of  “irresponsibility” for corporations by allowing 
them to commit crimes and not to be directly liable for them.  
Fundamental principles of criminal law, principles of contemporaneity or concurrence, 
require that the mens rea and actus reus of an offence coincide in time. The reactive 
corporate fault violates these postulates overtly. The failure to react after the 
commission of a wrongdoing might have harmful consequences that sometimes can be 
even worse than the consequences of the first act; however, there is no justification to 
conclude that an initial actus reus does not need to or cannot be reprimanded. As 
  
 
Boisvert points out, natural persons do not enjoy that advantage.348 There is no sound 
basis for determining the liability of a corporation by considering its behaviour after an 
offence. The inquiry must focus on intents and acts that are contemporaneous, on 
culpable mental states that are concurrent to illegal acts.  It should be kept in mind that 
the commission of an initial actus reus may have devastating consequences that might 
prove it necessary to punish without awaiting the occurrence of a second event.349
9.2.2. Principle of Responsive Adjustment 
While Fisse’s and Braithwaite’s model of Reactive Corporate Fault is to some extent 
attached to theories of organization, French makes his arguments for the Responsive 
Adjustment Model mainly on philosophical grounds, arguing that corporations can be 
primarilyly liable because they are fully fledged moral persons. These two models of 
attributing liability to corporate offenders can be seen more as an expansion of each 
other than two diverse assumptions.  
In line with the principle of responsive adjustment, the intention of the corporation is to 
be found in what French calls CID structure (corporate internal decision structure). The 
CID structure is made up of an organizational or responsibility flowchart and two types 
of corporate decision recognition rules-procedural rules and policies.350 Every 
corporation would have an internal decision structure, that would make the task of 
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350 Peter A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984) at 48. [Corporate Responsibility] 
  
 
finding corporate mental state easy.351 The CID would allow identification of what is 
“the” corporate agency and the reasons for corporations doing what they do. French 
asserts that when operative and properly activated, the CID structure synthesizes the 
intentions and acts of various biological persons into a corporate decision.352   
The organizational chart, one element of the CID Structure, would provide the 
“grammar” of corporate decision-making, or internal recognition of rules.353 This chart 
would be the link between the act performed and the corporate reasons for the 
performance of the act. From the analysis of the chart it would be possible to determine 
whether or not the act was in accordance with corporate reasons. If the act is 
inconsistent with organizational structure or established procedure, it will not be 
considered the corporation’s act.  
It could be argued that a corporation, specially a small, closely held one, would choose 
not to have a chart or a decision structure. While a small corporation can choose not to 
have a chart, and in most of the cases it does not have an organizational chart, it cannot 
choose not to have a decision structure. In every corporation, there is a hierarchy and 
consequently a procedure for the decisions. This is  the truth for both small and large 
corporations; however, it is unlikely that a large corporation will not have an 
organizational chart or a similar document. 
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Corporate compliance is an important feature of this approach, according to the 
principle of responsive  adjustment, “the causally responsible party for an untoward 
event should adopt specific courses of future action calculated to prevent 
repetitions.”354 The corporations should take the initiative to respond to the event that it 
has caused by adopting new behaviour, or in other words, by making adjustments to its 
internal system. The metaphysical foundation of PRA can be reflected in Bradley’s 
idea: “In morality the past is real because it is present in the will.”355 French explains 
that the PRA model is especially applicable to corporations and that it requires that 
corporations have the structural capacity to innovate. PRA requires that habits that 
produce morally disvalued events be broken and replaced by behaviour (or procedures) 
that do not have such effects.356  The PRA is not concerned with the reason for 
corporate morality or immorality, but with the designation of rational reasons for 
making the morally recommended adjustments.  
a) Critique of the responsive adjustment model  
Myopic view of the decision making process 
 
One of the central points of French’s model is the assumption that corporate mens rea 
can be identified within the decision-making process and does not need to be linked to 
any singular individual. To this stage of the argument, many people would agree with 
this view. When French  goes further and compares the decision-making process with a 
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rational individual mind and concludes for this reason corporations can be fully moral 
persons, he commits two important mistakes. First, he suggests that the decision-
making process, or what he calls CID structure, is linear and pure. This assumption 
ignores the informal structure of the corporation and the complexity and “impurity” of 
decision-making process. As Professor Dan-Cohen puts it: this view exaggerates the 
unity of the corporation.357  There is no unity in the corporation as a whole that could 
render it rational. Indeed, the very concept of rationality is questionable. As a 
consequence of this live and complex structure of the corporation, there is a range of 
factors that crucially influence all forms of judgment in the decision making process.358 
Secondly, French considers the corporation analogous to an individual for the purpose 
of justifying the corporation moral agency. This analogy is not only unnecessary but 
paradoxically individualistic. Taking the individual as the fundamental premise and 
mirror is to automatically reinforce his or her importance for the formulation of a 
theory of corporate liability. 
9.2.3. Corporate Ethos Model 
Pamela Bucy, the main advocate of this theory, explains that the term “corporate ethos” 
is not equivalent to corporate culture or corporate personality.359 Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
357 Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986) at 38. 
358 David Weeks & Sam Whimster, “Contested Decision Making: A Socio-Organizational 
Perspective,” in Wright, George, ed., Behavioural Decision Making (New York: Plenum Press, 1985) 
167 at 174. 
359 Pamela Bucy explains that the terms corporate culture or corporate personality have specialized 
meanings within their originating disciplines of anthropology and psychology, respectively, that may 
prove limiting. (Pamela H. Bucy, “Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Liability” 
(1991) 75 Minnesota Law Review 1095, 1121 at note 98) 
  
 
corporate ethos standard can be placed in the same category as corporate criminal 
liability theories based on the idea of corporate culture. This approach has a charming 
dialectical tone, assuming that each corporate entity has a distinct and identifiable ethos 
that can be translated into intention. The notion of corporate ethos is based on the 
Aristotelian concept of ethos or “characteristic spirit.” It is said to be 
[T]he abstract, and intangible, character of a corporation separate from 
the substance of what it actually does, whether manufacturing, 
retailing, finance or other activity.360  
Under this standard, the government can convict the corporation only if it proves that 
the corporate structure encouraged agents to commit the criminal act and that the 
criminal act was committed by a corporate agent. Bucy clarifies, however, that to apply 
this standard it is not necessary to ascertain the overall and complete ethos of an 
organization,361 but only the ethos that is relevant to the criminal behaviour in question. 
Laufer argues that PCF, RCF, and CE  (Corporate ethos) models “all but abandon the 
requirement for finding a mens rea, or a mental state associated with corporate acts.”362  
Although Laufer’s assumption is true with regard to the PCF and RCF models, it is not 
so credible in relation to the Responsive Adjustment and Corporate Ethos. This might 
be the reason why Laufer does not endeavour to make a case against the viability of 
these later models for finding a mental state for the corporate offence. These same 
critiques cannot be extended to Responsive Adjustment and Corporate Ethos since 
these models advocate that the mental state of a corporate crime is to be found 
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somehow in the corporation itself and must be connected to the offence and not to the 
failure to avoid the offence or the failure to respond to the duties imposed after the 
offence. The notion of corporate identity and corporate internal decision structure 
brought in respectively by Bucy and French offer a salutary basis to argue for the 
concept of corporate mens rea that respects the criminal law premise that the mental 
state of the conduct be concomitant to the act. 
a) Critique of Corporate Ethos 
Single criterion of culpability 
The corporate ethos model embraces the notion of corporate culture and rightly 
associates it with the mental state of the corporation. Bucy tries to clarify what 
corporate culture is and why it can be considered a proper locus for corporate mental 
states, yet, the analysis proposed by Bucy is too general and lacks an important point: 
the differentiation of different degrees of culpability. The fact that the culpable mental 
state can be found within corporate culture and structure does not give any clue about 
the degree of culpability; thus, it is inappropriate to identify and differentiate purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness and negligence. In addition to that, Bucy’s model does not 
indicate how to determine the ethos that is relevant to the criminal act in question. 
   
  
 
 9.2.4. Constructive model of corporate liability 
William Laufer proposes, in a similar vein to the previous suggestions, a constructive 
model of corporate liability.363 This model is also grounded on the foundation that 
corporations are and must be considered as separate entities, with a life and existence 
independent from their members, hence, the reason why it is possible to ascribe 
criminal liability to corporations on a more compelling basis. However, this model 
seems to take a singular pathway, by giving special attention to the relationship 
between the agent who acts, the corporation and the parties to the offences.  In addition, 
it addresses two important points that were neglected by previous models: the 
contemporaneity of the mental state and the act and the criteria of culpability.  
The Constructive Corporate Fault model claims that the attribution of the act element of 
the offence to the corporation does not need to be vicariously linked to the corporation. 
This model abandons the use of the doctrine of respondeat superior employed by the 
other models. In harmony with Laufer, the previous models do not differentiate 
between primary action (corporate action) and secondary action (individual action); 
they connect the secondary action with the primary intent, which is the intent of the 
corporation. In order to determine whether the act is primary or secondary, an objective 
test is proposed. The test to assess the “scale of the action" is called the “reasonableness 
                                                 
363 See Laufer, supra note 17; “Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance” 
(1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1343 ; “Why Personhood doesn’t matter: Corporate Criminal 
Liability and Sanctions” (1991) 18 American Journal of Criminal Law 263; and, 
 “Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability” (2000) 37 American Criminal 
Law Review 1285, 
online:<http://web1.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/895/658/44940293w1/purl=rcl_EAIM_0> 
[“Corporate Intentionality”]. 
  
 
test.”364 Given the size, complexity, formality, functionality, decision making process, 
and structure of the corporate organization, it would be reasonable to conclude that the 
agents’ acts are the actions of the corporation. Laufer explains that both “ownership” 
and “authorship” are critical terms for the proposed models. The former reflects the 
connectedness between an agent’s acts or intents and the organization’s. The latter 
reflects an action or intention that is not attributable to any single agent or group, but 
rather comes from the organization. Such actions and intentions will almost always be 
derivative of individual or group action.365
It is this very relationship that lies at the heart of the reasonableness test. 
The stronger the agent-entity relationship, the more reasonable it is to 
consider an agent’s action to be a construction of the corporation’s.366
According to CCF, corporate action may be found in: 
(1) agents whose actions and intentions are related to each other in such 
a way that they assume the characteristics of the corporate form; (2) 
agents whose status in the organization is such that their actions and 
intention are those of the organization; and (3) aspects of the 
organization, such as policies, goals and practices, that reflect not 
merely the sum total of individual agent’s intentions, but instead 
attributes and conditions of the corporation that make it possible for 
these agents to cooperate and collaborate in legally problematic ways.367
The reasonableness test would avoid the problem of different temporal frameworks 
between the mental element and the act since both elements would have to come from a 
single agent, the corporation. The same standard should be used as a criterion to 
determine the degree of culpability. Laufer argues that previous models do not reflect a 
                                                 
364 Ibid at 687. 
365 Ibid at 682. footnote 132. 
366 Ibid at 687. 
367 Laufer, “Corporate Intentionality,” supra note 17 at 1285. 
  
 
range of mental states of the corporation. In response to this problem, he proposes 
objective criteria for reasonable judgments.368 The constructive culpability model 
would evaluate facts and circumstances with reference to nonsubjective standards and 
subjective evidence. This model allows the evaluation of corporate purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness and negligence. Following the example of the Australian 
Criminal code, Laufer defines different mental states. In line with the constructive 
culpability standard, the corporation will act purposively, “if its object or goal is to 
engage in conduct or cause a result and, if the offence involves attendant 
circumstances, there is an awareness of such circumstances, or a belief that they 
exist.”369 The corporation will act knowingly if “there is an awareness that conduct 
exists of a certain nature, or there is an awareness that it is practically certain that its 
conduct will cause a result.”370The corporation will act recklessly if “there is a knowing 
disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a material element of the offence 
exists or will result.”371 Finally, the corporation will act negligently if “it should be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element of the offence 
exists or will result.”372
                                                 
368 Laufer, “Corporate Bodies,” supra note 5 at 698. Laufer carefully differentiates purely objective 
standards of culpability from reasonableness judgments as objective criteria. He explains that “purely 
objective standards are difficult to justify and have been ignored in relation to corporate culpability for 
at least two reasons. First, criminal law would be weakened by moving away from requiring proof of a 
culpable state of mind, it would strip the law from its moral meaning and render it indistinguishable 
from civil law. Second, anything short of requiring proof of a subjective mental state must result in 
strict liability.  
369 Ibid at 725. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Ibid. 
  
 
Moreover, Laufer attempts to put forward some evidentiary guidance by listing 
examples of evidence required for each degree of corporate mental state. Some 
examples of evidence of purpose would range from desire to commit an illegality to 
endorsement of a violation; signs of corporate knowledge could be noticed in the 
existence of a tolerated, permitted or consented illegality; corporate recklessness would 
be evident in some deliberate inattention to risks of harm; in its turn, negligence could 
be traced to inadequate management control, the failure to make reasonable efforts to 
take reasonable precautions and the unreasonableness of corporate practices and 
procedures. 
a) Critique of the constructive corporate liability model 
William Laufer’s proposal, without a doubt, is a signal improvement in the whole set of 
the holistic models. It fills some lacunae left by other approaches and raises 
fundamental issues, such as the need for a spectrum of mental states for the assessment 
of culpability and the possibility of incorporating some objective criteria in order to 
determine such mental states.373 Still, this model also has its flaws. The central problem 
of the Constructive Corporate Liability model lies in the use of what is called the 
“reasonableness test.’ This test is suggested in order to identify which action is to be 
attributed to the corporation. The parameter that is taken into account by this test is the 
relationship between the agent and the entity. This relationship “lies at the very heart of 
                                                 
373 These two developments integrated the proposal of  a more sound model of corporate criminal 
liability that is going to be developed in the next chapter.  
  
 
the reasonableness test.”374 In harmony with this test, “the stronger the agent-entity 
relationship, the more reasonable is to consider an agent’s action to be a construction of 
the corporation’s.”375 It is assumed that when this relationship increases the actions 
become more impersonal and can safely be attributed to the corporation. On the other 
hand, when this relationship is remote, the actions become less impersonal and could 
not be considered as corporate actions. 
The reasonableness test seems to be an adaptation of the same test to assess the guilty 
mind in identification theory, yet it replaces the mental element by an objective 
element. By channeling the number of actions that can be attributed to corporations, it 
is clear that the constructive liability model will incur the same problem as the 
identification theory: an act will rarely be found to be attributed to the corporation. In 
addition, if the only paradigm for the attribution of responsibility to the corporation is 
the relationship between the corporation and the employee, the mere degree of the 
relationship will suffice to ascribe responsibility to the corporation, even if the 
individual had acted with no influence or contrary to the culture of the corporation.  
9.2.5. Opting for holistic models of corporate criminal liability 
The holistic approach to corporate criminal liability cannot be seem as an isolated 
legal trend, but on the contrary, as part of a general panorama that includes models 
and theories of other fields like economics, organizational theories e moral 
philosophy that challenge the individualistic view of corporations. This whole 
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panorama gives more substance to the defence of a model of attributing criminal 
liability that denies the need of linking the corporate entity to an individual.  This 
theoretical background that the holistic approach has is what differentiate it from 
prior models of corporate criminal liability. However, the more solid theoretical basis 
of the holistic approach are not the only positive point, they also can be more 
effective since they do not allow corporations to escape liability by hiding in its 
structure and bureaucracy an individual guilty mind. 
The holistic theories are the foundation of what is needed to justify the attribution of 
criminal liability to corporations without using artificial and individual devices. Yet, 
these theories also have problems. They have gradually developed the idea that 
corporations can be held liable for their conduct and based on their on mental state. The 
first proposal to transcend the individual barrier was to limit corporate criminal liability 
based on corporate mental state for crimes that do not require proof of mental state. 
This is the reactive corporate fault model. This model has the value of being the first 
concrete alternative proposed against the individualistic-based theories. This idea was 
refined in the principle of responsive adjustment model, where it is defended that 
corporations can be held liable for crimes that require proof of intent and that the 
corporate mental state can be found in the corporate internal decision structure. This 
model amplifies the roll of crimes for which corporations can be criminally responsible, 
yet, it is based on the idea of corporations as rational entities, and this rational element 
is what makes this model theoretically unsound. Corporate ethos and the constructive 
model of corporate criminal liability are also built on the idea that corporations can 
  
 
have a mental state that does not need to be found in its individual members. The 
Corporate ethos better expresses de idea of corporate culture and its values. The 
Constructive model of corporate criminal liability approach the problem of corporate 
criminal liability and corporate mens rea from a practical perspective. It is based on the 
assumptions of corporate mens rea and corporate culture that were defended in the 
other holistic models, but it goes further buy offering practical insights into the problem 
of degrees of culpability. This is why the holistic approaches cannot be seem separately 
but rather as a gradual evolution of the concept of corporate criminal liability. The 
constructive model of corporate criminal liability does not focus on the debate whether 
the mental state of corporations are to be found in the corporations or in their members, 
it does start from the assumption that corporations can have a corporate mens rea and 
applies this notion into practice, it gives effectiveness to the concept of corporate mens 
rea. The constructive model of corporate criminal liability gives important guidance as 
how to assess different degrees of corporate criminal liability. This is an important 
advance in the theory of corporate criminal liability. 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTRIBUTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO 
CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL 
 
The common law experience with corporate criminal liability can and should 
influence the introduction of the concept of corporate criminal liability in the 
Brazilian legal system. European civil law countries like Denmark and France have 
adopted the common law model of identification doctrine as a ground theory for the 
ascription of criminal liability to corporations. Nonetheless, it is important to look at 
the whole picture of corporate criminal liability.  There has to be an analytical view 
of the common law experience and not merely an adaptation of the traditional 
theories. The success of the introduction of a completely new concept in the Brazilian 
legal scenario is conditioned to the existence of a solid theoretical background. It is in 
the hands of Brazilian legal scholars to develop theoretical constructions that will 
support the attribution of criminal liability to corporations and trigger structural and 
legislative changes in the legal system.  
1- The importance of common law experience for the Brazilian legal system 
The contemporary concept of corporate criminal liability was created and developed 
by common law courts and this issue has also been the object of study of many 
common law scholars. Thus, the common law experience with corporate criminal 
liability can serve as a pragmatic and theoretical source for the work of Brazilian 
  
 
scholars and legislators. Indeed, common law theories of corporate criminal liability 
have already been adopted in France, Denmark and other civil law jurisdictions.  
 
 
2- The need for a critical approach to the common law experience with corporate 
criminal liability. 
It does not seem that the Brazilian legal system will accept corporate criminal liability 
in the near future. Discussions about this theme are in its infancy in Brazil, but a 
change is inevitable. The increasing control over corporations in developed countries 
has made corporations changed their targets and this has transformed undeveloped 
and corrupt countries like Brazil in a free territory for this type of criminals. But, a 
contra sense of that is that corporate criminality is becoming a concrete reality in 
Brazil and the Brazilian law will have to react to that. Because of the European 
influence, and in this case especially because of the French influence, it seems that 
Brazil will likely follow the French example by adopting the identification theory. 
This would be quite problematic. The traditional theories of corporate criminal 
liability have shown to be ineffective. The prevailing theory, the identification 
doctrine, is problematic and rooted in individualistic ideas. It has a simple palliative 
effect at most. The search for the guilty mind is in the majority of the situations 
unfruitful and in the end no liability is attributed to the corporation. In addition to 
that, the identification theory does not incorporate a holistic view of the corporate 
entity, which better explains the reality of corporations and corporate misconduct. It 
  
 
is important that the Brazilian legislator be aware of the limitations of the traditional 
law theories and be acquainted with what has been proposed as a solution and 
alternative to these limitations in order to avoid taking a problematic and flawed 
position. 
3- The role of doctrine (legal scholars) in the introduction and development of the 
concept of corporate criminal liability in Brazil. 
Corporate criminal liability will only be effective in Brazil when incorporated in the 
Statutes, especially the Brazilian Constitution and the Criminal Code. But, no 
legislative change will occur without an exhaustive doctrinaire debate. Relevant 
statutory amendments are the concretization of what had been already analysed and 
constructed by legal scholars. In Brazil the growth of the concept of corporate 
criminal liability is conditioned to the maturation of the idea in doctrinal debates. 
Brazilian scholars must trigger these changes by developing theories and models and 
more importantly, by bringing into discussion all aspects related to corporate criminal 
liability; this implies debates that range from conceptual to practical concerns. It is 
important that legal scholars address basic questions such as the concept of corporate 
crime and the need to use criminal law to control corporate crime. Parallel to that, 
there has to be a structural change in the legal system to receive the concept of 
corporate criminal liability.  Legal scholars can contribute to that by remodelling the 
traditional theory of crime and introducing new aspects of the corporation as a real 
and complex person able to have mens rea, to be a moral agent and consequently to 
be criminally liable for its acts.  
  
 
a) Definition of corporate crime 
The expression corporate crime is not common in Brazil. It is important that more 
scholars use this expression and that it be differentiated from “white collar crimes” 
that are not only related to the individual action but also have a purely economic 
connotation, and exclude other violent crimes.  
b) Redefining the role of criminal law in the Brazilian legal system 
 Once the concept of corporate crime is introduced in the legal system, the viability of 
using criminal law to control corporate crime will be questioned. It is important that 
this issue be integrated in the current discussions about the general role of criminal 
law.  
c) Extending the concept of persons in the Brazilian legal system 
The concept of persons should be modified in order to include a broader definition of 
legal person so as to understand corporations as real and complex entities. Thinking 
about corporate criminal liability in Brazil has been afflicted by an oversimplified 
view of corporations. Currently, the fiction theory prevails in both the civil and 
criminal law fields. The fiction theory denies the possibility of attributing corporate 
criminal liability to corporations. In addition to that, it would be essential to import 
the idea that organizations are complex organism not identifiable with an individual 
member.  
Organizational theories, especially the idea of corporations as a metaphor would 
serve as theoretical basis for this broader definition. Organizational studies have 
  
 
shown that corporations are not merely an aggregation of individuals as portrayed by 
current theories of corporate criminal liability. A new corporate image must be 
incorporated into criminal law. This can only be achieved if legal scholars cross the 
border between law and organizational studies and face the reality of corporations 
more closely, however complex and disturbing that may be, or sometimes at odds 
with their personal preconceptions and biases.  
d) Adaptation of criminal law theory  
There is no need to change the prevailing definitions of act or mental element, since 
they can be applied to corporations. But they need to be interpreted extensively as to 
include the corporation’s peculiar way of acting and of having mens rea. For the 
allocation of the mental state, it is vital that the concept of corporate culture also be 
introduced in the criminal law theory as a different place to find intention. Another 
aspect of criminal liability that has to be reshaped is the issue of moral agency. A 
more comprehensive theory of crime has to embrace the notion that corporations are 
also moral agents.  
e) Laufer’s approach as the basis for a Brazilian theory of corporate criminal 
liability 
A new paradigm of the corporation’s nature, moral agency, and mens rea allows legal 
systems to accept corporate criminal liability. No model of corporate criminal 
liability will be efficient if it is not based on a portrayal of corporations as an open 
system or organism, with a distinctive type of moral responsibility and with a culture 
  
 
in which to allocate the mental element of the offence. The holistic approach can be a 
more efficient way to attribute corporate criminal liability to corporations. It is 
theoretically better structured than the other proposals; it does not use artificial 
expedients to attribute liability what facilitates the allocation of the mental state. 
Among all the holistic approaches analyzed here, Laufer’s proposal seems to be the 
best source for a Brazilian model of corporate criminal liability. The responsive 
adjustment model is an expansion of the other models but more theoretically founded. 
It is this theoretical background that allows Laufer to propose objective criteria to 
assess different degrees of mental state, what configures a real practical improvement 
on the precedent models.   
It is therefore appropriate for Brazilian scholars to base their proposals in the holistic 
approaches, especially in the responsive adjustment as opposed to the identification 
theory. Although the identification theory is by far the most popular model of 
attributing corporate criminal liability, it is not in harmony with studies on large 
organizations like corporations. The identification theory is an artificial device 
created to allow the use of criminal law against corporations, but it is superficial, it 
neglects important features of corporations. This other corporate features like their 
nature, their structures, their decision-making process and their culture, have a strong 
impact on theories about corporate criminal liability. The responsive adjustment 
model, as a holistic model, takes into account these elements of the corporation and it 
is this whole view of the corporations that makes it more concrete.  
  
 
The inclusion of a new paradigm in the Brazilian legal systems is more complex than 
the mere legislative change. The frustrated constitutional attempt to accept the 
attribution of criminal liability to corporations has been evidence that an statute to be 
applied and to be effective must be in accord with the legal system.  Corporate 
criminal liability has to be part of the Brazilian legal scenario before it becomes a true 
legal concept.  For the seeds of corporate criminal liability to grow in Brazil, they 
must come in the form of legal doctrine, legal research. For this reason theory has an 
essential role. Since corporate criminal liability has been already applied and studied 
in other legal systems, the task of built a theoretical background for the institution of 
corporate criminal liability becomes more concrete. The Brazilian legal scholars do 
not need to speculate about the effectiveness of certain models, foreign experience 
have already shown their problems.   It would be unproductive to propose a model 
that has revealed to be not workable. Brazilian scholars should include in their 
analyses a holistic perspective of corporations. Basic concepts still need to be mature 
in the Brazilian legal system before the holistic models can be accepted.  
Corporations are only a shadow for Brazilian scholars, it is important that they 
acquire a more realistic face; the more it is know about corporations, the more sound 
a model of attributing criminal liability will be.  In this case, theory serves not as a 
justification but also has the advantage of anticipating practical problems and to offer 
solutions that are based on preceding problems.  
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